Claude Cursor Skill

signed-audit-trails-recipe

Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tam

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Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/wshobson/agents/tree/main/plugins/signed-audit-trails/skills/signed-audit-trails-recipe
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install wshobson-agents@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/wshobson/agents.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole wshobson/agents collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Signed Audit Trails for Claude Code Tool Calls

Cookbook-style walkthrough for cryptographically signed receipts on every Claude Code tool call. This is the teaching skill. For the runtime implementation, install the protect-mcp plugin.

What this gives you

Every tool call (Bash, Edit, Write, WebFetch) is:

  1. Evaluated against a Cedar policy before execution. If the policy denies the call, the tool does not run.
  2. Signed as an Ed25519 receipt after execution. Receipts are JCS-canonical and verifiable offline by anyone with the public key.

An auditor, regulator, or counterparty can verify every receipt later (Step 5). No network call, no vendor lookup, no trust in the operator.

When to use the pattern

  • Regulated environments (finance, healthcare, critical infrastructure) where you need tamper-evident evidence of agent behavior
  • CI/CD pipelines where you want to prove that a policy gate held for every automated build step
  • Multi-party collaboration where a counterparty wants to verify your agent's behavior without trusting your operator
  • Compliance contexts (EU AI Act Article 12, SLSA provenance for agent-built software) where standard logging is not sufficient

Step 1: Install the hook configuration

Install the protect-mcp plugin with /plugin install protect-mcp. Its hooks run evaluate.sh before each tool call and sign.sh after it. Both scripts read the hook event from stdin, because Claude Code sets no TOOL_NAME or TOOL_INPUT variables. See references/hook-wiring.md for the hook configuration and what each script passes to protect-mcp.

protect-mcp 0.7.4 does not create the signing key, and without a key the receipts are unsigned. Create ./protect-mcp.key once. The command never replaces an existing key:

if [ ! -e ./protect-mcp.key ]; then
  d=$(mktemp -d) && npx protect-mcp@0.7.4 init --dir "$d" && mv "$d/keys/gateway.json" ./protect-mcp.key
fi

Give auditors the publicKey value from that file. Do not commit the file, because it also holds the private key.

Add the private key and receipt directory to .gitignore:

echo "/protect-mcp.key" >> .gitignore
echo "/receipts/" >> .gitignore

Step 2: Write a Cedar policy

Create ./protect.cedar from the example in references/cedar-policy.md. It allows read-only tools and a short list of Bash commands, denies shell chaining and destructive commands, and limits writes to the project with .. segments denied.

Step 3: Use Claude Code normally

Start Claude Code. Every tool call goes through both hooks:

You: Please read the README and summarize it.

Claude: I will read README.md.
  [PreToolUse: Read ./README.md -> allow]
  [Tool: Read executes]
  [PostToolUse: receipt rcpt-a8f3c9d2 signed to ./receipts/]

... summary of README ...

A session of 20 tool calls appends 20 receipts to ./receipts/receipts.jsonl.

Step 4: Inspect a receipt

protect-mcp 0.7.4 appends each receipt as one line of ./receipts/receipts.jsonl. Print the newest one:

tail -n 1 ./receipts/receipts.jsonl | python3 -m json.tool

The receipt is a signed v2 envelope that names the tool, and it holds no public key. See references/receipt-format.md for a sample and the signed fields.

Step 5: Verify the receipts

Pass the publicKey value from ./protect-mcp.key to the verifier:

PUB=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("./protect-mcp.key")).publicKey')
npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"

Exit codes:

Code Meaning
0 Every receipt verified
1 A receipt failed verification (tampered, wrong key, or malformed line)
2 The receipts file could not be read

Step 6: Demonstrate tamper detection

Change the newest receipt's decision from allow to deny:

python3 -c "
import json
path = './receipts/receipts.jsonl'
lines = open(path).read().splitlines()
r = json.loads(lines[-1])
r['payload']['decision'] = 'deny'
lines[-1] = json.dumps(r)
open(path, 'w').write('\n'.join(lines) + '\n')
"

npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"

The verifier exits with code 1 and reports which line failed. The Ed25519 signature no longer matches the JCS-canonical bytes of the tampered payload.

Restore the field and verification passes again.

