security-audit
Use when a codebase needs a formal security audit beyond a quick scan — applies OWASP Top 10 and STRIDE threat modeling from a CSO perspective to surface systemic vulnerabilities.
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/drvoss/everything-copilot-cli/tree/main/skills/workflow/security-audit
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install drvoss-everything-copilot-cli@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/drvoss/everything-copilot-cli.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole drvoss/everything-copilot-cli collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
Security Audit Skill
A structured security review workflow inspired by gstack's /cso role. Treat every
audit as if you are the Chief Security Officer: adversarial, systematic, and unapologetic
about raising issues.
This skill is distinct from the security-scan development skill — it covers full
threat modeling, not just code-level checks.
When to Use
- Before launching a new product or significant feature
- After adding authentication, authorization, or data handling code
- When onboarding to a codebase with unknown security posture
- Periodic audits (monthly, per-sprint, before major releases)
Audit Framework
OWASP Top 10 Checklist
Copilot will systematically check each OWASP category:
> Perform an OWASP Top 10 audit on this codebase. For each category:
> 1. Check if the application is potentially vulnerable
> 2. Find specific code locations if vulnerable
> 3. Recommend a fix
> 4. Rate severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low
OWASP categories to cover:
- A01 Broken Access Control — authorization bypasses, privilege escalation
- A02 Cryptographic Failures — weak encryption, hardcoded secrets, cleartext data
- A03 Injection — SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP injection
- A04 Insecure Design — threat modeling gaps, missing security controls
- A05 Security Misconfiguration — default credentials, verbose errors, open cloud storage
- A06 Vulnerable Components — outdated dependencies with known CVEs
- A07 Auth Failures — session management, credential stuffing, weak passwords
- A08 Software Integrity — unsigned updates, insecure CI/CD, deserialization
- A09 Logging Failures — missing security logs, log injection
- A10 SSRF — server-side request forgery, internal service exposure
STRIDE Threat Modeling
For each major component (API endpoint, service, data store):
> Apply STRIDE threat modeling to the [component]. For each threat type,
> describe the attack vector, assess likelihood (1-5), assess impact (1-5),
> and recommend a mitigation.
| Threat | Question |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can an attacker impersonate a user or service? |
| Tampering | Can data be modified in transit or at rest? |
| Repudiation | Can an actor deny performing an action? |
| Information Disclosure | Can sensitive data be exposed unintentionally? |
| Denial of Service | Can the system be made unavailable? |
| Elevation of Privilege | Can a low-privilege user gain higher access? |
Secrets Scan
> Scan the codebase for hardcoded secrets, API keys, passwords, and tokens.
> Include config files, environment examples, and test fixtures.
Check these patterns:
- Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords
.env.examplefiles with real values- Comments containing credentials
- Git history (check
.gitlog for accidentally committed secrets) - Infrastructure-as-code files (Terraform, CloudFormation)
Dependency Audit
> Audit our dependencies for known CVEs. Run npm audit / pip-audit /
> bundler-audit and summarize critical and high severity issues.
Auth & Session Review
> Review the authentication and session management implementation:
> - Token expiration and refresh logic
> - Password hashing (bcrypt/argon2, not MD5/SHA1)
> - Session fixation and hijacking prevention
> - OAuth/OIDC implementation correctness
> - MFA implementation
Full Audit Workflow
# 0. Ask before you scan
> Before auditing, ask what the workload must satisfy: data sensitivity, regulatory or
> privacy obligations, who owns which layer (your code vs. the platform vs. a vendor),
> accepted exceptions, and how the team currently proves its controls work.
# 1. Get the lay of the land
> Map the attack surface: list all public API endpoints, auth endpoints,
> file upload handlers, and external service integrations.
# 2. OWASP sweep
> Perform an OWASP Top 10 audit. Start with A01-A03 (highest frequency).
# 3. Threat model critical paths
> Apply STRIDE to our authentication flow and payment processing.
# 4. Secrets scan
> Scan for hardcoded secrets and credentials.
