LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports. Covers coupon-race-stacking (Instacart, Stripe, Reverb), negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering (Upserve, Eternal/Zomato), decimal/fraction price-field overflow (Shipt), client-side chec

Hunting skill for cache poison vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including X-Forwarded-Host poisoning, X-HTTP-Method-Override / GCS cache, reflected→stored XSS via cache, classic Omer-Gil Web Cache Deception, Cloudflare Cache Deception Armor bypass, session

Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved o

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terra

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pag

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessib

Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDE

Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000)

Hunt Insecure Deserialization — Java gadget chains (ysoserial), PHP object injection (phpggc), Python pickle RCE, .NET BinaryFormatter, Ruby Marshal.load, JNDI/Log4Shell. RCE via deserialization is almost always Critical. Use when target runs Java, PHP serialization, Python pickl

Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and pri

Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char v

Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, li

Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php0.jpg), cas

Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization

Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) pass

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypa

Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, an

Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting vi

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by send

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

Прогнать контроль качества 1С по изменённым файлам и снять блокирующий гейт

Показать состояние гейта качества 1С — какие файлы ждут проверки

Прогнать контроль качества 1С по изменённым файлам и снять гейт

Triage drain over the keyed audit residue recorded in merged pull-request bodies. Enumerates candidates, resolves each one's cited line, and takes one disposition per entry, promote to a tech-debt issue, dismiss, or keep. Never fixes anything. Pass `list` to see live candidates or `why <path>:<line>` to explain one.

Deprecated - use the aegis:brainstorming skill instead

Deprecated - use the aegis:executing-plans skill instead

Deprecated - use the aegis:writing-plans skill instead

Initialize a new camp

Capture an idea, list intents, or promote an intent to a festival

Commit changes with festival traceability metadata

Create a new festival, phase, sequence, or task

List all festivals with their status and completion percentage

Get the next actionable festival task with full context

Show festival progression (in-progress tasks, roadmap, and dependency view)

Show festival progress and current status

Learn about the Festival Methodology (concepts, structure, rules, and workflows)

Validate festival structure and find issues

Turn one sentence of intent into a structured plan, sized correctly and planned through the loop

Initialize a new camp

Capture an idea, list intents, or promote an intent to a festival

Persistent session memory for AI coding agents — local-first, with on-device inference, associative recall, and drift detection. Works with Claude Code, Cursor,…

Run Hermes Agent and OpenClaw on the same WeChat account

An AI co-scientist running on your desktop. Claude Science but better.

Emotion Ball 是一套面向 AI 助手的表情引擎:32 种状态表情全部由纯 SVG 与原生 JavaScript 实时驱动,零框架、零图片资源。AI 侧只需输出一个 emotionId,小球即可切换到对应表情,可直接用作聊天机器人、桌面宠物、悬浮助手的情绪表达层。

Agent communication SDK. The open-source agent communication layer for AI agents — email, WhatsApp, Slack, Discord, Telegram, SMS. Python & TypeScript.

The micro-VM for AI agents — light enough to embed on your laptop, elastic enough to power an agentic cloud.

Give each AI agent its own isolated machine with root, Docker, and systemd. Active defense detects and stops threats automatically.

Webhook integration skills for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot). Step-by-step guidance for setting up webhook receivers, signature verification,…

Token burn reducer and focus keeper for Claude Code, Codex, Copilot, Gemini CLI, and more: surgical read hints, PDF/Office/CSV/markdown file interception, 160+…

RuvNet Brain — a downloadable, source-grounded brain for Claude Code over Reuven Cohen's (rUv's) RuvNet stack: RuVector/RVF, Ruflo, AgentDB, RuLake, SPARC + 21…

💼 One MCP server to search job boards and company career sites

C++ MCP SDK - build Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and clients in C++ / CPP. Enterprise-grade security, observability, connectivity. Stdio, HTTP+SSE, Stre…

Open-Source AI Presentation Generator and API (Gamma, Canva, Beautiful AI, Decktopus, Presentations AI Alternative)

Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.

Give your AI agent eyes to see the entire internet. Read & search Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, GitHub, Bilibili, XiaoHongShu — one CLI, zero API fees.

Browser Harness | Self-healing harness that enables LLMs to complete any task.

The World's First Agentic IDE. Visual dashboard: live sessions, task management, code editor, terminal. Epic Swarm parallel workflows. Auto-proceed rules. Autom…

Agenta is a workspace where you and your team build agents and automations.

Terminal Director. One lightweight app, eight features, your whole dev workflow in a single window.

AI turns documents or topics into real, native PowerPoint decks—with native shapes, transitions and animations, data-backed charts and tables on demand, audio n…