Claude Skill

stock-screening

Use when building a screen to find candidates. Covers screen design, criteria that actually discriminate, avoiding overfitting, survivorship bias, and turning a screen's output into a shortlist rather than a shopping list. Trigger on "build a stock screener", "my screen returns h

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Download nimadorostkar-claude-skills-collection-skills_finance_stock-screening-1691932.zip · 3 KB

Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection/tree/main/skills/finance/stock-screening
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install nimadorostkar-claude-skills-collection@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Stock Screening

Purpose

Build a screen that narrows a universe to a reviewable shortlist. A screen is a filter, not a decision — its output is a list of things to look at, and treating it as a list of things to buy is the fastest way to lose money with a spreadsheet.

When to Use

  • Building a systematic screen for candidates.
  • A screen that returns hundreds of results, or none.
  • Evaluating whether a screen's criteria actually discriminate.
  • Reviewing a screen that historically performed well and now does not.

Capabilities

  • Screen design: fundamental, technical, and combined criteria.
  • Criteria selection and threshold setting.
  • Overfitting detection.
  • Survivorship and look-ahead bias avoidance.
  • Ranking and shortlisting.

Inputs

  • The universe, and how it is defined.
  • The characteristics being sought, and why they should matter.
  • Historical data, if the screen is to be validated.

Outputs

  • A screen that returns a reviewable number of names — typically 10 to 40.
  • Each criterion justified by a mechanism, not by backtest fit.
  • A ranked shortlist for manual review.

Workflow

  1. Define the universe first — Liquidity and market-capitalization floors. A screen that returns illiquid microcaps you cannot actually trade is returning noise.
  2. Choose criteria with a mechanism — Each filter should have a reason it should work, stated before you test it. "It scored well in the backtest" is not a mechanism; it is a warning sign.
  3. Use few criteria — Three to six. Each additional filter cuts the result set and increases the chance you have fitted the screen to the past rather than to a real effect.
  4. Set thresholds at round, defensible numbers — A revenue growth threshold of 23.7% is fitted. 20% is a judgment. The former will not survive out of sample.
  5. Check the biases — Does the historical universe include companies that no longer exist? If not, the backtest is measuring the performance of survivors, which is not a strategy you could have run.
  6. Rank and review manually — The screen produces candidates. A human — or a careful, separate analysis — decides. The screen does not know why a company is cheap.

Best Practices

  • A screen that returns 300 names has not screened. A screen that returns zero has been over-fitted. Aim for a number you will actually review.
  • Every criterion should have a mechanism you can articulate before testing. Criteria discovered by searching the space of possible criteria are discovered by fitting noise, and there is a great deal of noise.
  • Survivorship bias makes almost every naive backtest look good. A universe of "today's S&P 500 constituents, historically" excludes every company that failed, and that is precisely the population the screen needed to avoid.
  • Look-ahead bias is subtler: using a fiscal-year figure on the day the year ended, rather than the day it was reported, gives the screen information nobody had. Use point-in-time data.
  • Value screens find cheap stocks, and stocks are usually cheap for a reason. The screen finds the candidates; the work of determining whether the reason is fatal is not done by the screen.
  • Do not re-optimize a screen after a period of poor performance. That fits it to the most recent regime, which is exactly the regime least likely to persist.

Examples

A screen with few criteria, each with a mechanism:

def momentum_quality_screen(universe: pd.DataFrame) -> pd.DataFrame:
    """Each filter has a stated mechanism. None was found by searching.

    Mechanisms:
      - Liquidity: we must be able to enter and exit without moving the price.
      - Relative strength: momentum is one of the most durable documented
        anomalies. Persistence over 6-12 months is the effect.
      - Trend structure: we do not want falling knives. Above a rising 200-day.
      - Profitability: quality screens out the low-priced momentum that is
        momentum toward zero.
      - Earnings growth: confirms the price move has a fundamental driver.
    """
    return (
        universe
        # Liquidity: tradable, not theoretical.
        .query("market_cap_usd > 2e9 and avg_dollar_volume_50d > 20e6")

