LLM Mart Basic

Hunting skill for idor vulnerabilities. Built from 26 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting idor on any target.

Hunt JWT cryptographic failures — alg:none signature-stripping and RS256→HS256 key-confusion that let an attacker forge a token for any identity (e.g. an admin) without knowing a secret. Use when the app authenticates with a JSON Web Token (an `eyJ...` Bearer token in the Authori

Hunt Kubernetes & Docker — API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-20

Hunt Laravel specific vulnerabilities — Debug mode leakage (APP_DEBUG=true exposes full stack trace + env vars), Laravel Telescope/Horizon dashboard unauthorized access, Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129), Signed URL manipulation, Queue Worker abuse, mass assignment via Eloquent, deser

Hunt LDAP Injection and XPath Injection — authentication bypass, blind char-by-char attribute exfiltration, AD user/group enumeration, XML-store XPath bypass. Covers the LDAP special-character set (* ( ) \ NUL /), search-filter-context vs DN-injection, parenthesis-balancing, AND/

Hunt Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), and Path Traversal — /etc/passwd read, log poisoning → RCE, PHP filter-chain RCE (no upload needed), php:// / data:// / zip:// / phar:// wrappers, RFI via allow_url_include, directory traversal read/write/delete. Cover

Hunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration via tool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous instructions'), indirect injection via documents/web page

Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6

Hunting skill for misc vulnerabilities. Built from 225 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting misc on any target.

Hunt Next.js specific vulnerabilities — Server Actions arbitrary function execution, Middleware auth bypass via static asset paths, ISR cache poisoning, Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image), RSC payload leakage, getServerSideProps injection, source map exposure, debug endpoint

Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash/merge/assign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process/eval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS/Pug/Handlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable

Hunt NoSQL Injection — MongoDB operator injection ($where, $regex, $gt, $ne), CouchDB, Redis command injection, auth bypass via NoSQLi, data dump. Use when target uses MongoDB/Mongoose, CouchDB, Redis, or shows NoSQL error messages.

Hunt NTLM/Negotiate information disclosure on internet-reachable IIS/SharePoint/Exchange. Anonymous NTLM Type-2 challenge capture leaks NetBIOS domain, internal DNS forest, computer name, AD timestamp via AV_PAIRS structure. Default Windows-installer hostnames (WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX pa

Hunting skill for oauth vulnerabilities. Built from 19 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting oauth on any target.

Hunt Open Redirect — all types including low-impact, chained to OAuth token theft → ATO, phishing chains. URL parameter manipulation, JavaScript redirect, meta refresh, header injection. Use when hunting redirect bugs or building ATO chains.

Hunting skill for race condition vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern HTTP/2 single-packet attack cases (James Kettle DEF CON 2023 "Smashing the State Machine"; RyotaK / Flatt Security 10,000-request first-sequence-sync expansion 2024). Covers

Hunt vector-store / embedding-layer weaknesses in RAG pipelines (OWASP LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses) — persistent corpus poisoning that survives across sessions and users (distinct from one-shot indirect prompt injection, which is owned by hunt-llm-ai), cross-tenant vect

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting rce on any target.

Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove S

Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities — session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps,

Fourteen posts of being wrong in production, compressed to checkboxes

Healthy nodes, a quiet network, 300 restarts in three days, and a latency budget measured in milliseconds

Discovery worked. Ping worked. Every TCP connection timed out, and later the tunnel only worked when someone had a terminal open.

Every VM came back. The cluster did not. Declarative systems converge on config, and the datapath isn't config.

A surprising share of AI-in-the-terminal failures aren't the AI. They're zsh, and a version of bash from 2006.

A Claude Code plugin turns standalone project configuration into a namespaced, installable extension that teams and communities can update as one unit.

None of the safety came from the model. It came from six boring habits.

Skills package instructions and references. Subagents run work in a separate context and return results. They solve different problems and can be composed deliberately.

Six hours in, one step left, everything green, and the incident that didn't happen

CLAUDE.md carries persistent project context. Skills load reusable procedures when relevant. Separating stable facts from task-specific workflows keeps both easier to maintain.

Twenty minutes recovering secrets that never existed, and the one sentence from a human that ended it

An API request routing a model's tool call through an approval gate to a remote MCP server

31 config keys, two audits, and why the first one was wrong in both directions

The official MCP Registry stores standardized server metadata rather than package code. Publishers verify a namespace, describe installation or remote access, and submit immutable versions.

Everyone looks at the Dockerfile. The file that actually leaked the key was the project file.

Remote MCP authorization uses established OAuth standards, but secure integration still requires issuer validation, least-privilege scopes, protected token handling, and server-side enforcement.

