Claude Skill

what-an-email-reveals

- Investigate an email address — MX and syntactic validation, Gravatar lookup, corporate email-format inference, breach exposure, and full mail-header analysis covering the Received chain, Message-ID and SPF, DKIM and DMARC results.

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Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit/tree/master/skills/what-an-email-reveals
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install tonydzi-second-brain-starter-kit@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

What an email reveals

An email address is usually the highest-value selector in an investigation: it carries a name, a domain, an account history, and a breach footprint. The beginner error is trying to prove the address exists. Existence is the least interesting thing about it, it is the hardest thing to establish passively, and the techniques that establish it are the ones that expose you. Work the structure and the footprint first; treat validation as a bonus.

Never send mail to the subject as a research technique.

Step 1 — Authorized scope

Read ../../ETHICS.md. Write down subject, objective, in-bounds selectors, out-of-bounds actions, and the governing jurisdiction. Decide in advance whether interactive probing — SMTP conversations, password-reset flows, signup-form enumeration — is authorized. It usually is not. Everything below is passive unless marked otherwise.

Done when scope is written and the interactive-probing decision is recorded.

Step 2 — Parse and validate

Three different things get called "email validation". They are not interchangeable.

Method What it proves Cost
Syntactic The string could be an address Free, passive, proves nothing about the mailbox
Domain / MX The domain exists and accepts mail Free, passive, dig MX example.com
SMTP RCPT TO probe The server claims the mailbox exists Interactive, often blocked or lied to, and logged

Do the first two. The third — opening an SMTP session and issuing RCPT TO to see whether the server accepts the recipient — is a live conversation with the subject's mail infrastructure from your IP. It gets logged, it gets your address range blocklisted, and against a catch-all domain it is worthless: a catch-all accepts every recipient, so every address "exists". Greylisting, tarpitting, and accept-then-bounce policies produce the same useless answer. Third-party validation APIs mostly wrap the same probe; the exposure moves to the vendor, the accuracy limits do not change.

Then parse the local part. first.last, flast, firstl, f.last each imply a name and, on a corporate domain, a company-wide convention — see reference/corporate-formats.md.

Gmail normalisation matters. Gmail ignores dots in the local part and everything after a +. j.doe+news@gmail.com, jdoe@gmail.com and jd.oe@gmail.com are one mailbox. Consequences: addresses that look different in two breaches may be the same person, and a +tag frequently names the service the address was given to, which is free intelligence about where the subject holds accounts. Not every provider behaves this way — check before assuming.

Done when the address is graded valid / invalid / unknown, the normalised form is recorded, and the name hypothesis is written down.

Step 3 — Gravatar

Gravatar maps an address to a public avatar by MD5 hash of the lowercased, trimmed address. Compute the hash and request the avatar; a returned image means the address was registered with the service, and the associated public profile can carry a display name, a location, links to other accounts, and verified accounts on other platforms.

printf '%s' "jdoe@example.com" | tr 'A-Z' 'a-z' | md5sum

Free, passive, no key. Run the avatar through find-the-original-image. Treat a default fallback image as "no Gravatar", not as "address invalid".

Done when Gravatar presence is checked and any profile fields captured.

Step 4 — Where is this address registered

The honest position: reliable account enumeration by email is an oracle problem. Password-reset and signup forms disclose whether an address is registered, which is exactly why tools exist to automate them — and exactly why doing so is interactive, often against terms of service, and potentially notifying (a reset request can email the subject). Flag it, get it authorized explicitly, or don't do it.

Passive alternatives that cost you nothing:

  • google-like-a-spy the full address in quotes, and the local part alone. Resumes, conference programmes, mailing-list archives, WHOIS history, and committed config files are full of addresses.
  • Run what-leaked-about-you. Breach membership is the single best answer to "which services did this identity use", and it is retrospective rather than interactive.
  • Push the local part into hunt-a-handle as a username seed.
  • Search code hosting for the address in commit metadata via secrets-in-git-history.

Done when the service list is assembled and each entry is marked passive or interactive in provenance.

