Claude Skill

terraform-ops

Terraform and OpenTofu infrastructure-as-code operations - project layout, state management, module design, plan/apply safety, CI/CD pipelines, and secrets. Use for: terraform, opentofu, infrastructure as code, IaC, tfstate, terraform state, terraform module, remote backend, terr

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Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/0xDarkMatter/claude-mods/tree/main/skills/terraform-ops
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install 0xdarkmatter-claude-mods@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/0xDarkMatter/claude-mods.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole 0xdarkmatter/claude-mods collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Terraform Operations

Terraform / OpenTofu infrastructure-as-code: layout, state, modules, safety, CI/CD, secrets.

Version context (verified 2026-06): Terraform 1.15.x (BUSL-1.1 licence since 1.6) · OpenTofu 1.12.x (MPL-2.0 fork of Terraform 1.5.x). Commands below are interchangeable (terraform ↔ tofu) unless flagged. See Terraform vs OpenTofu for the decision note.

Reference Files

File Covers
references/state-management.md Remote backends, locking, moved/import/removed blocks, state surgery, drift detection
references/module-patterns.md Module composition, variable validation, optional/nullable, output contracts, versioning
references/cicd-pipelines.md GitHub Actions plan/apply, OIDC auth, policy gates (tflint/trivy/checkov/OPA), Atlantis/HCP
references/security-and-secrets.md Secrets in state, ephemeral resources, write-only arguments, SOPS/Vault, sensitive limits
assets/github-actions-terraform.yml Ready-to-adapt PR-plan + OIDC-apply workflow
scripts/check-action-refs.sh Staleness verifier for any workflow's uses: action refs (offline structural / live API resolve)

The action versions pinned in github-actions-terraform.yml are point-in-time (verified 2026-06). Run scripts/check-action-refs.sh --live before adopting — a tag that was valid at write time may have been retracted or never existed (e.g. trivy-action@0.33.1 vs the real v0.33.1).

Project Layout Decision Tree

How many environments / accounts?
│
├─ One environment, one team
│  └─ Single root module + tfvars. Don't over-engineer.
│
├─ Multiple environments (dev/staging/prod)
│  ├─ Need different backend/account/region per env? (usually YES for prod isolation)
│  │  └─ DIRECTORY PER ENVIRONMENT (recommended default)
│  │     environments/{dev,staging,prod}/ each a thin root calling shared modules
│  │
│  └─ Environments truly identical except a few variables, same backend account?
│     └─ Workspaces are *acceptable* — but see the workspace caveats below
│
└─ Many teams / many state files / platform engineering
   └─ Directory-per-env + per-component state split (network / data / app)
      Consider Terragrunt, Terraform Stacks (HCP), or OpenTofu + CI orchestration

Canonical multi-env layout

infra/
├── modules/                  # Reusable child modules (no provider/backend blocks)
│   ├── network/
│   │   ├── main.tf
│   │   ├── variables.tf
│   │   ├── outputs.tf
│   │   └── versions.tf       # required_providers ONLY (no provider config)
│   └── app-service/
├── environments/             # Root modules — one state file each
│   ├── dev/
│   │   ├── main.tf           # module "network" { source = "../../modules/network" ... }
│   │   ├── backend.tf        # remote backend, env-specific key
│   │   ├── providers.tf      # provider config lives in ROOT only
│   │   ├── terraform.tfvars  # committed, non-secret env values
│   │   └── versions.tf       # required_version + required_providers pins
│   └── prod/
└── .tflint.hcl

Why directories usually beat workspaces

Concern Directories Workspaces
Separate backend/account per env Yes — each root has its own backend.tf No — one backend, envs differ only by state key
Blast radius of wrong-env apply Low — you're physically in prod/ High — invisible terraform workspace select state
Env-specific config divergence Natural (different main.tf if needed) terraform.workspace conditionals creep everywhere
Prod IAM isolation Per-dir CI role Same credentials see all envs
Visibility in code review Diff shows which env changed Workspace is runtime state, not in the diff

Workspaces fit short-lived ephemeral copies (PR preview envs) — not the dev/prod boundary. HashiCorp's own docs say workspaces are "not suitable for strong separation."

tfvars conventions

terraform.tfvars            # auto-loaded — per-root committed defaults (non-secret)
*.auto.tfvars               # auto-loaded — generated/local overrides
prod.tfvars                 # explicit only: terraform plan -var-file=prod.tfvars
TF_VAR_db_password=...      # env var injection — secrets in CI, never in files

Gotcha: -var-file + directories-per-env is belt-and-braces; with workspaces it's load-bearing and one forgotten flag applies dev values to prod.

