LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports. Covers coupon-race-stacking (Instacart, Stripe, Reverb), negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering (Upserve, Eternal/Zomato), decimal/fraction price-field overflow (Shipt), client-side chec

Hunting skill for cache poison vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including X-Forwarded-Host poisoning, X-HTTP-Method-Override / GCS cache, reflected→stored XSS via cache, classic Omer-Gil Web Cache Deception, Cloudflare Cache Deception Armor bypass, session

Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved o

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terra

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pag

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessib

Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDE

Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000)

Hunt Insecure Deserialization — Java gadget chains (ysoserial), PHP object injection (phpggc), Python pickle RCE, .NET BinaryFormatter, Ruby Marshal.load, JNDI/Log4Shell. RCE via deserialization is almost always Critical. Use when target runs Java, PHP serialization, Python pickl

Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and pri

Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char v

Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, li

Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php0.jpg), cas

Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization

Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) pass

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypa

Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, an

Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting vi

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by send

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

Assemble the governance record for a range — commits, overrides, ADRs, sprint auto-decisions, open questions, checkpoint findings — into one dated audit packet. Read-only.

Lightweight Q&A about the project — answer from context and return, no routing, no state change.

Periodic multi-reviewer sweep of the whole codebase — surfaces a triaged checkpoint report.

Sanctioned lane for non-behavioral work — docs-only edits, dependency bumps, reverts. Type-scaled gates; no TDD demanded of prose.

Clean up an already-merged local branch after proving containment. Confirm each discard and preserve unique work.

Show the codeArbiter command catalog — the public command list and what each routes to.

Create a verified local Git commit when committing changes is requested. Not for explaining commit history, drafting a message only, or postponing a commit. Applies every commit gate and never implies a push or PR.

Stop everything and surface a rule conflict — persona vs. docs vs. code. Present both sides and the conflict-hierarchy level; the user resolves. No silent reconciliation.

Audit stale provenance-tracked docs on request. Report first; re-scout or re-baseline only for selected docs.

Build project context from an existing codebase through isolated scouts, resolve gaps, and preserve initialization gates.

Investigate an unexplained defect or unexpected behavior without changing application code. Use for root-cause diagnosis and an evidence-backed handoff. A no-action close records a board note. Not for implementing a known fix, new features, or explanation-only questions.

Develop greenfield project context through a layered interview, preserve decisions, and initialize only after the required gates.

Verify the active host install, package, command ownership, enforcement, and harmless live-fire probe. Read-only.

Start a feature: brainstorm a spec, get it approved, then drive it test-first through the pipeline. The one entry to implementation.

Fix a confirmed bug: a failing regression test first, then a minimal fix, then the rest of the tdd gates.

Opt this repo into codeArbiter — scaffold the root-level .codearbiter/ state store.

Read-only 3-metric governance glance — override rate, small-lane rate, sprint low-confidence ratio — each with a trend arrow vs. the prior 20-commit window.

Sanctioned, logged bypass of a gate or hard rule — one audit line, then proceed.

Open a PR or finish branch disposition; route CI watching and post-merge cleanup to their owners. Merge and discard need explicit authority.

Zero-onboarding, read-only dry-run of the reviewer fleet against the current uncommitted diff. Predicts reviewers, runs the state-free secret scan, writes nothing.

AI assistant in Telegram that remembers everything and helps you run your life. Self-hosted in one command.

知更 — 本地 AI 的上下文与记忆层。Mac 上用语音输入、情境代回并调度 Codex / Claude Code；iOS 正在成为随身记忆终端和本地 Agent 遥控器。Local-first · BYOK.

Agent skill that turns Claude Code / Codex into a motion-design studio for voiceover-driven explainer videos — word-level voiceover sync, 78 motion recipe cards…

CoCo Super Intelligence is the orchestration layer that turns Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex into an engineering department: a routed advisory board, 185 skills,…

Deploy AI agent teams at scale without compromise

大师.skill — 输入行业，自动调研 6 轨[行业大佬 / 工具地图 / 工作流 / 知识正典 / 信息源 / 术语标准] → 提炼为可运行的行业 Master OS skill；装到任意 Claude Code / OpenClaw / Codex / Hermes agent 即让其进入「这一行的资深人」模式。…

Notion MCP server for Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT & Claude Desktop. Connect AI agents to Notion via Model Context Protocol — pages, databases, blocks, comments, fil…

Hook-based token compressor for 5 AI CLI hosts (Claude Code, Copilot CLI, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, Codex CLI). Up to 95% bash compression, signature-mode for code…

Model-neutral agent desktop/runtime for private, enterprise, and OpenAI-compatible / Anthropic-compatible model API. Tested on DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, GLM models.…

AI agent skill for end-to-end hotel search and booking—compare live rates across leading OTAs and hotel suppliers, verify availability, book stays, and manage r…

More than just Karpathy’s LLM Wiki, 100% local with Ollama. Drop Markdown notes → AI extracts concepts → your Obsidian wiki auto-links and grows. Zero sharing.…

Claude Code Guide - Setup, Commands, workflows, agents, skills & tips-n-tricks from beginner to power user!

A magical tool that changes how you use Agents. Install once — every Agent automatically discovers and uses all your MCP tools, and saves your tokens along the…

Open-source 24/7 Cowork app for OpenClaw, Hermes, Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode and 20+ more CLI Agent | Customize your assistants | Team them up｜Star if you lik…

AgenticX is a unified, production-ready multi-agent platform — Python SDK + CLI (agx) + Studio server + Machi desktop app. Features Meta-Agent orchestration, 15…

Query, provision and operate Cloud, SaaS, API and Model Context Protocol (MCP) resources through a unified SQL-based framework for humans and AI agents.

Open-source AI job search: scan job portals, evaluate listings into a structured A-H report with a global 1-5 score, tailor your CV, track applications — runs l…

A self-healing scraper for hostile sites: broken selectors repair themselves, browser rendering kicks in when needed, and a coherent identity layer (Chrome TLS…

Lightweight AI-native workflow builder for individuals and small teams — describe your idea in natural language, get a runnable workflow on a visual canvas, pub…

Minimal AI coding agent (~1,000 lines of Python) inspired by Claude Code. Works with any LLM. Think NanoGPT for coding agents. Formerly NanoCoder.