Step 5 — Read the headers, if you have the message

Only applies when you legitimately possess the message. Headers are where an email stops being a selector and becomes evidence.

Read the Received: chain bottom-up: the bottom-most is the earliest hop, and the originating host is there unless the sending platform strips it. Everything below the first server you trust can be forged wholesale.

  • Message-ID — the domain part and the ID's shape often identify the sending platform or mail client even when the visible headers are cosmetic.
  • Authentication-Results — the receiving server's SPF, DKIM, and DMARC verdicts. A DKIM pass is the strongest thing in the header block: it is a cryptographic signature over content, so it survives forwarding claims.
  • X-Mailer / User-Agent — client fingerprint, frequently left in place by bulk-mail tooling.
  • Return-Path vs From — a mismatch is normal for mailing lists and suspicious in direct correspondence.

Field-by-field guide: reference/header-fields.md.

Done when the originating infrastructure is identified or explicitly stated as unrecoverable.

Where this goes wrong

  • Catch-all domains defeat verification outright. Everything validates. Detect one by testing an address you invented; if a random string validates, every result from that domain is meaningless.
  • Disposable and forwarding services. Throwaway domains mean the address was never meant to persist; relay and alias services (including provider-issued private-relay addresses) mean the visible address is a wrapper around a mailbox you cannot see. Both cap how far the address can take you — recognise them early rather than burning hours.
  • Role addresses (info@, sales@, admin@) belong to functions, not people. Attributing one to an individual is the most common serious error in email OSINT, and it survives into reports because it looks like a finding.
  • Inferred addresses are hypotheses. Deriving j.doe@company.com from a company pattern gives a plausible address, not a real one. Label it inferred, permanently.
  • Breach data is not proof of current ownership. Addresses get abandoned, recycled by providers, and reassigned to new staff at the same company.
  • Forwarding is indistinguishable from forgery at a glance. Mailing lists and security gateways rewrite headers in ways that look like tampering.

Confidence grading

  • Confirmed — a DKIM-passing message from the address, or the address published by the subject on a source they control, or an authenticated Gravatar profile matching a separately confirmed identity.
  • Probable — MX-valid, appears in a breach alongside a corroborating selector, and the local part matches the subject's name pattern.
  • Unconfirmed — inferred from a corporate format, or found in a single aggregator or combolist with no second source.
  • Rejected — proven catch-all with no supporting evidence, a known disposable domain with no linked activity, or a role address attributed to an individual on no basis but the domain.

Worked example

Given j.okonkwo@northwind-eng.example. dig MX returns records at a hosted provider — the domain takes mail. Gravatar: no avatar, so no profile pivot.

Two employee addresses in a conference PDF are t.[человек]@ and s.aldridge@, so the convention is first-initial.lastname. That makes j.okonkwo@ structurally consistent — evidence about the format, not evidence the person exists. No SMTP probe is run; interactive steps are out of scope here.

The dead end: what-leaked-about-you returns nothing for the address, which initially reads as "not a real user". Re-running against the Gmail-normalised personal address recovered from a code-hosting commit gives three breaches, one of them a developer forum with the handle sunfish_ada. That handle goes to hunt-a-handle. The corporate address stays graded inferred; the personal one is the working selector.

Pivots

New selector Skill
Name from local part or Gravatar find-anyone
Local part as username hunt-a-handle
Email domain who-owns-this-domain, recon-a-domain-passively
Employer from a corporate domain x-ray-a-company
Breach appearances what-leaked-about-you
Address in commits or config secrets-in-git-history
Originating IP from headers find-exposed-servers
Gravatar or profile avatar find-the-original-image
Address posted in dumps or channels find-leaks-in-the-wild

Legal and ToS notes

SMTP probing and password-reset enumeration are interactive, commonly prohibited by terms of service, and in some jurisdictions arguably unauthorized interrogation of a system. Get them in writing before you use them. Under GDPR and UK data protection law an email address is personal data on its own — collect only what the objective needs, store it encrypted, and set a deletion date with the case file. Message content you possess may carry separate confidentiality or privilege obligations independent of the OSINT question.