State Quick Reference

Full detail: references/state-management.md.

Task Command / block Notes
Remote backend (AWS) backend "s3" { bucket, key, region, use_lockfile = true } S3-native locking (TF ≥1.10) — DynamoDB table no longer required
Rename resource in code moved { from = aws_x.a, to = aws_x.b } Declarative, reviewable, no CLI surgery
Adopt existing infra import { to = aws_x.a, id = "i-123" } + plan -generate-config-out=gen.tf Config-driven import (TF ≥1.5) beats terraform import CLI
Forget without destroy removed { from = aws_x.a, lifecycle { destroy = false } } TF ≥1.7; OpenTofu 1.12 also has lifecycle { destroy = false } on resources
Drift detection terraform plan -detailed-exitcode Exit 0 = clean, 1 = error, 2 = drift — cron it
Inspect state terraform state list / state show ADDR Read-only, always safe
Move state (last resort) terraform state mv SRC DST Prefer moved blocks — see "when NOT to" below
Pull/push (emergency) terraform state pull > backup.tfstate ALWAYS pull a backup before any surgery

State surgery — when NOT to: if a moved/removed/import block can express it, use the block. CLI state mv/rm is immediate, unreviewed, unversioned, and a typo orphans real infrastructure. Legit uses: splitting state between roots, unwedging a failed migration. Always state pull a backup first.

Module Quick Reference

Full detail: references/module-patterns.md.

module "network" {
  source  = "terraform-aws-modules/vpc/aws"
  version = "~> 6.0"          # pin minor-float for registry modules; exact pin in prod roots
  # ...
}
Rule Why
Composition over inheritance Roots compose flat modules; never module-wraps-module-wraps-module
No provider blocks in child modules Providers configured in root only; child declares required_providers
validation blocks on variables Fail at plan with a real message, not mid-apply
optional(type, default) in object attrs Callers omit fields; nullable = false rejects explicit null
Outputs are the contract Output IDs/ARNs consumers need; document with description
Anti-pattern: thin wrappers A module that just renames variables of another module adds a version-lag layer and zero value — call the upstream module directly

Safety Checklist (before every apply)

□ plan output READ, not skimmed — every destroy/replace explained
□ "Plan: X to add, Y to change, Z to destroy" — does Z surprise you?
□ -/+ (replace) lines: check the "forces replacement" attribute
□ Applying the SAME saved plan that was reviewed: plan -out=tfplan → apply tfplan
□ prevent_destroy on stateful resources (db, state bucket, KMS keys)
□ Cloud-side deletion protection too (RDS deletion_protection, S3 versioning+MFA-delete)
□ No -target unless this is a declared emergency (see below)
□ for_each (stable keys), not count, for any collection that can reorder

Footguns

Footgun Detail Fix
count index shift Removing item 0 of a count list re-addresses every later item → destroy/recreate cascade for_each with stable string keys
-target habit Skips dependency graph; state diverges from config; hides drift Emergency-only (broken dependency cycle, partial outage). Follow with a full clean plan
prevent_destroy false comfort Doesn't survive the block being deleted, and doesn't stop state rm + console delete Pair with cloud-native deletion protection
Dynamic blocks everywhere dynamic for 2 static blocks is obfuscation Use dynamic only over genuinely variable collections
Unpinned providers aws = ">= 5.0" in prod pulls a breaking major the day it ships ~> 6.12 + commit .terraform.lock.hcl
Apply ≠ reviewed plan Plan on PR, apply on merge re-plans — drift in between applies unreviewed changes Save the plan artifact, or accept + re-review the merge plan
resource "aws_db_instance" "main" {
  deletion_protection = true            # cloud-side
  lifecycle {
    prevent_destroy = true              # terraform-side
    ignore_changes  = [password]        # if rotated outside TF
  }
}

CI/CD Quick Reference

Full detail: references/cicd-pipelines.md · template: assets/github-actions-terraform.yml.

