LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports. Covers coupon-race-stacking (Instacart, Stripe, Reverb), negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering (Upserve, Eternal/Zomato), decimal/fraction price-field overflow (Shipt), client-side chec

Hunting skill for cache poison vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including X-Forwarded-Host poisoning, X-HTTP-Method-Override / GCS cache, reflected→stored XSS via cache, classic Omer-Gil Web Cache Deception, Cloudflare Cache Deception Armor bypass, session

Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved o

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terra

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pag

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessib

Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDE

Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000)

Hunt Insecure Deserialization — Java gadget chains (ysoserial), PHP object injection (phpggc), Python pickle RCE, .NET BinaryFormatter, Ruby Marshal.load, JNDI/Log4Shell. RCE via deserialization is almost always Critical. Use when target runs Java, PHP serialization, Python pickl

Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and pri

Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char v

Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, li

Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php0.jpg), cas

Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization

Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) pass

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypa

Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, an

Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting vi

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by send

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

Use the bundled `skillopt-sleep` skill to run or manage SkillOpt-Sleep for the

Git + worktree orchestrator entry point. /git-ops --landall surveys every branch/worktree and batch-lands the ones that are done; bare /git-ops runs a status survey. Thin router over the git-ops skill.

Save session state - persist tasks (via TaskList), plan content, and git context. Complementary to /sync.

Session bootstrap - read project context, restore saved state, show status. Quick orientation with optional deep dive.

Query AI Gateway models (list, filter by provider/tag, get details)

Search for icons by name, or identify a PUA character

Install a pinned skill extension on demand (/add-skill <id>), or list core packs and extensions

Implement an approved plan or issue in its own worktree, run the gate, open the pull request.

Close a finished session: sweep for unfinished work, ask once, land, file the follow-ups, hand off, tell the sessions that depend on this one, then archive.

Write the repository handoff file for the next session, and record any durable learning.

Merge an approved pull request, clean up its worktree and branch, then check whether a release is due.

Turn a topic or issue into a plan the reviewer approves in the native plan pane.

Answer a research question with parallel read-only gatherers and one synthesized digest.

Review the branch's diff in two fresh contexts — scope against the spec, then quality — and report findings only.

An open-source, privacy-first, self-hosted knowledge workspace where humans and AI agents work together 开源、隐私优先、自托管的知识工作空间，让人与智能体在此协作

Scale computer-use 2.0 with open-source drivers, cross-OS fleets, and benchmarks for training, evaluation, and data generation.

The go-to web for your AI coding agent — local-first search, fetch, crawl & research over MCP. No API keys, no cloud, $0/query. Public beta.

Transform and optimize your markdown documentation for Large Language Models (LLMs) and RAG systems. Generate llms.txt automatically.

合乎周礼：DeepSeek-powered Zhouli-style Chinese translator, web app, and distributable Skill package.

This is a fork of the https://dockbox.dev project I made

🏆 Curated, ranked list of AI agent harnesses (100+) — plus an MCP server, llms.txt & JSON so agents can recommend them too. Rescored weekly.

A Python framework for modular, self-contained skill management for machines.

ADHD — a skill for coding agents. Tree-of-thought with pruning, built on the Claude & Codex Agent SDK. Fans out parallel divergent thoughts under different cogn…

AI Agent 驱动的开源可自部署视频工作台：将小说与剧本转为角色、场景、道具资产、分镜、视频和剪映草稿，支持跨镜头一致性、多供应商与费用追踪 | Self-hosted AI video workspace for stories, storyboards and short-form video producti…

DeepSeek Harness Desktop App: a local AI desktop workspace for DSH Sessions, projects, files, web research, plugins, and Office artifacts.

Autonomous Offensive Security, Bug Bounty & Red Teaming Agent Framework powered by Hermes Agent, specialized reasoning skills, and multi-model LLM orchestration…

⌥ Coding agent with the IDE wired in

Supercharge AI Agents, Safely

X (Twitter) Scraper API and X API Alternative. You do not need an official X developer account. You do not need to connect or use an X account for supported scr…

My AI Stand. Realtime by day, rewriting itself by night. Summon my AI superpower.

Open-source coding agent for your terminal, built in Rust and on a journey of continuous community improvement. Issues and PRs welcome.

观澜 / Guanlan：AI Agent 的中文互联网研究、阅读与信源路由工具。

Mac Agent for macOS 26: the agentic AI harness for your Mac Desktop. Computer use, automation, scripting, coding, and more. Powered by 18+ providers across loca…

Semantic version control => entity-level diffs, blame, and impact analysis on top of git. 28 languages via tree-sitter. Built for coding agents.