LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for idor vulnerabilities. Built from 26 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting idor on any target.

Hunt JWT cryptographic failures — alg:none signature-stripping and RS256→HS256 key-confusion that let an attacker forge a token for any identity (e.g. an admin) without knowing a secret. Use when the app authenticates with a JSON Web Token (an `eyJ...` Bearer token in the Authori

Hunt Kubernetes & Docker — API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-20

Hunt Laravel specific vulnerabilities — Debug mode leakage (APP_DEBUG=true exposes full stack trace + env vars), Laravel Telescope/Horizon dashboard unauthorized access, Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129), Signed URL manipulation, Queue Worker abuse, mass assignment via Eloquent, deser

Hunt LDAP Injection and XPath Injection — authentication bypass, blind char-by-char attribute exfiltration, AD user/group enumeration, XML-store XPath bypass. Covers the LDAP special-character set (* ( ) \ NUL /), search-filter-context vs DN-injection, parenthesis-balancing, AND/

Hunt Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), and Path Traversal — /etc/passwd read, log poisoning → RCE, PHP filter-chain RCE (no upload needed), php:// / data:// / zip:// / phar:// wrappers, RFI via allow_url_include, directory traversal read/write/delete. Cover

Hunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration via tool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous instructions'), indirect injection via documents/web page

Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6

Hunting skill for misc vulnerabilities. Built from 225 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting misc on any target.

Hunt Next.js specific vulnerabilities — Server Actions arbitrary function execution, Middleware auth bypass via static asset paths, ISR cache poisoning, Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image), RSC payload leakage, getServerSideProps injection, source map exposure, debug endpoint

Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash/merge/assign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process/eval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS/Pug/Handlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable

Hunt NoSQL Injection — MongoDB operator injection ($where, $regex, $gt, $ne), CouchDB, Redis command injection, auth bypass via NoSQLi, data dump. Use when target uses MongoDB/Mongoose, CouchDB, Redis, or shows NoSQL error messages.

Hunt NTLM/Negotiate information disclosure on internet-reachable IIS/SharePoint/Exchange. Anonymous NTLM Type-2 challenge capture leaks NetBIOS domain, internal DNS forest, computer name, AD timestamp via AV_PAIRS structure. Default Windows-installer hostnames (WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX pa

Hunting skill for oauth vulnerabilities. Built from 19 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting oauth on any target.

Hunt Open Redirect — all types including low-impact, chained to OAuth token theft → ATO, phishing chains. URL parameter manipulation, JavaScript redirect, meta refresh, header injection. Use when hunting redirect bugs or building ATO chains.

Hunting skill for race condition vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern HTTP/2 single-packet attack cases (James Kettle DEF CON 2023 "Smashing the State Machine"; RyotaK / Flatt Security 10,000-request first-sequence-sync expansion 2024). Covers

Hunt vector-store / embedding-layer weaknesses in RAG pipelines (OWASP LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses) — persistent corpus poisoning that survives across sessions and users (distinct from one-shot indirect prompt injection, which is owned by hunt-llm-ai), cross-tenant vect

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting rce on any target.

Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove S

Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities — session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps,

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

Move cold material out of the wiki

Ask a question answered only from the vault

Audit what an agent did

Bulk import an archive in batches

Find the pages holding the graph together

What I have revised

Build or update your CLAUDE.md

Show what the vault is actually about

Commit the current state with a useful message

List open commitments

Compare two things from your own sources

Find the path between two ideas

List unresolved contradictions

Argue against me

List decisions made

Find near-duplicate pages

Check the setup is working

Draft from the vault

Preview a run without writing

Explain it back and find the gaps

Ultra-lightweight, open-source, self-hosted personal AI agent framework in Python with WebUI, tools, memory, MCP, multi-agent workflows, automation, and chat ap…

Governance framework for AI coding agents. It runs them through a five-step workflow (plan, build, review, test, ship) where no step counts as done without evid…

Ultimate Multi-Agent OS for Autonomous AI NPCs 2026

Personal AI Agent Hub 2026 — Build Your 24/7 Autonomous Assistant

Proven 2026 Multi-Agent AI Review System – Verdict-Driven Quality Control

Slash API Batch: Cut AI Costs by 50% in 2026

Web dashboard for Hermes Agent — multi-platform AI chat, session management, scheduled jobs, usage analytics

Agent Skills for Solopreneurs

AirLLM dramatically reduces inference memory usage, letting 70B large language models run on a single 4GB GPU card

Zero, your trustworthy AI teammate for real work.

一套 DSH runtime，Desktop、Web 与 TUI 三种开发体验。

Open-source operational advisor for ClickHouse — real-time monitoring plus AI-driven index/partition/materialized-view recommendations.

⚙️ TypeScript Style Guide and Agent Skill. A concise set of conventions and best practices for consistent, maintainable code.

Framework for AI agents to build and maintain a digital brain through Obsidian wiki

Apache Maka (Incubating) is a local-first AI agent workspace. Model messages, tool calls, tool results, permission decisions, and termination events are recorde…

Neo.mjs is a self-evolving software organism: a professional end-to-end AI engineering team whose cross-model swarm inhabits live apps via Neural Link, Active H…

Agentic development harness for Claude Code — SPEC-driven plan/run/sync, TRUST 5 quality gates, model+effort routing, and Claude×GLM multi-LLM cost control. Sin…

NocoBase is an open-source AI + no-code platform for building business systems fast. Instead of generating everything from scratch, AI works on top of productio…

An open-source AI coding agent that lives in your terminal.

PawWork — free, open-source desktop AI agent for macOS and Windows. Alternative to Codex App and Claude Cowork. BYOK with 75+ providers, ChatGPT OAuth, local mo…