PR opened   → fmt -check → validate → tflint → trivy/checkov → plan → plan posted as PR comment
PR merged   → plan (fresh) → apply, authenticated via OIDC — no long-lived cloud keys
Nightly     → plan -detailed-exitcode → exit 2 ⇒ drift alert
  • OIDC everywhere — aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials with role-to-assume, never AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID secrets. Same supply-chain doctrine as this repo's rules: short-lived tokens, no standing credentials.
  • Pin action SHAs in workflows (uses: actions/checkout@<sha>), not floating tags.
  • Policy gates: tflint (provider-aware lint), trivy config / checkov (misconfig scan), OPA/conftest for org policy ("no public buckets").
Orchestrator Fit
Plain GitHub Actions Default — full control, free, template in assets/
Atlantis Self-hosted PR automation, atlantis plan/apply comments, locking per dir
HCP Terraform / Terraform Cloud Managed runs, Sentinel policy, state hosting; free ≤500 resources
Spacelift / env0 / Digger / Scalr Commercial Atlantis-likes; Digger runs inside your Actions

Verification — uses: ref staleness

GitHub Action versions rot: a tag gets retracted, or a workflow pins one that never existed. scripts/check-action-refs.sh lints every uses: owner/repo@ref line. It's general — pass any workflow file(s) as positionals (default: this skill's own assets/github-actions-terraform.yml).

# Structural only, no network — well-formedness of every uses: ref (CI-safe gate).
# Floating @main/@master → WARN (exit 0; use --strict to fail). Malformed → exit 4.
scripts/check-action-refs.sh --offline .github/workflows/ci.yml

# Live — resolve each ref against the GitHub API. A 404 (ref doesn't exist) → exit 10
# DRIFT; API unreachable/rate-limited → exit 7 (advisory, never fails the build, §7).
# Set GITHUB_TOKEN to dodge the unauthenticated rate limit.
GITHUB_TOKEN=$GH_PAT scripts/check-action-refs.sh --live .github/workflows/*.yml

scripts/check-action-refs.sh --json --offline | jq '.data[] | select(.status!="ok")'

--live is the check that catches the classic aquasecurity/trivy-action@0.33.1 mistake — that tag 404s; the real one is v0.33.1. Run live on a schedule (never as a blocking PR gate), offline in PR CI.

Testing Quick Reference

# tests/network.tftest.hcl  — native test framework (TF ≥1.6 / OpenTofu ≥1.6)
variables { cidr = "10.0.0.0/16" }

run "valid_cidr_plan" {
  command = plan                          # plan = fast unit-ish; apply = real integration
  assert {
    condition     = aws_vpc.main.cidr_block == "10.0.0.0/16"
    error_message = "VPC CIDR did not match input"
  }
}

run "rejects_tiny_cidr" {
  command = plan
  variables { cidr = "10.0.0.0/30" }
  expect_failures = [var.cidr]            # asserts the validation block fires
}

terraform test runs every *.tftest.hcl under tests/; command = apply runs create real (then auto-destroyed) infra — use a sandbox account. Mock providers (mock_provider blocks, TF ≥1.7) fake apply without credentials. For multi-tool/Go-level orchestration (retry, real HTTP probes), Terratest is the heavyweight alternative — native terraform test covers most module CI needs first.

Secrets Quick Reference

Full detail: references/security-and-secrets.md.