How the cryptography works

Two invariants make receipts verifiable offline across any conformant implementation:

  1. JCS canonicalization (RFC 8785) before signing. Keys sorted by UTF-16 code units, whitespace minimized, strings not normalized. Two independent implementations produce byte-identical signing payloads for the same receipt content.
  2. Ed25519 signatures (RFC 8032) over the canonical bytes. Deterministic, fixed-size, no nonce dependency.

protect-mcp 0.7.4 receipts carry no link to the previous receipt, so a deleted receipt goes undetected.

For the formal wire format see draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts.

Cross-implementation interop

The receipt format has four independent implementations today:

Implementation Language Use case
protect-mcp TypeScript Claude Code, Cursor, MCP hosts
protect-mcp-adk Python Google Agent Development Kit
sb-runtime Rust OS-level sandbox (Landlock + seccomp)
APS governance hook Python CrewAI, LangChain

A receipt produced by any of them verifies against @veritasacta/verify. The auditor does not need to trust the operator's tooling choice: the format is the contract.

CI/CD integration

Verify receipts in CI so a tampered receipt fails the build. references/ci-cd.md has a GitHub Actions workflow that runs on pushes to the default branch. It installs the signing key from a branch-limited environment, runs the agent, verifies the receipts, and uploads them. It does not run on pull requests, because that would hand the key to unreviewed code.

Composition with SLSA provenance for agent-built software

When Claude Code builds and releases software (running npm install, npm build, npm publish as tool calls), the receipt chain is the per-step build log. SLSA Provenance v1 has an extension point for this: the byproducts field can reference the receipt chain alongside the build attestation.

The agent-commit build type documents the pattern using the ResourceDescriptor shape:

{
  "name": "decision-receipts",
  "digest": { "sha256": "..." },
  "uri": "oci://registry/org/build-xyz/receipts:sha256-...",
  "annotations": {
    "predicateType": "https://veritasacta.com/attestation/decision-receipt/v0.1",
    "signerRole": "supervisor-hook"
  }
}

The SLSA provenance is signed by the builder identity; the receipt attestation is signed by the supervisor-hook identity. Two trust domains, cross-referenced at the byproduct layer. See slsa-framework/slsa#1594 for the composition discussion.

Common pitfalls

Private key in version control. The generated ./protect-mcp.key must not be committed. The examples above add it to .gitignore. If a key is accidentally committed, rotate it immediately. Move the key and ./receipts/receipts.jsonl to an archive, then run the Step 1 command again. Verify the archived receipts with the old public key.

Hook payload on stdin. Claude Code sets no $TOOL_NAME or $TOOL_INPUT variables. A hook command that passes --tool "$TOOL_NAME" sends an empty tool name, so the policy denies every call. Read the payload from stdin as the plugin scripts do.

Receipts directory in CI. If Claude Code runs in CI, upload receipts as an artifact at the end of the job or the receipts are lost at job end.

Policy is missing. When ./protect.cedar does not exist, evaluate.sh prints a warning to stderr and allows the call. No call is gated until you create the policy in Step 2.

Related in this marketplace

  • protect-mcp — the runtime hook implementation (use this plugin in production)
  • review-agent-governance — require human approval before review-surface actions; composes with protect-mcp

References

Files (agents)
  • references
    • cedar-policy.md 3.9 KB
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    • ci-cd.md 2.1 KB
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    • hook-wiring.md 1.3 KB
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    • receipt-format.md 1.2 KB
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  • SKILL.md 9.9 KB
    ---
    name: signed-audit-trails-recipe
    description: Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tamper detection, CI/CD integration, and SLSA composition.
    ---
    
    # Signed Audit Trails for Claude Code Tool Calls
    
    Cookbook-style walkthrough for cryptographically signed receipts on every
    Claude Code tool call. This is the teaching skill. For the runtime
    implementation, install the [`protect-mcp`](../../../protect-mcp/) plugin.
    
    ## What this gives you
    
    Every tool call (`Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `WebFetch`) is:
    
    1. **Evaluated against a Cedar policy** before execution. If the policy denies
       the call, the tool does not run.
    2. **Signed as an Ed25519 receipt** after execution. Receipts are
       JCS-canonical and verifiable offline by anyone with the public key.
    
    An auditor, regulator, or counterparty can verify every receipt later
    (Step 5). No network call, no vendor lookup, no trust in the operator.
    