# 5. Dependency check
npm audit --audit-level=high
# 6. Generate report
> Generate a security audit report with:
> - Executive summary (3 sentences)
> - Critical findings (must fix before launch)
> - High findings (fix within 2 weeks)
> - Medium/Low findings (backlog)
> - Recommended next steps
Map findings to design principles
The checklists find defects; the principles explain why the defect class keeps recurring. Tag each critical or high finding with the principle it violates, so the fix targets the process and not only the line:
| Principle | Ask of each finding |
|---|---|
| Security by design | Was a security requirement written down before the code? |
| Zero trust | Was access granted by location or prior trust instead of verified each time? |
| Shift-left | Could a pre-commit, CI, or review check have caught it earlier? |
| Compliance and privacy | Does it break a stated obligation, not only a best practice? |
| Shared responsibility | Is this layer ours to fix, or the platform's or a vendor's? |
A cluster of findings under one principle points to a gap in the development process worth its own
follow-up. A finding that fits none of these five is unclassified, not necessarily a one-off — this
is a shortened list. Principles adapted from the Security pillar in google/skills
google-cloud-waf-security (Apache-2.0), without the Google Cloud product guidance.
Output Format
Request a structured report:
> Format the audit findings as a Markdown table:
> | Finding | Category | Severity | Location | Recommended Fix |
Tips
- Be adversarial: Ask Copilot to think like an attacker, not a developer
- Audit the happy path last: Most vulnerabilities are in error handling and edge cases
- Check the infrastructure too: Security isn't just code — review CORS config, headers, TLS
- Rotate secrets after audits: If you found any, assume they're compromised
- Schedule regular audits: Security debt accumulates; quarterly > never
Skill Differentiation
| Skill | Scope | When |
|---|---|---|
| security-audit (this skill) | Full threat model: OWASP + STRIDE + auth + deps. Strategic/CSO view. | Pre-launch, quarterly, new auth feature |
security-scan |
Code-level grep patterns + npm audit. Quick tactical scan. |
Before every PR, CI integration |
evaluate-repository |
Repository-wide 7-dimension scorecard (secrets, deps, input validation, auth, error handling, supply chain, AI agent governance). | Onboarding to unknown codebase |
Run security-scan every PR. Run security-audit every sprint or release. Run evaluate-repository once on unfamiliar codebases.
See Also
security-scan— Quick code-level vulnerability scan (OWASP grep + STRIDE per feature)evaluate-repository— Full repo security scorecardpr-multi-perspective-review— Security Lens in PR reviewssecret-detection— Dedicated secret and credential scanning
Files (everything-copilot-cli)
-
SKILL.md 7.5 KB
--- name: security-audit license: MIT description: Use when a codebase needs a formal security audit beyond a quick scan — applies OWASP Top 10 and STRIDE threat modeling from a CSO perspective to surface systemic vulnerabilities. metadata: category: workflow --- # Security Audit Skill A structured security review workflow inspired by gstack's `/cso` role. Treat every audit as if you are the Chief Security Officer: adversarial, systematic, and unapologetic about raising issues. This skill is distinct from the `security-scan` development skill — it covers full threat modeling, not just code-level checks. ## When to Use - Before launching a new product or significant feature - After adding authentication, authorization, or data handling code - When onboarding to a codebase with unknown security posture - Periodic audits (monthly, per-sprint, before major releases) ## Audit Framework ### OWASP Top 10 Checklist Copilot will systematically check each OWASP category: ```text > Perform an OWASP Top 10 audit on this codebase. For each category: > 1. Check if the application is potentially vulnerable > 2. Find specific code locations if vulnerable > 3. Recommend a fix > 4. Rate severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low ``` OWASP categories to cover: - **A01 Broken Access Control** — authorization bypasses, privilege escalation - **A02 Cryptographic Failures** — weak encryption, hardcoded secrets, cleartext data - **A03 Injection** — SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP injection - **A04 Insecure Design** — threat modeling gaps, missing security controls - **A05 Security Misconfiguration** — default credentials, verbose errors, open cloud storage - **A06 Vulnerable Components** — outdated dependencies with known CVEs - **A07 Auth Failures** — session management, credential stuffing, weak passwords - **A08 Software Integrity** — unsigned updates, insecure CI/CD, deserialization - **A09 Logging Failures** — missing security logs, log injection - **A10 SSRF** — server-side request forgery, internal service exposure ### STRIDE Threat Modeling For each major component (API endpoint, service, data store): ```text > Apply STRIDE threat modeling to the [component]. For each threat type, > describe the attack vector, assess likelihood (1-5), assess impact (1-5), > and recommend a mitigation. ``` | Threat | Question | |--------|----------| | **S**poofing | Can an attacker