"Copy it over and switch the reference" is two steps, and the outage lives in the one nobody checks

stdio fits local processes and prototypes. Streamable HTTP fits hosted services and shared integrations. The right choice follows where the capability runs and who must reach it.

The most important rule wasn't about what I could change. It was about what I was allowed to display.

Tools perform operations, resources expose readable context, and prompts provide reusable templates. Choosing the correct primitive makes an MCP server easier to understand and govern.

Run an organic-social (ECHO) workflow: channel portfolio and voice dossiers, platform-native content and calendars, the social-quality gate with a pre-publish go/no-go, community/inbox/crisis operations, and the listening/SOV/dark-social measurement loop. Not sure? Use /aaron-marketing:auto.

Route meeting-recall questions to the right Minutes MCP tool.

Prepare a sourced Minutes meeting outcome for human-governed closeout of existing X1 work. Use when the user wants a meeting decision or commitment to close, defer, escalate, or retire a specific X1 coordination thread. Never use it to infer settlement, move money, contact anyone, or close X1 work automatically.

Route meeting-recall questions to the right Minutes MCP tool.

Prepare a sourced Minutes meeting outcome for human-governed closeout of existing X1 work. Use when the user wants a meeting decision or commitment to close, defer, escalate, or retire a specific X1 coordination thread. Never use it to infer settlement, move money, contact anyone, or close X1 work automatically.

`crabbox capacity [--json]` reports the authenticated owner's current admission

Code review the current proposed code change

Resolve a merge conflict

Code review for pull request $1

Six Thinking Hats Analysis

Slash commands shipped by the plugin. Portable framework commands work in any Claude Code session; the workflow commands embed one author's personal setup and are opt-in - see [Adapting for your workflow](../README.md#adapting-for-your-workflow) before relying on them. Back to th

Autonomous fix loop for failing CI on the repo's default branch

Autonomous PR fixing loop - iterates on CI failures and review comments until green

GitHub-issue marathon - triage open issues, then run agent-ready ones to merge with Agent Teams

Example Marathon Configuration for CLAUDE.md - copy the section below into your project's CLAUDE.md

Task Master - plan, start, review, and close

Deep understanding mode (nemawashi) - exhaustive context-gathering before action

Searches Burp Suite project files for security analysis

Detects timing side-channels in cryptographic code

Performs security-focused differential review of code changes

Build AI Agents like playing LEGOs. Everything is a Plugin.

The coding agent that answers to you, your model, your machine, your rules.

CI-native agent CLI tool for deterministic pipeline gating.

Local-first cross-platform desktop workspace for Claude Code / agents: multi-agent, Git worktrees, code diffs, skill marketplace, multi-model, Computer Use, tas…

Local-first visual generation runtime and studio for people and coding agents, with reproducible image and video workflows across multiple providers.

A token-efficient MCP server for safe, line-oriented text file editing with partial reads, hash-based conflict detection, and atomic multi-file operations.

Open-source, evidence-driven MCP server for RTL simulation debugging: correlate VCS/Xcelium logs, VCD/FSDB waveforms, SystemVerilog/UVM source, hierarchy, and c…

runs anywhere. uses anything

One macOS app for Claude Code, Codex, and every agent runtime you use — scheduled runs, global hotkey launcher, per-run git worktrees, one review board.

Soul-driven AI agent with permission-hardened tools, token budgets, and multi-channel access. Runs 24/7 from CLI or Telegram.

Email, SMS & phone-call infrastructure for AI agents — send and receive real email and text messages, and place agent-driven outbound voice calls, all programma…

55 MCP tools to drive the Unity Editor from any MCP-compatible AI agent — scenes, GameObjects, prefabs, assets, tests, and builds. OpenClaw gateway included for…

Google Ads MCP + Meta Ads MCP + GA4 in one server for Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor & n8n — 250+ tools, hosted remote MCP, OAuth login, no API keys. By Ryze AI.

Claude Code & Codex 本地 token 追踪 — 状态栏（Codex 业界首创伪 statusline）、GitHub 风格热力图、多模型成本分析。 | Local token tracker for Claude Code & Codex — status line (industry-first…

Empower the Shell to think. Evolve Operations.

🤖 A full-stack Agent Chat Runtime for pre-production validation, built with act, TypeScript, and LangGraph JS combining streaming, multimodal, HITL, and tools…

Cerul — video memory infrastructure for AI products. SDKs, CLI, MCP, and developer integrations.

Stealth headless browser for AI agents — bypass Cloudflare, bot detection, and anti-scraping. Drop-in Puppeteer/Playwright replacement.

Web research for your agents with smart and safe tooling + knowledge store

FuXi is a fast, self-contained AI coding agent that lives in your terminal — edit code, run commands, and drive tools, with cost-aware routing across LLM provid…