Mechanism Version What it does
sensitive = true all Redacts from CLI output only — value still plaintext in state
Ephemeral resources (ephemeral "...") TF ≥1.10 / OpenTofu ≥1.11 Fetch secret at run time; never persisted to state or plan
Write-only arguments (password_wo) TF ≥1.11 / OpenTofu ≥1.11 Send secret to provider; never stored in state; rotate via _wo_version
SOPS-encrypted tfvars tool Secrets encrypted at rest in git; decrypted at plan time
Vault / cloud secret manager tool Reference by ID; resource reads secret at boot, TF never sees it
OpenTofu state encryption OpenTofu ≥1.7 Client-side AES-GCM encryption of state/plan — no Terraform equivalent

Rule zero: treat state as secret regardless. Encrypt the backend (SSE-KMS), restrict IAM on the bucket, never commit *.tfstate (gitignore it).

Terraform vs OpenTofu

Terraform OpenTofu
Licence BUSL-1.1 since 1.6 (no production use competing with HashiCorp; fine for normal internal use) MPL-2.0 — genuinely open source, Linux Foundation
Current 1.15.x 1.12.x
Exclusive features Stacks (HCP-tied), Terraform Cloud agents, terraform query State/plan encryption, provider for_each iteration, -exclude flag, early variable eval in backend/module blocks, OCI registry distribution, .tofu file extension
Registry registry.terraform.io registry.opentofu.org (mirrors most providers)
Compatibility — Forked at 1.5.x; HCL/state compatible for mainstream use, diverging feature-by-feature since

Decision: vendors and anyone redistributing IaC tooling commercially → OpenTofu (licence risk). Teams on HCP Terraform/Sentinel → Terraform. Everyone else: either works; OpenTofu's state encryption is the single biggest technical differentiator. Migration terraform → tofu is tofu init + state-compatible up to ~1.8-era features; the gap widens each release — migrate early or commit.

Command Quick Reference

terraform init -upgrade               # init / upgrade providers within constraints
terraform fmt -recursive -check       # CI: fail on unformatted
terraform validate                    # syntax + internal consistency (no creds needed after init)
terraform plan -out=tfplan            # save plan for exact-apply
terraform show -json tfplan | jq      # machine-readable plan (policy tools eat this)
terraform apply tfplan                # apply EXACTLY the reviewed plan
terraform plan -detailed-exitcode     # 0 clean / 2 drift — for cron drift checks
terraform plan -refresh-only          # show drift without proposing config changes
terraform apply -replace=aws_x.a      # force recreate one resource (replaces old taint)
terraform state pull > backup.json    # ALWAYS before surgery
terraform output -json                # consume outputs in scripts
terraform graph | dot -Tsvg > g.svg   # dependency graph
tofu init                             # OpenTofu: same verbs throughout
Files (claude-mods)
  • assets
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  • references
    • cicd-pipelines.md 9.5 KB
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    • module-patterns.md 9.3 KB
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    • security-and-secrets.md 8.3 KB
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    • state-management.md 9.3 KB
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  • scripts
    • .gitkeep 0 B · in bundle
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  • tests
    • run.sh 4.7 KB
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  • SKILL.md 16.2 KB
    ---
    name: terraform-ops
    description: "Terraform and OpenTofu operations: project layout, state, module design, plan/apply safety, CI/CD, secrets. Use for: terraform, opentofu, infrastructure as code, IaC, tfstate, terraform state, terraform module, remote backend, terraform plan, terraform apply, for_each, moved block, terraform import, drift detection, tflint, checkov, HCL."
    license: MIT
    allowed-tools: "Read Write Bash"
    metadata:
      author: claude-mods
      related-skills: ci-cd-ops, docker-ops, kubernetes-ops
    ---
    
    # Terraform Operations
    
    Terraform / OpenTofu infrastructure-as-code: layout, state, modules, safety, CI/CD, secrets.
    
    **Version context (verified 2026-06):** Terraform **1.15.x** (BUSL-1.1 licence since 1.6) · OpenTofu **1.12.x** (MPL-2.0 fork of Terraform 1.5.x). Commands below are interchangeable (`terraform` ↔ `tofu`) unless flagged. See [Terraform vs OpenTofu](#terraform-vs-opentofu) for the decision note.
    