    ## When to use the pattern
    
    - **Regulated environments** (finance, healthcare, critical infrastructure)
      where you need tamper-evident evidence of agent behavior
    - **CI/CD pipelines** where you want to prove that a policy gate held for
      every automated build step
    - **Multi-party collaboration** where a counterparty wants to verify your
      agent's behavior without trusting your operator
    - **Compliance contexts** (EU AI Act Article 12, SLSA provenance for
      agent-built software) where standard logging is not sufficient
    
    ## Step 1: Install the hook configuration
    
    Install the `protect-mcp` plugin with `/plugin install protect-mcp`. Its hooks
    run `evaluate.sh` before each tool call and `sign.sh` after it. Both scripts
    read the hook event from stdin, because Claude Code sets no `TOOL_NAME` or
    `TOOL_INPUT` variables. See
    [`references/hook-wiring.md`](references/hook-wiring.md) for the hook
    configuration and what each script passes to protect-mcp.
    
    protect-mcp 0.7.4 does not create the signing key, and without a key the
    receipts are unsigned. Create `./protect-mcp.key` once. The command never
    replaces an existing key:
    
    ```bash
    if [ ! -e ./protect-mcp.key ]; then
      d=$(mktemp -d) && npx protect-mcp@0.7.4 init --dir "$d" && mv "$d/keys/gateway.json" ./protect-mcp.key
    fi
    ```
    
    Give auditors the `publicKey` value from that file. Do not commit the file,
    because it also holds the private key.
    
    Add the private key and receipt directory to `.gitignore`:
    
    ```bash
    echo "/protect-mcp.key" >> .gitignore
    echo "/receipts/" >> .gitignore
    ```
    
    ## Step 2: Write a Cedar policy
    
    Create `./protect.cedar` from the example in
    [`references/cedar-policy.md`](references/cedar-policy.md). It allows read-only
    tools and a short list of Bash commands, denies shell chaining and destructive
    commands, and limits writes to the project with `..` segments denied.
    
    ## Step 3: Use Claude Code normally
    
    Start Claude Code. Every tool call goes through both hooks:
    
    ```
    You: Please read the README and summarize it.
    
    Claude: I will read README.md.
      [PreToolUse: Read ./README.md -> allow]
      [Tool: Read executes]
      [PostToolUse: receipt rcpt-a8f3c9d2 signed to ./receipts/]
    
    ... summary of README ...
    ```
    
    A session of 20 tool calls appends 20 receipts to `./receipts/receipts.jsonl`.
    
    ## Step 4: Inspect a receipt
    
    protect-mcp 0.7.4 appends each receipt as one line of
    `./receipts/receipts.jsonl`. Print the newest one:
    
    ```bash
    tail -n 1 ./receipts/receipts.jsonl | python3 -m json.tool
    ```
    
    The receipt is a signed v2 envelope that names the tool, and it holds no
    public key. See [`references/receipt-format.md`](references/receipt-format.md)
    for a sample and the signed fields.
    
    ## Step 5: Verify the receipts
    
    Pass the `publicKey` value from `./protect-mcp.key` to the verifier:
    
    ```bash
    PUB=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("./protect-mcp.key")).publicKey')
    npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"
    ```
    
    Exit codes:
    
    | Code | Meaning |
    |------|---------|
    | `0`  | Every receipt verified |
    | `1`  | A receipt failed verification (tampered, wrong key, or malformed line) |
    | `2`  | The receipts file could not be read |
    
    ## Step 6: Demonstrate tamper detection
    
    Change the newest receipt's `decision` from `allow` to `deny`:
    
    ```bash
    python3 -c "
    import json
    path = './receipts/receipts.jsonl'
    lines = open(path).read().splitlines()
    r = json.loads(lines[-1])
    r['payload']['decision'] = 'deny'
    lines[-1] = json.dumps(r)
    open(path, 'w').write('\n'.join(lines) + '\n')
    "
    
    npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"
    ```
    
    The verifier exits with code `1` and reports which line failed. The
    Ed25519 signature no longer matches the JCS-canonical bytes of the
    tampered payload.
    
    Restore the field and verification passes again.
    
    ## How the cryptography works
    
    Two invariants make receipts verifiable offline across any conformant
    implementation:
    
    1. **JCS canonicalization (RFC 8785)** before signing. Keys sorted by
       UTF-16 code units, whitespace minimized, strings not normalized. Two
       independent implementations produce byte-identical signing payloads for the same
       receipt content.
    2. **Ed25519 signatures (RFC 8032)** over the canonical bytes.
       Deterministic, fixed-size, no nonce dependency.
    
    protect-mcp 0.7.4 receipts carry no link to the previous receipt, so a
    deleted receipt goes undetected.
    
