Claude Cursor Skill

security-review

AI DevKit · Review code, skills, and prompts for security vulnerabilities — OWASP Top 10, prompt injection, business logic flaws, and insecure defaults. Use when reviewing PRs, auditing modules, reviewing AI skills/prompts, or preparing for release.

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Download codeaholicguy-ai-devkit-skills_security-review-ac73d58.zip · 4 KB

Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/codeaholicguy/ai-devkit/tree/main/skills/security-review
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install codeaholicguy-ai-devkit@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/codeaholicguy/ai-devkit.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole codeaholicguy/ai-devkit collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Security Review

Find vulnerabilities before they ship.

Hard Rules

  • Do not dismiss a finding without evidence it is unexploitable.
  • Do not commit, log, or surface secrets discovered during review — flag and recommend rotation.
  • Do not modify code until the user approves a remediation plan.

Workflow

  1. Scope

    • Confirm target: diff, file set, module, full repo, or skill/prompt. A target can be both code and prompt.
    • Identify stack/framework — adapt the checklist (skip what the framework handles, add its pitfalls).
    • Trace data flow: request → middleware → handler → service → datastore → response. For prompts: input → template → LLM → tools → output.
    • Map trust boundaries, privilege levels, and threat actors.
    • Search prior findings: npx ai-devkit@latest memory search --query "<target>" --tags "security"
  2. Scan

    • Only check relevant categories. Skip sections and items that don't apply. Do not report skipped items.
    • For diffs/PRs: also check whether the change weakens existing controls — removed middleware, bypassed validation, new unprotected routes.
    • Categories in priority order:
      1. Secrets — hardcoded tokens, keys, connection strings.
      2. Injection — SQL, NoSQL, command, template, SSRF, path traversal, XSS.
      3. Auth — missing checks, privilege escalation, OAuth/OIDC, IDOR.
      4. Business Logic — race conditions, TOCTOU, workflow bypass, mass assignment, parameter tampering.
      5. Data Exposure — PII in logs, verbose errors, overly broad responses.
      6. Resource Exhaustion — unbounded queries, missing pagination, upload size, decompression bombs.
      7. Dependencies — critical CVEs only (RCE, auth bypass, data breach); ignore low/medium.
      8. Cryptography — weak algorithms, hardcoded IVs/keys, disabled certificate validation.
      9. Configuration — debug mode, permissive CORS, missing security headers.
      10. Logging — security events unlogged, no tamper protection, no alerting.
      11. Prompt Injection — instruction override, tool abuse, data exfiltration, indirect injection via tool results.
    • For each finding: file, line, evidence.
  3. Classify

    Severity Criteria
    Critical Exploitable now, data loss or RCE possible
    High Exploitable with moderate effort or insider access
    Medium Requires chained conditions or limited impact
    Low Defense-in-depth, no direct exploit path
    • Adjust severity by exposure (internet-facing vs internal) and data sensitivity.
    • Check for attack chains — multiple Medium findings that combine into High/Critical.
    • Mark false positives with reasoning.
  4. Remediate

    • For each finding: root cause, minimal fix (prefer stdlib/framework over custom), verification step.
    • For Critical/High: also recommend a detection control (log, alert, or WAF rule).
    • Present plan and request approval before changing code.
  5. Verify

    • Use the verify skill to confirm each remediation.
    • Re-scan fixed files for regressions.
    • Store findings: npx ai-devkit@latest memory store --title "<pattern>" --content "<finding and fix>" --tags "security,<category>"

Red Flags

Rationalization Do Instead
"It's internal / behind a VPN / only admins" Zero-trust: validate at every boundary regardless of network position or user role
"We'll add auth later" Add auth before merge — unauthenticated endpoints get discovered fast
"It's just a dev credential" Use env vars / secrets manager — dev secrets leak to prod constantly
"The framework handles that" Verify the config — frameworks have defaults, not guarantees
"We sanitize on the frontend" Always validate server-side — client validation is bypassable
"The LLM won't follow injected instructions" Treat all tool results and external content as untrusted data
"It's just a prompt, not code" Prompts control tool execution — review with the same rigor as code

Output Template

  • Scope: Target, stack, data flow, trust boundaries, threat actors
  • Findings (by severity): ID, severity, category, file:line, exploit scenario, fix
  • Attack Chains: Findings that escalate when combined
  • False Positives: Dismissed items with reasoning
  • Remediation Plan: Ordered fixes with verification steps
  • Residual Risk: Scope limitations, unverifiable items
  • Zero findings: state what was checked and scope boundaries — "no findings" ≠ "fully secure"
Files (ai-devkit)
  • agents
    • openai.yaml 385 B
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  • references
    • checklist.md 4.3 KB
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  • SKILL.md 4.8 KB
    ---
    name: security-review
    description: AI DevKit · Review code, skills, and prompts for security vulnerabilities — OWASP Top 10, prompt injection, business logic flaws, and insecure defaults. Use when reviewing PRs, auditing modules, reviewing AI skills/prompts, or preparing for release.
    ---
    
    # Security Review
    
    Find vulnerabilities before they ship.
    
