hunt-exceptional-conditions
Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, li
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/main/skills/hunt-exceptional-conditions
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install elementalsouls-claude-bughunter@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole elementalsouls/claude-bughunter collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
HUNT-EXCEPTIONAL-CONDITIONS — Verbose Errors / Fail-Open (A10:2025)
What actually pays
Well-built apps catch errors and return a clean, generic message. A broken app, when handed input it didn't expect, throws an unhandled exception and renders a developer error page straight to the client — leaking the stack trace, the ORM/query internals, server-side file paths, and framework/library versions. That disclosure is the finding (and it arms SQLi/RCE/path attacks next).
Recon
Any endpoint that parses input is a candidate; the richest are:
JSON APIs that expect typed fields: POST /api/* with {numbers, ids, enums}
Endpoints with numeric/id path or query params: /item/{id}, ?page=, ?quantity=
Search / filter / sort params
File or content-type sensitive uploads
Attack — send what the code didn't anticipate
Take a known-good request and break ONE assumption at a time:
- Wrong type: a field the app expects to be a number/string is sent as an
array or object —
{"rating":"x","comment":[1,2,3]},{"quantity":{}}. - Malformed body: truncated/!invalid JSON, an unterminated string, a stray brace, a wrong/missing Content-Type.
- Boundary/oversized: a very long string, a huge/negative/overflow number.
- Null byte / control chars embedded in a value.
POST /api/Feedbacks {"rating":"notanumber","comment":[1,2,3]}
GET /item/' OR /item/%00 (also exercises the error path)
Watch the RESPONSE BODY, not just the status: a 500 (or even a 200/400) whose body contains a stack trace or framework error page is the signal.
What counts as a leak (the success signal)
A finding is confirmed when the response body contains a cross-framework error-disclosure signature:
- Node/Express + Sequelize:
SequelizeDatabaseError,node_modules/sequelize, a JS stack with internal paths. - PHP:
<b>Warning</b> ... /var/www/.../file.php on line N. - Python:
Traceback (most recent call last),werkzeug.exceptions. - Java:
at com.app.Foo(Foo.java:42)stack frames. - .NET:
Server Error in '/' Application, a[System.XxxException: ...]YSOD.
A clean JSON error ({"error":"Invalid input"}) with no internals is NOT a
finding — that's correct handling. Disclosure of internal structure is.
Validation discipline
- Capture the exact leaked artifact (path, ORM class, version, stack frame) — that's the evidence. "It returned 500" alone is not disclosure.
- Note what the leak enables next (e.g. a disclosed SQL error → hunt-sqli; a disclosed absolute path → hunt-lfi).
Files (claude-bughunter)
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SKILL.md 3.1 KB
--- name: hunt-exceptional-conditions description: "Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, library versions, or a language traceback. Use on any input-accepting endpoint (JSON APIs, forms, query params). Medium-High when the leak exposes internal structure that arms a deeper attack." report_count: 0 sources: hackerone_public --- # HUNT-EXCEPTIONAL-CONDITIONS — Verbose Errors / Fail-Open (A10:2025) ## What actually pays Well-built apps catch errors and return a clean, generic message. A broken app, when handed input it didn't expect, throws an unhandled exception and renders a **developer error page** straight to the client — leaking the stack trace, the ORM/query internals, server-side file paths, and framework/library versions. That disclosure is the finding (and it arms SQLi/RCE/path attacks next). ## Recon Any endpoint that parses input is a candidate; the richest are: ``` JSON APIs that expect typed fields: POST /api/* with {numbers, ids, enums} Endpoints with numeric/id path or query params: /item/{id}, ?page=, ?quantity= Search / filter / sort params File or content-type sensitive uploads ``` ## Attack — send what the code didn't anticipate Take a known-good request and break ONE assumption at a time: - **Wrong type:** a field the app expects to be a number/string is sent as an array or object — `{"rating":"x","comment":[1,2,3]}`, `{"quantity":{}}`. - **Malformed body:** truncated/!invalid JSON, an unterminated string, a stray brace, a wrong/missing Content-Type. - **Boundary/oversized:** a very long string, a huge/negative/overflow number. - **Null byte / control chars** embedded in a value. ``` POST /api/Feedbacks {"rating":"notanumber","comment":[1,2,3]} GET /item/' OR /item/%00 (also exercises the error path) ``` Watch the RESPONSE BODY, not just the status: a 500 (or even a 200/400) whose body contains a stack trace or framework error page is the signal. ## What counts as a leak (the success signal) A finding is confirmed when the response body contains a cross-framework error-disclosure signature: - **Node/Express + Sequelize:** `SequelizeDatabaseError`, `node_modules/sequelize`, a JS stack with internal paths. - **PHP:** `<b>Warning</b> ... /var/www/.../file.php on line N`. - **Python:** `Traceback (most recent call last)`, `werkzeug.exceptions`. - **Java:** `at com.app.Foo(Foo.java:42)` stack frames. - **.NET:** `Server Error in '/' Application`, a `[System.XxxException: ...]` YSOD. A clean JSON error (`{"error":"Invalid input"}`) with no internals is NOT a finding — that's correct handling. Disclosure of internal structure is. ## Validation discipline - Capture the exact leaked artifact (path, ORM class, version, stack frame) — that's the evidence. "It returned 500" alone is not disclosure. - Note what the leak enables next (e.g. a disclosed SQL error → hunt-sqli; a disclosed absolute path → hunt-lfi).
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