        # Relative strength: top quintile over 6 months, versus the benchmark.
        .query("rs_126d > rs_126d.quantile(0.80)")

        # Trend: above a rising 200-day. No falling knives.
        .query("close > ma200 and ma200_slope_20d > 0")

        # Quality: profitable. Filters momentum-toward-zero.
        .query("roe > 0.15 and net_margin > 0.05")

        # Fundamental confirmation of the price move.
        .query("eps_growth_yoy > 0.20 and revenue_growth_yoy > 0.10")

        .sort_values("rs_126d", ascending=False)
        .head(25)                     # a reviewable shortlist, not a portfolio
    )

# Five criteria. Round thresholds. Each defensible without reference to a
# backtest. It will not be the best-performing screen in a backtest, and it is
# far more likely to work out of sample than one that is.

The bias that makes a backtest lie:

# WRONG: today's index constituents, tested historically. Every company that
# was delisted, acquired, or went to zero is absent. The screen appears to
# have avoided them; in reality it was never offered them.
universe = current_sp500_members()
backtest(screen, universe, start="2010-01-01")   # results are fiction

# RIGHT: point-in-time membership, including everything that later failed.
universe = sp500_members_as_of(date)              # survivorship-free
fundamentals = fundamentals_as_reported(date)     # not as later restated,
                                                  # and not before the filing date
backtest(screen, universe, fundamentals, start="2010-01-01")

# The difference is routinely several percentage points of annual return —
# frequently the entire apparent edge.

Notes

  • Survivorship bias alone typically accounts for 1-4 percentage points of annualized return in a naive backtest. An apparent edge of that size is often nothing but the bias.
  • The number of criteria is a proxy for overfitting risk. Every additional filter is another chance to have fitted the past. Three good criteria beat eight fitted ones.
  • This is educational material about screening methodology, not financial advice, and no screen output is a recommendation to buy anything.
Files (claude-skills-collection)
  • SKILL.md 6.8 KB
    ---
    name: stock-screening
    description: Use when building a screen to find candidates. Covers screen design, criteria that actually discriminate, avoiding overfitting, survivorship bias, and turning a screen's output into a shortlist rather than a shopping list. Trigger on "build a stock screener", "my screen returns hundreds of stocks", "find stocks that match these criteria". Do not use for testing whether the screen's picks would have made money — see the backtesting skill.
    metadata:
      category: finance
      version: 1.0.0
      tags: [screening, filters, factors, selection, bias]
    ---
    
    # Stock Screening
    
    ## Purpose
    
    Build a screen that narrows a universe to a reviewable shortlist. A screen is a filter, not a decision — its output is a list of things to look at, and treating it as a list of things to buy is the fastest way to lose money with a spreadsheet.
    
    ## When to Use
    
    - Building a systematic screen for candidates.
    - A screen that returns hundreds of results, or none.
    - Evaluating whether a screen's criteria actually discriminate.
    - Reviewing a screen that historically performed well and now does not.
    
    ## Capabilities
    
    - Screen design: fundamental, technical, and combined criteria.
    - Criteria selection and threshold setting.
    - Overfitting detection.
    - Survivorship and look-ahead bias avoidance.
    - Ranking and shortlisting.
    
    ## Inputs
    
    - The universe, and how it is defined.
    - The characteristics being sought, and why they should matter.
    - Historical data, if the screen is to be validated.
    
    ## Outputs
    
    - A screen that returns a reviewable number of names — typically 10 to 40.
    - Each criterion justified by a mechanism, not by backtest fit.
    - A ranked shortlist for manual review.
    
    ## Workflow
    
    1. **Define the universe first** — Liquidity and market-capitalization floors. A screen that returns illiquid microcaps you cannot actually trade is returning noise.
    2. **Choose criteria with a mechanism** — Each filter should have a reason it should work, stated before you test it. "It scored well in the backtest" is not a mechanism; it is a warning sign.
    3. **Use few criteria** — Three to six. Each additional filter cuts the result set and increases the chance you have fitted the screen to the past rather than to a real effect.
    4. **Set thresholds at round, defensible numbers** — A revenue growth threshold of 23.7% is fitted. 20% is a judgment. The former will not survive out of sample.
    5. **Check the biases** — Does the historical universe include companies that no longer exist? If not, the backtest is measuring the performance of survivors, which is not a strategy you could have run.
    6. **Rank and review manually** — The screen produces candidates. A human — or a careful, separate analysis — decides. The screen does not know why a company is cheap.
    