impersonate a user or service? | | **T**ampering | Can data be modified in transit or at rest? | | **R**epudiation | Can an actor deny performing an action? | | **I**nformation Disclosure | Can sensitive data be exposed unintentionally? | | **D**enial of Service | Can the system be made unavailable? | | **E**levation of Privilege | Can a low-privilege user gain higher access? | ### Secrets Scan ```text > Scan the codebase for hardcoded secrets, API keys, passwords, and tokens. > Include config files, environment examples, and test fixtures. ``` Check these patterns: - Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords - `.env.example` files with real values - Comments containing credentials - Git history (check `.git` log for accidentally committed secrets) - Infrastructure-as-code files (Terraform, CloudFormation) ### Dependency Audit ```text > Audit our dependencies for known CVEs. Run npm audit / pip-audit / > bundler-audit and summarize critical and high severity issues. ``` ### Auth & Session Review ```text > Review the authentication and session management implementation: > - Token expiration and refresh logic > - Password hashing (bcrypt/argon2, not MD5/SHA1) > - Session fixation and hijacking prevention > - OAuth/OIDC implementation correctness > - MFA implementation ``` ## Full Audit Workflow ```text # 0. Ask before you scan > Before auditing, ask what the workload must satisfy: data sensitivity, regulatory or > privacy obligations, who owns which layer (your code vs. the platform vs. a vendor), > accepted exceptions, and how the team currently proves its controls work. # 1. Get the lay of the land > Map the attack surface: list all public API endpoints, auth endpoints, > file upload handlers, and external service integrations. # 2. OWASP sweep > Perform an OWASP Top 10 audit. Start with A01-A03 (highest frequency). # 3. Threat model critical paths > Apply STRIDE to our authentication flow and payment processing. # 4. Secrets scan > Scan for hardcoded secrets and credentials. # 5. Dependency check npm audit --audit-level=high # 6. Generate report > Generate a security audit report with: > - Executive summary (3 sentences) > - Critical findings (must fix before launch) > - High findings (fix within 2 weeks) > - Medium/Low findings (backlog) > - Recommended next steps ``` ### Map findings to design principles The checklists find defects; the principles explain why the defect class keeps recurring. Tag each critical or high finding with the principle it violates, so the fix targets the process and not only the line: | Principle | Ask of each finding | |-----------|---------------------| | Security by design | Was a security requirement written down before the code? | | Zero trust | Was access granted by location or prior trust instead of verified each time? | | Shift-left | Could a pre-commit, CI, or review check have caught it earlier? | | Compliance and privacy | Does it break a stated obligation, not only a best practice? | | Shared responsibility | Is this layer ours to fix, or the platform's or a vendor's? | A cluster of findings under one principle points to a gap in the development process worth its own follow-up. A finding that fits none of these five is unclassified, not necessarily a one-off — this is a shortened list. Principles adapted from the Security pillar in `google/skills` `google-cloud-waf-security` (Apache-2.0), without the Google Cloud product guidance. ## Output Format Request a structured report: ```text > Format the audit findings as a Markdown table: > | Finding | Category | Severity | Location | Recommended Fix | ``` ## Tips - **Be adversarial**: Ask Copilot to think like an attacker, not a developer - **Audit the happy path last**: Most vulnerabilities are in error handling and edge cases - **Check the infrastructure too**: Security isn't just code — review CORS config, headers, TLS - **Rotate secrets after audits**: If you found any, assume they're compromised - **Schedule regular audits**: Security debt accumulates; quarterly > never ## Skill Differentiation | Skill | Scope | When | |-------|-------|------| | **security-audit** (this skill) | Full threat model: OWASP + STRIDE + auth + deps. Strategic/CSO view. | Pre-launch, quarterly, new auth feature | | [`security-scan`](../../security/security-scan/SKILL.md) | Code-level grep patterns + `npm audit`. Quick tactical scan. | Before every PR, CI integration | | [`evaluate-repository`](../../security/evaluate-repository/SKILL.md) | Repository-wide 7-dimension scorecard (secrets, deps, input validation, auth, error handling, supply chain, AI agent governance). | Onboarding to unknown codebase | Run `security-scan` every PR. Run `security-audit` every sprint or release. Run `evaluate-repository` once on unfamiliar codebases. ## See Also - [`security-scan`](../../security/security-scan/SKILL.md) — Quick code-level vulnerability scan (OWASP grep + STRIDE per feature) - [`evaluate-repository`](../../security/evaluate-repository/SKILL.md) — Full repo security scorecard - [`pr-multi-perspective-review`](../../development/pr-multi-perspective-review/SKILL.md) — Security Lens in PR reviews - [`secret-detection`](../../security/secret-detection/SKILL.md) — Dedicated secret and credential scanning
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