    ## Reference Files
    
    | File | Covers |
    |------|--------|
    | [references/state-management.md](references/state-management.md) | Remote backends, locking, moved/import/removed blocks, state surgery, drift detection |
    | [references/module-patterns.md](references/module-patterns.md) | Module composition, variable validation, optional/nullable, output contracts, versioning |
    | [references/cicd-pipelines.md](references/cicd-pipelines.md) | GitHub Actions plan/apply, OIDC auth, policy gates (tflint/trivy/checkov/OPA), Atlantis/HCP |
    | [references/security-and-secrets.md](references/security-and-secrets.md) | Secrets in state, ephemeral resources, write-only arguments, SOPS/Vault, sensitive limits |
    | [assets/github-actions-terraform.yml](assets/github-actions-terraform.yml) | Ready-to-adapt PR-plan + OIDC-apply workflow |
    | [scripts/check-action-refs.sh](scripts/check-action-refs.sh) | Staleness verifier for any workflow's `uses:` action refs (offline structural / live API resolve) |
    
    > The action versions pinned in `github-actions-terraform.yml` are **point-in-time** (verified 2026-06). Run `scripts/check-action-refs.sh --live` before adopting — a tag that was valid at write time may have been retracted or never existed (e.g. `trivy-action@0.33.1` vs the real `v0.33.1`).
    
    ## Project Layout Decision Tree
    
    ```
    How many environments / accounts?
    │
    ├─ One environment, one team
    │  └─ Single root module + tfvars. Don't over-engineer.
    │
    ├─ Multiple environments (dev/staging/prod)
    │  ├─ Need different backend/account/region per env? (usually YES for prod isolation)
    │  │  └─ DIRECTORY PER ENVIRONMENT (recommended default)
    │  │     environments/{dev,staging,prod}/ each a thin root calling shared modules
    │  │
    │  └─ Environments truly identical except a few variables, same backend account?
    │     └─ Workspaces are *acceptable* — but see the workspace caveats below
    │
    └─ Many teams / many state files / platform engineering
       └─ Directory-per-env + per-component state split (network / data / app)
          Consider Terragrunt, Terraform Stacks (HCP), or OpenTofu + CI orchestration
    ```
    
    ### Canonical multi-env layout
    
    ```
    infra/
    ├── modules/                  # Reusable child modules (no provider/backend blocks)
    │   ├── network/
    │   │   ├── main.tf
    │   │   ├── variables.tf
    │   │   ├── outputs.tf
    │   │   └── versions.tf       # required_providers ONLY (no provider config)
    │   └── app-service/
    ├── environments/             # Root modules — one state file each
    │   ├── dev/
    │   │   ├── main.tf           # module "network" { source = "../../modules/network" ... }
    │   │   ├── backend.tf        # remote backend, env-specific key
    │   │   ├── providers.tf      # provider config lives in ROOT only
    │   │   ├── terraform.tfvars  # committed, non-secret env values
    │   │   └── versions.tf       # required_version + required_providers pins
    │   └── prod/
    └── .tflint.hcl
    ```
    
    ### Why directories usually beat workspaces
    
    | Concern | Directories | Workspaces |
    |---------|-------------|------------|
    | Separate backend/account per env | Yes — each root has its own `backend.tf` | No — one backend, envs differ only by state key |
    | Blast radius of wrong-env apply | Low — you're physically in `prod/` | High — invisible `terraform workspace select` state |
    | Env-specific config divergence | Natural (different main.tf if needed) | `terraform.workspace` conditionals creep everywhere |
    | Prod IAM isolation | Per-dir CI role | Same credentials see all envs |
    | Visibility in code review | Diff shows which env changed | Workspace is runtime state, not in the diff |
    
    Workspaces fit short-lived ephemeral copies (PR preview envs) — not the dev/prod boundary. HashiCorp's own docs say workspaces are "not suitable for strong separation."
    