Step 6 — Report

Run write-the-intel-brief. State validity and how it was established, whether the domain is catch-all, the service list with passive/interactive provenance, breach exposure, and the identity attribution with its confidence grade.

Done when every address is marked observed or inferred, and no inferred address is stated as fact.


Like this skill? It is part of second-brain-starter-kit: the second brain we built for ourselves and run every day at Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Install the whole set with npx skills add tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit. Everything is open source and free, so take what you need.

Flagships worth a look on their own: secondop-panel (a second opinion from a panel of external models), claude-memory-tidy (stop your agent's memory from rotting), telegram-mcp-kit (your own Telegram over MCP in about 15 minutes).

Author: Anton Dziatkovskii, Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Telegram @tonydzi - WhatsApp +1 341 222 9178 - X @Tony_Stef_

Engineers: want to test-drive this setup? Message me. I hand out free starter seeds to engineers who test and report back, and custom skill requests are welcome.

Files (second-brain-starter-kit)
  • reference
    • corporate-formats.md 4.4 KB
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    • header-fields.md 4.9 KB
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  • SKILL.md 11.4 KB
    ---
    name: what-an-email-reveals
    description: "- Investigate an email address — MX and syntactic validation, Gravatar lookup, corporate email-format inference, breach exposure, and full mail-header analysis covering the Received chain, Message-ID and SPF, DKIM and DMARC results."
    disable-model-invocation: true
    ---
    
    # What an email reveals
    
    An email address is usually the highest-value selector in an investigation: it
    carries a name, a domain, an account history, and a breach footprint. The
    beginner error is trying to prove the address exists. Existence is the least
    interesting thing about it, it is the hardest thing to establish passively, and
    the techniques that establish it are the ones that expose you. Work the
    structure and the footprint first; treat validation as a bonus.
    
    Never send mail to the subject as a research technique.
    
    ## Step 1 — Authorized scope
    
    Read [../../ETHICS.md](../../ETHICS.md). Write down subject, objective,
    in-bounds selectors, out-of-bounds actions, and the governing jurisdiction.
    Decide in advance whether *interactive* probing — SMTP conversations,
    password-reset flows, signup-form enumeration — is authorized. It usually is
    not. Everything below is passive unless marked otherwise.
    
    **Done when** scope is written and the interactive-probing decision is recorded.
    
    ## Step 2 — Parse and validate
    
    Three different things get called "email validation". They are not
    interchangeable.
    
    | Method | What it proves | Cost |
    |---|---|---|
    | Syntactic | The string could be an address | Free, passive, proves nothing about the mailbox |
    | Domain / MX | The domain exists and accepts mail | Free, passive, `dig MX example.com` |
    | SMTP `RCPT TO` probe | The server claims the mailbox exists | Interactive, often blocked or lied to, and logged |
    
    Do the first two. The third — opening an SMTP session and issuing `RCPT TO` to
    see whether the server accepts the recipient — is a live conversation with the
    subject's mail infrastructure from your IP. It gets logged, it gets your address
    range blocklisted, and against a **catch-all domain** it is worthless: a
    catch-all accepts every recipient, so every address "exists". Greylisting,
    tarpitting, and accept-then-bounce policies produce the same useless answer.
    Third-party validation APIs mostly wrap the same probe; the exposure moves to
    the vendor, the accuracy limits do not change.
    
    Then parse the local part. `first.last`, `flast`, `firstl`, `f.last` each imply
    a name and, on a corporate domain, a company-wide convention — see
    [reference/corporate-formats.md](reference/corporate-formats.md).
    
    **Gmail normalisation matters.** Gmail ignores dots in the local part and
    everything after a `+`. `j.doe+news@gmail.com`, `jdoe@gmail.com` and
    `jd.oe@gmail.com` are one mailbox. Consequences: addresses that look different
    in two breaches may be the same person, and a `+tag` frequently names the
    service the address was given to, which is free intelligence about where the
    subject holds accounts. Not every provider behaves this way — check before
    assuming.
    