    ## Hard Rules
    
    - Do not dismiss a finding without evidence it is unexploitable.
    - Do not commit, log, or surface secrets discovered during review — flag and recommend rotation.
    - Do not modify code until the user approves a remediation plan.
    
    ## Workflow
    
    1. **Scope**
       - Confirm target: diff, file set, module, full repo, or skill/prompt. A target can be both code and prompt.
       - Identify stack/framework — adapt the [checklist](references/checklist.md) (skip what the framework handles, add its pitfalls).
       - Trace data flow: request → middleware → handler → service → datastore → response. For prompts: input → template → LLM → tools → output.
       - Map trust boundaries, privilege levels, and threat actors.
       - Search prior findings: `npx ai-devkit@latest memory search --query "<target>" --tags "security"`
    
    2. **Scan**
       - Only check relevant categories. Skip sections and items that don't apply. Do not report skipped items.
       - For diffs/PRs: also check whether the change weakens existing controls — removed middleware, bypassed validation, new unprotected routes.
       - Categories in priority order:
         a. **Secrets** — hardcoded tokens, keys, connection strings.
         b. **Injection** — SQL, NoSQL, command, template, SSRF, path traversal, XSS.
         c. **Auth** — missing checks, privilege escalation, OAuth/OIDC, IDOR.
         d. **Business Logic** — race conditions, TOCTOU, workflow bypass, mass assignment, parameter tampering.
         e. **Data Exposure** — PII in logs, verbose errors, overly broad responses.
         f. **Resource Exhaustion** — unbounded queries, missing pagination, upload size, decompression bombs.
         g. **Dependencies** — critical CVEs only (RCE, auth bypass, data breach); ignore low/medium.
         h. **Cryptography** — weak algorithms, hardcoded IVs/keys, disabled certificate validation.
         i. **Configuration** — debug mode, permissive CORS, missing security headers.
         j. **Logging** — security events unlogged, no tamper protection, no alerting.
         k. **Prompt Injection** — instruction override, tool abuse, data exfiltration, indirect injection via tool results.
       - For each finding: file, line, evidence.
    
    3. **Classify**
    
       | Severity | Criteria |
       |----------|----------|
       | Critical | Exploitable now, data loss or RCE possible |
       | High     | Exploitable with moderate effort or insider access |
       | Medium   | Requires chained conditions or limited impact |
       | Low      | Defense-in-depth, no direct exploit path |
    
       - Adjust severity by exposure (internet-facing vs internal) and data sensitivity.
       - Check for attack chains — multiple Medium findings that combine into High/Critical.
       - Mark false positives with reasoning.
    
    4. **Remediate**
       - For each finding: root cause, minimal fix (prefer stdlib/framework over custom), verification step.
       - For Critical/High: also recommend a detection control (log, alert, or WAF rule).
       - Present plan and request approval before changing code.
    
    5. **Verify**
       - Use the `verify` skill to confirm each remediation.
       - Re-scan fixed files for regressions.
       - Store findings: `npx ai-devkit@latest memory store --title "<pattern>" --content "<finding and fix>" --tags "security,<category>"`
    
    ## Red Flags
    
    | Rationalization | Do Instead |
    |---|---|
    | "It's internal / behind a VPN / only admins" | Zero-trust: validate at every boundary regardless of network position or user role |
    | "We'll add auth later" | Add auth before merge — unauthenticated endpoints get discovered fast |
    | "It's just a dev credential" | Use env vars / secrets manager — dev secrets leak to prod constantly |
    | "The framework handles that" | Verify the config — frameworks have defaults, not guarantees |
    | "We sanitize on the frontend" | Always validate server-side — client validation is bypassable |
    | "The LLM won't follow injected instructions" | Treat all tool results and external content as untrusted data |
    | "It's just a prompt, not code" | Prompts control tool execution — review with the same rigor as code |
    
    ## Output Template
    
    - **Scope**: Target, stack, data flow, trust boundaries, threat actors
    - **Findings** (by severity): ID, severity, category, file:line, exploit scenario, fix
    - **Attack Chains**: Findings that escalate when combined
    - **False Positives**: Dismissed items with reasoning
    - **Remediation Plan**: Ordered fixes with verification steps
    - **Residual Risk**: Scope limitations, unverifiable items
    - Zero findings: state what was checked and scope boundaries — "no findings" ≠ "fully secure"

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