LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports. Covers coupon-race-stacking (Instacart, Stripe, Reverb), negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering (Upserve, Eternal/Zomato), decimal/fraction price-field overflow (Shipt), client-side chec

Hunting skill for cache poison vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including X-Forwarded-Host poisoning, X-HTTP-Method-Override / GCS cache, reflected→stored XSS via cache, classic Omer-Gil Web Cache Deception, Cloudflare Cache Deception Armor bypass, session

Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved o

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terra

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pag

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessib

Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDE

Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000)

Hunt Insecure Deserialization — Java gadget chains (ysoserial), PHP object injection (phpggc), Python pickle RCE, .NET BinaryFormatter, Ruby Marshal.load, JNDI/Log4Shell. RCE via deserialization is almost always Critical. Use when target runs Java, PHP serialization, Python pickl

Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and pri

Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char v

Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, li

Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php0.jpg), cas

Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization

Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) pass

Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypa

Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, an

Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting vi

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by send

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

`crabbox attach` follows the recorded events of an active coordinator run and

`crabbox azure` groups Azure provider setup commands. It currently has a single

`crabbox bench` records and reports local benchmark timing observations. It is a

`crabbox cache` inspects, purges, or warms package and build caches on a

`crabbox capsule` captures, replays, and tracks lightweight failure capsules.

Save the state of a lease, then restore it onto another box or fork it into a

`crabbox claims list` prints the lease claims stored on the current machine. It

`crabbox cleanup` sweeps direct-provider machines and local provider state that

`crabbox code` bridges a Linux lease's `code-server` workspace into the

`crabbox config` inspects and updates user configuration. It has three

`crabbox connect` resolves a lease and opens an interactive SSH session to it.

`crabbox cp` copies files or directories between the host and a Crabbox-owned

`crabbox desktop` drives a visible desktop session on a lease that was warmed

`crabbox doctor` runs a preflight before you commit to a long workflow. It is

`crabbox egress` gives a lease mediated outbound network: a lease-local browser

`crabbox events` prints the broker's event log for a recorded run.

`crabbox heartbeat` refreshes the idle deadline for one owned lease and prints

`crabbox history` lists recorded remote command runs from the broker. Each run is

`crabbox image` holds the trusted-operator controls for provider base images:

`crabbox init` onboards the current repository: it writes the minimal config

AI coding platform for teams

AI Multi-Agent Framework in .NET

Production-ready code examples for Telnyx AI Communications Infrastructure — Voice AI, SMS, SIP, and IoT APIs

UltraGameStudio - AI coding agent for game development: engine workflows, gameplay code, and asset generation.

🦞 ResearchClawBench: Evaluating AI Agents for Automated Research from Re-Discovery to New-Discovery

The context-aware model router that learns & adapts to your long-horizon coding agent workflows. Lightweight & extensible, works with any harnesses, any models,…

Open-source sandboxes where coding agents build and deploy. Spin up isolated environments where Claude Code, Cursor, and other agents code and deploy software.

Native desktop UI for Claude Code with orchestration, streaming, background agents, and multi-provider support. Built with Tauri + React.

OpenCode mobile client via Telegram: run and monitor AI coding tasks from your phone while everything runs locally on your machine. Scheduled tasks support.

Terminal session manager for AI coding agents. One TUI for Claude, Gemini, OpenCode, Codex, and more.

Exposes internet search tools for use by LLM-backed Assist in Home Assistant

Templates and workflow for generating PRDs, Tech Designs, and MVP and more using LLMs for AI IDEs

Versus Incident is the self-hosted AI SRE agent. It learns what your system normally look like and escalates only what is new or unexpected issues — routing to…

Browser-native side panel for Hermes Agent — connect web context to your local Hermes runtime.

Agentic-friendly CLI generator for APIs: turn Swagger, OpenAPI, and google.api.http protos into single-binary CLIs with catalogs and generated Skills.

Open-source agent platform for Global × China enterprises — wire every system through one agent core. Self-hosted, any LLM.

Official python implementation of UTCP. UTCP is an open standard that lets AI agents call any API directly, without extra middleware.

An agent small enough to run anywhere. A minimal agentic runtime in C — ~380 lines, 54KB binary, ~2MB RAM. A skill file + an LLM + a shell loop, no framework.

AgentiLoop Agent! An Autonomous Agentic Agent for Mac, and exclusive Apple only harnesss. Suppprtd automation, scripting, coding, build anything and more. Power…

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