    ### tfvars conventions
    
    ```bash
    terraform.tfvars            # auto-loaded — per-root committed defaults (non-secret)
    *.auto.tfvars               # auto-loaded — generated/local overrides
    prod.tfvars                 # explicit only: terraform plan -var-file=prod.tfvars
    TF_VAR_db_password=...      # env var injection — secrets in CI, never in files
    ```
    
    Gotcha: `-var-file` + directories-per-env is belt-and-braces; with workspaces it's load-bearing and one forgotten flag applies dev values to prod.
    
    ## State Quick Reference
    
    Full detail: [references/state-management.md](references/state-management.md).
    
    | Task | Command / block | Notes |
    |------|-----------------|-------|
    | Remote backend (AWS) | `backend "s3" { bucket, key, region, use_lockfile = true }` | S3-native locking (TF ≥1.10) — DynamoDB table no longer required |
    | Rename resource in code | `moved { from = aws_x.a, to = aws_x.b }` | Declarative, reviewable, no CLI surgery |
    | Adopt existing infra | `import { to = aws_x.a, id = "i-123" }` + `plan -generate-config-out=gen.tf` | Config-driven import (TF ≥1.5) beats `terraform import` CLI |
    | Forget without destroy | `removed { from = aws_x.a, lifecycle { destroy = false } }` | TF ≥1.7; OpenTofu 1.12 also has `lifecycle { destroy = false }` on resources |
    | Drift detection | `terraform plan -detailed-exitcode` | Exit 0 = clean, 1 = error, **2 = drift** — cron it |
    | Inspect state | `terraform state list` / `state show ADDR` | Read-only, always safe |
    | Move state (last resort) | `terraform state mv SRC DST` | Prefer `moved` blocks — see "when NOT to" below |
    | Pull/push (emergency) | `terraform state pull > backup.tfstate` | ALWAYS pull a backup before any surgery |
    
    **State surgery — when NOT to:** if a `moved`/`removed`/`import` block can express it, use the block. CLI `state mv`/`rm` is immediate, unreviewed, unversioned, and a typo orphans real infrastructure. Legit uses: splitting state between roots, unwedging a failed migration. Always `state pull` a backup first.
    
    ## Module Quick Reference
    
    Full detail: [references/module-patterns.md](references/module-patterns.md).
    
    ```hcl
    module "network" {
      source  = "terraform-aws-modules/vpc/aws"
      version = "~> 6.0"          # pin minor-float for registry modules; exact pin in prod roots
      # ...
    }
    ```
    
    | Rule | Why |
    |------|-----|
    | Composition over inheritance | Roots compose flat modules; never module-wraps-module-wraps-module |
    | No provider blocks in child modules | Providers configured in root only; child declares `required_providers` |
    | `validation` blocks on variables | Fail at plan with a real message, not mid-apply |
    | `optional(type, default)` in object attrs | Callers omit fields; `nullable = false` rejects explicit null |
    | Outputs are the contract | Output IDs/ARNs consumers need; document with `description` |
    | **Anti-pattern: thin wrappers** | A module that just renames variables of another module adds a version-lag layer and zero value — call the upstream module directly |
    
    ## Safety Checklist (before every apply)
    
    ```
    □ plan output READ, not skimmed — every destroy/replace explained
    □ "Plan: X to add, Y to change, Z to destroy" — does Z surprise you?
    □ -/+ (replace) lines: check the "forces replacement" attribute
    □ Applying the SAME saved plan that was reviewed: plan -out=tfplan → apply tfplan
    □ prevent_destroy on stateful resources (db, state bucket, KMS keys)
    □ Cloud-side deletion protection too (RDS deletion_protection, S3 versioning+MFA-delete)
    □ No -target unless this is a declared emergency (see below)
    □ for_each (stable keys), not count, for any collection that can reorder
    ```
    