    **Done when** the address is graded valid / invalid / unknown, the normalised
    form is recorded, and the name hypothesis is written down.
    
    ## Step 3 — Gravatar
    
    Gravatar maps an address to a public avatar by MD5 hash of the lowercased,
    trimmed address. Compute the hash and request the avatar; a returned image
    means the address was registered with the service, and the associated public
    profile can carry a display name, a location, links to other accounts, and
    verified accounts on other platforms.
    
    ```bash
    printf '%s' "jdoe@example.com" | tr 'A-Z' 'a-z' | md5sum
    ```
    
    Free, passive, no key. Run the avatar through `find-the-original-image`. Treat a
    default fallback image as "no Gravatar", not as "address invalid".
    
    **Done when** Gravatar presence is checked and any profile fields captured.
    
    ## Step 4 — Where is this address registered
    
    The honest position: reliable account enumeration by email is an *oracle*
    problem. Password-reset and signup forms disclose whether an address is
    registered, which is exactly why tools exist to automate them — and exactly why
    doing so is interactive, often against terms of service, and potentially
    notifying (a reset request can email the subject). Flag it, get it authorized
    explicitly, or don't do it.
    
    Passive alternatives that cost you nothing:
    
    - `google-like-a-spy` the full address in quotes, and the local part alone.
      Resumes, conference programmes, mailing-list archives, `WHOIS` history, and
      committed config files are full of addresses.
    - Run `what-leaked-about-you`. Breach membership is the single best answer to
      "which services did this identity use", and it is retrospective rather than
      interactive.
    - Push the local part into `hunt-a-handle` as a username seed.
    - Search code hosting for the address in commit metadata via
      `secrets-in-git-history`.
    
    **Done when** the service list is assembled and each entry is marked passive or
    interactive in provenance.
    
    ## Step 5 — Read the headers, if you have the message
    
    Only applies when you legitimately possess the message. Headers are where an
    email stops being a selector and becomes evidence.
    
    Read the `Received:` chain **bottom-up**: the bottom-most is the earliest hop,
    and the originating host is there unless the sending platform strips it.
    Everything below the first server you trust can be forged wholesale.
    
    - `Message-ID` — the domain part and the ID's shape often identify the sending
      platform or mail client even when the visible headers are cosmetic.
    - `Authentication-Results` — the receiving server's SPF, DKIM, and DMARC
      verdicts. A DKIM `pass` is the strongest thing in the header block: it is a
      cryptographic signature over content, so it survives forwarding claims.
    - `X-Mailer` / `User-Agent` — client fingerprint, frequently left in place by
      bulk-mail tooling.
    - `Return-Path` vs `From` — a mismatch is normal for mailing lists and
      suspicious in direct correspondence.
    
    Field-by-field guide:
    [reference/header-fields.md](reference/header-fields.md).
    
    **Done when** the originating infrastructure is identified or explicitly stated
    as unrecoverable.
    
    ## Where this goes wrong
    
    - **Catch-all domains defeat verification outright.** Everything validates.
      Detect one by testing an address you invented; if a random string validates,
      every result from that domain is meaningless.
    - **Disposable and forwarding services.** Throwaway domains mean the address was
      never meant to persist; relay and alias services (including provider-issued
      private-relay addresses) mean the visible address is a wrapper around a
      mailbox you cannot see. Both cap how far the address can take you — recognise
      them early rather than burning hours.
    - **Role addresses** (`info@`, `sales@`, `admin@`) belong to functions, not
      people. Attributing one to an individual is the most common serious error in
      email OSINT, and it survives into reports because it looks like a finding.
    - **Inferred addresses are hypotheses.** Deriving `j.doe@company.com` from a
      company pattern gives a plausible address, not a real one. Label it inferred,
      permanently.
    - **Breach data is not proof of current ownership.** Addresses get abandoned,
      recycled by providers, and reassigned to new staff at the same company.
    - **Forwarding is indistinguishable from forgery** at a glance. Mailing lists
      and security gateways rewrite headers in ways that look like tampering.
    