    For the formal wire format see
    [draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/).
    
    ## Cross-implementation interop
    
    The receipt format has four independent implementations today:
    
    | Implementation | Language | Use case |
    |----------------|----------|----------|
    | [protect-mcp](https://www.npmjs.com/package/protect-mcp) | TypeScript | Claude Code, Cursor, MCP hosts |
    | [protect-mcp-adk](https://pypi.org/project/protect-mcp-adk/) | Python | Google Agent Development Kit |
    | [sb-runtime](https://github.com/ScopeBlind/sb-runtime) | Rust | OS-level sandbox (Landlock + seccomp) |
    | APS governance hook | Python | CrewAI, LangChain |
    
    A receipt produced by any of them verifies against
    [`@veritasacta/verify`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify).
    The auditor does not need to trust the operator's tooling choice: the format
    is the contract.
    
    ## CI/CD integration
    
    Verify receipts in CI so a tampered receipt fails the build.
    [`references/ci-cd.md`](references/ci-cd.md) has a GitHub Actions workflow
    that runs on pushes to the default branch. It installs the signing key from a
    branch-limited environment, runs the agent, verifies the receipts, and uploads
    them. It does not run on pull requests, because that would hand the key to
    unreviewed code.
    
    ## Composition with SLSA provenance for agent-built software
    
    When Claude Code builds and releases software (running `npm install`,
    `npm build`, `npm publish` as tool calls), the receipt chain is the
    per-step build log. SLSA Provenance v1 has an extension point for this: the
    `byproducts` field can reference the receipt chain alongside the build
    attestation.
    
    The [agent-commit build type](https://refs.arewm.com/agent-commit/v0.2)
    documents the pattern using the ResourceDescriptor shape:
    
    ```json
    {
      "name": "decision-receipts",
      "digest": { "sha256": "..." },
      "uri": "oci://registry/org/build-xyz/receipts:sha256-...",
      "annotations": {
        "predicateType": "https://veritasacta.com/attestation/decision-receipt/v0.1",
        "signerRole": "supervisor-hook"
      }
    }
    ```
    
    The SLSA provenance is signed by the builder identity; the receipt
    attestation is signed by the supervisor-hook identity. Two trust domains,
    cross-referenced at the byproduct layer. See
    [slsa-framework/slsa#1594](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/1594)
    for the composition discussion.
    
    ## Common pitfalls
    
    **Private key in version control.** The generated `./protect-mcp.key` must
    not be committed. The examples above add it to `.gitignore`. If a key is
    accidentally committed, rotate it immediately. Move the key and
    `./receipts/receipts.jsonl` to an archive, then run the Step 1 command again.
    Verify the archived receipts with the old public key.
    
    **Hook payload on stdin.** Claude Code sets no `$TOOL_NAME` or `$TOOL_INPUT`
    variables. A hook command that passes `--tool "$TOOL_NAME"` sends an empty
    tool name, so the policy denies every call. Read the payload from stdin as the
    plugin scripts do.
    
    **Receipts directory in CI.** If Claude Code runs in CI, upload receipts as
    an artifact at the end of the job or the receipts are lost at job end.
    
    **Policy is missing.** When `./protect.cedar` does not exist, `evaluate.sh`
    prints a warning to stderr and allows the call. No call is gated until you
    create the policy in Step 2.
    
    ## Related in this marketplace
    
    - [`protect-mcp`](../../../protect-mcp/) — the runtime hook implementation
      (use this plugin in production)
    - [`review-agent-governance`](../../../review-agent-governance/) — require
      human approval before review-surface actions; composes with protect-mcp
    
    ## References
    
    - [`draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts`](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/) — IETF draft, receipt wire format
    - [RFC 8032](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032) — Ed25519
    - [RFC 8785](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8785) — JCS
    - [Cedar policy language](https://docs.cedarpolicy.com/)
    - [protect-mcp on npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/protect-mcp)
    - [@veritasacta/verify on npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify)
    - [in-toto/attestation#549](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/pull/549) — Decision Receipt predicate proposal
    - [agent-commit build type](https://refs.arewm.com/agent-commit/v0.2) — SLSA provenance for agent-produced commits
    - [Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit) (`examples/protect-mcp-governed/`)
    - [AWS Cedar for Agents](https://github.com/cedar-policy/cedar-for-agents)
    

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