    ### Footguns
    
    | Footgun | Detail | Fix |
    |---------|--------|-----|
    | `count` index shift | Removing item 0 of a `count` list re-addresses every later item → destroy/recreate cascade | `for_each` with stable string keys |
    | `-target` habit | Skips dependency graph; state diverges from config; hides drift | Emergency-only (broken dependency cycle, partial outage). Follow with a full clean plan |
    | `prevent_destroy` false comfort | Doesn't survive the block being deleted, and doesn't stop `state rm` + console delete | Pair with cloud-native deletion protection |
    | Dynamic blocks everywhere | `dynamic` for 2 static blocks is obfuscation | Use `dynamic` only over genuinely variable collections |
    | Unpinned providers | `aws = ">= 5.0"` in prod pulls a breaking major the day it ships | `~> 6.12` + commit `.terraform.lock.hcl` |
    | Apply ≠ reviewed plan | Plan on PR, apply on merge re-plans — drift in between applies unreviewed changes | Save the plan artifact, or accept + re-review the merge plan |
    
    ```hcl
    resource "aws_db_instance" "main" {
      deletion_protection = true            # cloud-side
      lifecycle {
        prevent_destroy = true              # terraform-side
        ignore_changes  = [password]        # if rotated outside TF
      }
    }
    ```
    
    ## CI/CD Quick Reference
    
    Full detail: [references/cicd-pipelines.md](references/cicd-pipelines.md) · template: [assets/github-actions-terraform.yml](assets/github-actions-terraform.yml).
    
    ```
    PR opened   → fmt -check → validate → tflint → trivy/checkov → plan → plan posted as PR comment
    PR merged   → plan (fresh) → apply, authenticated via OIDC — no long-lived cloud keys
    Nightly     → plan -detailed-exitcode → exit 2 ⇒ drift alert
    ```
    
    - **OIDC everywhere** — `aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials` with `role-to-assume`, never `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` secrets. Same supply-chain doctrine as this repo's rules: short-lived tokens, no standing credentials.
    - **Pin action SHAs** in workflows (`uses: actions/checkout@<sha>`), not floating tags.
    - Policy gates: `tflint` (provider-aware lint), `trivy config` / `checkov` (misconfig scan), OPA/`conftest` for org policy ("no public buckets").
    
    | Orchestrator | Fit |
    |---|---|
    | Plain GitHub Actions | Default — full control, free, template in assets/ |
    | Atlantis | Self-hosted PR automation, `atlantis plan/apply` comments, locking per dir |
    | HCP Terraform / Terraform Cloud | Managed runs, Sentinel policy, state hosting; free ≤500 resources |
    | Spacelift / env0 / Digger / Scalr | Commercial Atlantis-likes; Digger runs inside your Actions |
    
    ### Verification — `uses:` ref staleness
    
    GitHub Action versions rot: a tag gets retracted, or a workflow pins one that never existed. [scripts/check-action-refs.sh](scripts/check-action-refs.sh) lints every `uses: owner/repo@ref` line. It's **general** — pass any workflow file(s) as positionals (default: this skill's own `assets/github-actions-terraform.yml`).
    
    ```bash
    # Structural only, no network — well-formedness of every uses: ref (CI-safe gate).
    # Floating @main/@master → WARN (exit 0; use --strict to fail). Malformed → exit 4.
    scripts/check-action-refs.sh --offline .github/workflows/ci.yml
    
    # Live — resolve each ref against the GitHub API. A 404 (ref doesn't exist) → exit 10
    # DRIFT; API unreachable/rate-limited → exit 7 (advisory, never fails the build, §7).
    # Set GITHUB_TOKEN to dodge the unauthenticated rate limit.
    GITHUB_TOKEN=$GH_PAT scripts/check-action-refs.sh --live .github/workflows/*.yml
    
    scripts/check-action-refs.sh --json --offline | jq '.data[] | select(.status!="ok")'
    ```
    
    `--live` is the check that catches the classic `aquasecurity/trivy-action@0.33.1` mistake — that tag 404s; the real one is `v0.33.1`. Run live on a schedule (never as a blocking PR gate), offline in PR CI.
    