    ## Confidence grading
    
    - **Confirmed** — a DKIM-passing message from the address, or the address
      published by the subject on a source they control, or an authenticated
      Gravatar profile matching a separately confirmed identity.
    - **Probable** — MX-valid, appears in a breach alongside a corroborating
      selector, and the local part matches the subject's name pattern.
    - **Unconfirmed** — inferred from a corporate format, or found in a single
      aggregator or combolist with no second source.
    - **Rejected** — proven catch-all with no supporting evidence, a known
      disposable domain with no linked activity, or a role address attributed to an
      individual on no basis but the domain.
    
    ## Worked example
    
    Given `j.okonkwo@northwind-eng.example`. `dig MX` returns records at a hosted
    provider — the domain takes mail. Gravatar: no avatar, so no profile pivot.
    
    Two employee addresses in a conference PDF are `t.[человек]@` and `s.aldridge@`, so
    the convention is `first-initial.lastname`. That makes `j.okonkwo@`
    structurally consistent — evidence about the *format*, not evidence the person
    exists. No SMTP probe is run; interactive steps are out of scope here.
    
    The dead end: `what-leaked-about-you` returns nothing for the address, which
    initially reads as "not a real user". Re-running against the Gmail-normalised
    personal address recovered from a code-hosting commit gives three breaches, one
    of them a developer forum with the handle `sunfish_ada`. That handle goes to
    `hunt-a-handle`. The corporate address stays graded inferred; the personal one
    is the working selector.
    
    ## Pivots
    
    | New selector | Skill |
    |---|---|
    | Name from local part or Gravatar | `find-anyone` |
    | Local part as username | `hunt-a-handle` |
    | Email domain | `who-owns-this-domain`, `recon-a-domain-passively` |
    | Employer from a corporate domain | `x-ray-a-company` |
    | Breach appearances | `what-leaked-about-you` |
    | Address in commits or config | `secrets-in-git-history` |
    | Originating IP from headers | `find-exposed-servers` |
    | Gravatar or profile avatar | `find-the-original-image` |
    | Address posted in dumps or channels | `find-leaks-in-the-wild` |
    
    ## Legal and ToS notes
    
    SMTP probing and password-reset enumeration are interactive, commonly prohibited
    by terms of service, and in some jurisdictions arguably unauthorized
    interrogation of a system. Get them in writing before you use them. Under GDPR
    and UK data protection law an email address is personal data on its own —
    collect only what the objective needs, store it encrypted, and set a deletion
    date with the case file. Message content you possess may carry separate
    confidentiality or privilege obligations independent of the OSINT question.
    
    ## Step 6 — Report
    
    Run `write-the-intel-brief`. State validity and how it was established, whether
    the domain is catch-all, the service list with passive/interactive provenance,
    breach exposure, and the identity attribution with its confidence grade.
    
    **Done when** every address is marked observed or inferred, and no inferred
    address is stated as fact.
    
    <!--kit-footer-->
    
    ---
    
    **Like this skill?** It is part of [second-brain-starter-kit](https://github.com/tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit): the second brain we built for ourselves and run every day at Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Install the whole set with `npx skills add tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit`. Everything is open source and free, so take what you need.
    
    Flagships worth a look on their own: [secondop-panel](https://github.com/tonydzi/secondop-panel) (a second opinion from a panel of external models), [claude-memory-tidy](https://github.com/tonydzi/claude-memory-tidy) (stop your agent's memory from rotting), [telegram-mcp-kit](https://github.com/tonydzi/telegram-mcp-kit) (your own Telegram over MCP in about 15 minutes).
    
    Author: **Anton Dziatkovskii**, Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Telegram [@tonydzi](https://t.me/tonydzi) - WhatsApp [+1 341 222 9178](https://wa.me/13412229178) - X [@Tony_Stef_](https://x.com/Tony_Stef_)
    
    **Engineers: want to test-drive this setup?** Message me. I hand out free starter seeds to engineers who test and report back, and custom skill requests are welcome.
    

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