    ## Best Practices
    
    - A screen that returns 300 names has not screened. A screen that returns zero has been over-fitted. Aim for a number you will actually review.
    - Every criterion should have a mechanism you can articulate before testing. Criteria discovered by searching the space of possible criteria are discovered by fitting noise, and there is a great deal of noise.
    - Survivorship bias makes almost every naive backtest look good. A universe of "today's S&P 500 constituents, historically" excludes every company that failed, and that is precisely the population the screen needed to avoid.
    - Look-ahead bias is subtler: using a fiscal-year figure on the day the year ended, rather than the day it was reported, gives the screen information nobody had. Use point-in-time data.
    - Value screens find cheap stocks, and stocks are usually cheap for a reason. The screen finds the candidates; the work of determining whether the reason is fatal is not done by the screen.
    - Do not re-optimize a screen after a period of poor performance. That fits it to the most recent regime, which is exactly the regime least likely to persist.
    
    ## Examples
    
    **A screen with few criteria, each with a mechanism:**
    
    ```python
    def momentum_quality_screen(universe: pd.DataFrame) -> pd.DataFrame:
        """Each filter has a stated mechanism. None was found by searching.
    
        Mechanisms:
          - Liquidity: we must be able to enter and exit without moving the price.
          - Relative strength: momentum is one of the most durable documented
            anomalies. Persistence over 6-12 months is the effect.
          - Trend structure: we do not want falling knives. Above a rising 200-day.
          - Profitability: quality screens out the low-priced momentum that is
            momentum toward zero.
          - Earnings growth: confirms the price move has a fundamental driver.
        """
        return (
            universe
            # Liquidity: tradable, not theoretical.
            .query("market_cap_usd > 2e9 and avg_dollar_volume_50d > 20e6")
    
            # Relative strength: top quintile over 6 months, versus the benchmark.
            .query("rs_126d > rs_126d.quantile(0.80)")
    
            # Trend: above a rising 200-day. No falling knives.
            .query("close > ma200 and ma200_slope_20d > 0")
    
            # Quality: profitable. Filters momentum-toward-zero.
            .query("roe > 0.15 and net_margin > 0.05")
    
            # Fundamental confirmation of the price move.
            .query("eps_growth_yoy > 0.20 and revenue_growth_yoy > 0.10")
    
            .sort_values("rs_126d", ascending=False)
            .head(25)                     # a reviewable shortlist, not a portfolio
        )
    
    # Five criteria. Round thresholds. Each defensible without reference to a
    # backtest. It will not be the best-performing screen in a backtest, and it is
    # far more likely to work out of sample than one that is.
    ```
    
    **The bias that makes a backtest lie:**
    
    ```python
    # WRONG: today's index constituents, tested historically. Every company that
    # was delisted, acquired, or went to zero is absent. The screen appears to
    # have avoided them; in reality it was never offered them.
    universe = current_sp500_members()
    backtest(screen, universe, start="2010-01-01")   # results are fiction
    
    # RIGHT: point-in-time membership, including everything that later failed.
    universe = sp500_members_as_of(date)              # survivorship-free
    fundamentals = fundamentals_as_reported(date)     # not as later restated,
                                                      # and not before the filing date
    backtest(screen, universe, fundamentals, start="2010-01-01")
    
    # The difference is routinely several percentage points of annual return —
    # frequently the entire apparent edge.
    ```
    
    ## Notes
    
    - Survivorship bias alone typically accounts for 1-4 percentage points of annualized return in a naive backtest. An apparent edge of that size is often nothing but the bias.
    - The number of criteria is a proxy for overfitting risk. Every additional filter is another chance to have fitted the past. Three good criteria beat eight fitted ones.
    - This is educational material about screening methodology, not financial advice, and no screen output is a recommendation to buy anything.
    

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