LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports. Covers coupon-race-stacking (Instacart, Stripe, Reverb), negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering (Upserve, Eternal/Zomato), decimal/fraction price-field overflow (Shipt), client-side chec

Hunting skill for cache poison vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including X-Forwarded-Host poisoning, X-HTTP-Method-Override / GCS cache, reflected→stored XSS via cache, classic Omer-Gil Web Cache Deception, Cloudflare Cache Deception Armor bypass, session

Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved o

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terra

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pag

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessib

Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDE

Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000)

Hunt Insecure Deserialization — Java gadget chains (ysoserial), PHP object injection (phpggc), Python pickle RCE, .NET BinaryFormatter, Ruby Marshal.load, JNDI/Log4Shell. RCE via deserialization is almost always Critical. Use when target runs Java, PHP serialization, Python pickl

Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and pri

Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char v

Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, li

Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php0.jpg), cas

Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization

Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) pass

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypa

Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, an

Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting vi

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by send

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

`crabbox inspect` prints the full record for a single lease: state, provider,

Run named, repo-local jobs defined in your Crabbox config.

`crabbox list` shows the current Crabbox machines (leases) for a provider. It is

`crabbox login` authenticates the CLI against a coordinator, stores the

`crabbox logout` clears the stored broker token from your user config so the CLI

`crabbox logs` prints the retained command output for a recorded run.

`crabbox marketplace` previews the Crabbox credits gateway: one Crabbox billing

`crabbox media` turns a recorded desktop video into lightweight review

`crabbox open` prepares an existing SSH-capable lease for an external editor.

`crabbox pause` pauses a single lease, freeing the remote compute while

`crabbox pond` is the cross-provider peer-discovery and lifecycle surface for a

`crabbox pool` contains machine-pool helpers. `pool list` keeps the older

`crabbox ports` bridges provider-native port publishing for an existing Crabbox

`crabbox prewarm` leases a reusable box and prepares it for test runs. For

`crabbox providers` prints the provider capability matrix that the CLI compiles

`crabbox receipt <run-id>` retrieves a brokered run's committed terminal

`crabbox results` prints the structured test summary attached to a recorded

`crabbox resume` resumes a lease previously paused with [`pause`](pause.md),

`crabbox run` syncs the current dirty checkout to a box, runs a command there,

`crabbox screenshot` captures a single PNG from a desktop lease without opening a

Claude Code skills for Chinese-narration recaps from supported video files, with optional editable JianYing/CapCut draft export. | 用 Claude Code skills 为支持的视频文件…

Drive the Unity Editor from an AI agent or the terminal. The Editor serves MCP itself over HTTP, so there is no second process to run, and the isuzu-unity-cli c…

面向企业的数字员工构建与运行平台：把专业员工的经验、流程与判断标准，固化为可随时上岗、可配置、可审批、可观测的 AI 数字员工。

A local-first, Pi-powered AI agent workspace for Desktop, WebUI, and CLI

660+ muapi-hosted generative-media models plus community-submitted third-party API tools (SEO, enrichment, social, scraping) — one YAML file per entry, browsabl…

A compounding agent OS for recursive agents. Also an open source alternative to Grok Bot and Meta's Muse.

Independent desktop client for OpenCode 2. Manage projects, sessions, parallel agents, requests, and changes on Linux and macOS.

Production agent skills for Claude Code, Cursor, and any SKILL.md harness — Codex fleets, video pipeline, monorepo review bundles, multi-chain explorer.

See and manage what your coding assistants load — skills, commands, subagents, plugins and MCP servers, with real usage.

An Enterprise-Grade Full-Stack RBAC Permission Management System Built with Go + React

Create AI Agents in a No-Code Visual Builder or TypeScript SDK with full 2-way sync. For shipping AI assistants and multi-agent AI workflows.

基于 DeepSeek Harness（DSH）的稳定桌面端，集成Git、内置浏览器与记忆功能 | DeepSeek Harness desktop GUI with local workspaces, Git, browser and memory.

⚡ Control Apache Airflow with natural language via MCP. Chat with your workflows using Claude, GPT, or any LLM — no REST API calls needed. Supports Airflow 2.x…

Open-source CLI, schemas, resolver, and DSH agent tools for DSH Plugin Hub

Pi Coding Agent 中文学习蓝皮书：从安装与第一个可验收任务开始，逐步掌握 Session、Context、Skill、Extension、Subagent 与长期 Agent 工作流。

Self-hosted framework for orchestrating fleets of specialist AI agents — ensemble reasoning and a full agentic coding pipeline, model-agnostic and local-friendl…

Self-hosted, vendor-neutral control plane for your local coding agents (Claude Code & Codex). Run your agents, on any plane.

A practical AI agents handbook covering agent systems, agentic workflows, LangGraph, MCP/A2A, context engineering, agent memory, evaluation, observability, and…

Vibe Coding 从入门到精通教程｜AI 结对编程工作流｜Prompt、Skill、Workflow、上下文管理、codex实战指南

Static security scanner for LLM agents — prompt injection, MCP config auditing, taint analysis. 51 rules mapped to OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026). Works with LangC…