    ## Testing Quick Reference
    
    ```hcl
    # tests/network.tftest.hcl  — native test framework (TF ≥1.6 / OpenTofu ≥1.6)
    variables { cidr = "10.0.0.0/16" }
    
    run "valid_cidr_plan" {
      command = plan                          # plan = fast unit-ish; apply = real integration
      assert {
        condition     = aws_vpc.main.cidr_block == "10.0.0.0/16"
        error_message = "VPC CIDR did not match input"
      }
    }
    
    run "rejects_tiny_cidr" {
      command = plan
      variables { cidr = "10.0.0.0/30" }
      expect_failures = [var.cidr]            # asserts the validation block fires
    }
    ```
    
    `terraform test` runs every `*.tftest.hcl` under `tests/`; `command = apply` runs create real (then auto-destroyed) infra — use a sandbox account. Mock providers (`mock_provider` blocks, TF ≥1.7) fake apply without credentials. For multi-tool/Go-level orchestration (retry, real HTTP probes), Terratest is the heavyweight alternative — native `terraform test` covers most module CI needs first.
    
    ## Secrets Quick Reference
    
    Full detail: [references/security-and-secrets.md](references/security-and-secrets.md).
    
    | Mechanism | Version | What it does |
    |---|---|---|
    | `sensitive = true` | all | Redacts from CLI output **only** — value still plaintext in state |
    | Ephemeral resources (`ephemeral "..."`) | TF ≥1.10 / OpenTofu ≥1.11 | Fetch secret at run time; never persisted to state or plan |
    | Write-only arguments (`password_wo`) | TF ≥1.11 / OpenTofu ≥1.11 | Send secret to provider; never stored in state; rotate via `_wo_version` |
    | SOPS-encrypted tfvars | tool | Secrets encrypted at rest in git; decrypted at plan time |
    | Vault / cloud secret manager | tool | Reference by ID; resource reads secret at boot, TF never sees it |
    | OpenTofu state encryption | OpenTofu ≥1.7 | Client-side AES-GCM encryption of state/plan — **no Terraform equivalent** |
    
    **Rule zero: treat state as secret regardless.** Encrypt the backend (SSE-KMS), restrict IAM on the bucket, never commit `*.tfstate` (gitignore it).
    
    ## Terraform vs OpenTofu
    
    | | Terraform | OpenTofu |
    |---|---|---|
    | Licence | **BUSL-1.1** since 1.6 (no production use *competing with HashiCorp*; fine for normal internal use) | **MPL-2.0** — genuinely open source, Linux Foundation |
    | Current | 1.15.x | 1.12.x |
    | Exclusive features | Stacks (HCP-tied), Terraform Cloud agents, `terraform query` | State/plan **encryption**, provider `for_each` iteration, `-exclude` flag, early variable eval in backend/module blocks, OCI registry distribution, `.tofu` file extension |
    | Registry | registry.terraform.io | registry.opentofu.org (mirrors most providers) |
    | Compatibility | — | Forked at 1.5.x; HCL/state compatible for mainstream use, diverging feature-by-feature since |
    
    **Decision:** vendors and anyone redistributing IaC tooling commercially → OpenTofu (licence risk). Teams on HCP Terraform/Sentinel → Terraform. Everyone else: either works; OpenTofu's state encryption is the single biggest technical differentiator. Migration `terraform → tofu` is `tofu init` + state-compatible up to ~1.8-era features; the gap widens each release — migrate early or commit.
    
    ## Command Quick Reference
    
    ```bash
    terraform init -upgrade               # init / upgrade providers within constraints
    terraform fmt -recursive -check       # CI: fail on unformatted
    terraform validate                    # syntax + internal consistency (no creds needed after init)
    terraform plan -out=tfplan            # save plan for exact-apply
    terraform show -json tfplan | jq      # machine-readable plan (policy tools eat this)
    terraform apply tfplan                # apply EXACTLY the reviewed plan
    terraform plan -detailed-exitcode     # 0 clean / 2 drift — for cron drift checks
    terraform plan -refresh-only          # show drift without proposing config changes
    terraform apply -replace=aws_x.a      # force recreate one resource (replaces old taint)
    terraform state pull > backup.json    # ALWAYS before surgery
    terraform output -json                # consume outputs in scripts
    terraform graph | dot -Tsvg > g.svg   # dependency graph
    tofu init                             # OpenTofu: same verbs throughout
    ```
    

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