Claude Skill

security-architecture

Optional, opt-in STRIDE threat pass for a sensitive feature — invoked deliberately via /threat-model, never forced on ordinary changes. Walks the change's attack surface and security boundaries (governed by <project-root>/.codearbiter/security-controls.md), surfaces threats and u

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Download arbiterForge-codeArbiter-plugins_ca-pi_routines_security-architecture-9b8989c.zip · 2 KB

Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/arbiterForge/codeArbiter/tree/main/plugins/ca-pi/routines/security-architecture
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install arbiterforge-codearbiter@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/arbiterForge/codeArbiter.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole arbiterforge/codearbiter collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

security-architecture

For every security policy reference below, follow <plugin-root>/includes/knowledge.md ("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's context format, read the complete policy from exact CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy.

Optional, lightweight threat-modeling pass over a design before it is built. Selected when the user deliberately requests threat modeling of a sensitive design, with or without /ca-threat-model. Never forced on an ordinary change. Reviews architectural intent before code exists; for code already written, dispatch security-reviewer instead.

Entry boundaries

Read-only: modify no project file, decision record, control or implementation. Optional reviewers inherit this read-only analysis scope. An explanation-only security question does not start the pass; mentioning authentication in an ordinary change does not opt in. The user need not repeat a slash command to request it. Missing required security-controls input is a prerequisite failure, separate from the severity of a finding. A lesser gap is a constraint, not blanket denied clearance.

Pre-flight

  • Read the complete format-selected security-controls policy — approved primitives, declared security boundaries and their permitted crossings, what is and is not allowed. If the required policy cannot be read, STOP and surface the gap; do not guess the boundary model.
  • Establish the scope from the user's request: the feature, component, or design under review.
  • Read relevant security ADRs under <project-root>/.codearbiter/decisions/; do not invent decisions or interpret their absence as approval.

Phase 1 — Attack surface · gate: BLOCK

Map what the change exposes. Name, for the scope:

  • New or changed entry points — routes, endpoints, message consumers, CLI surfaces.
  • New egress — outbound calls, external dependencies, new data sinks.
  • Security boundaries crossed, as declared in security-controls.md (trust transitions, privilege changes, data leaving a controlled zone).
  • The data handled and its sensitivity.

A boundary crossing not described in security-controls.md is a finding, not a silent pass. A finding outside this scope gets one line with an inline [NEEDS-TRIAGE] marker.

Gate: the attack surface and every boundary crossing in scope are enumerated.

Phase 2 — STRIDE pass · gate: STOP

Walk the surface from Phase 1 through STRIDE. For each relevant category, name the concrete threat and the control expected to mitigate it:

  • Spoofing — identity/authentication of the actor at the boundary.
  • Tampering — integrity of data in transit and at rest.
  • Repudiation — whether actions are attributable.
  • Information disclosure — exposure of sensitive data, including in logs and errors.
  • Denial of service — exhaustion or availability impact.
  • Elevation of privilege — privilege gained across the boundary.

Mark each threat's mitigation PRESENT, PLANNED, or GAP. Skip a category only with a one-line reason it does not apply.

If the threat depends on auth, crypto, key handling, or secrets, MAY dispatch <plugin-root>/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md. For broader boundary or surface concerns, MAY dispatch <plugin-root>/agents/security-reviewer.md. Both govern by security-controls.md.

Gate: STOP only on a genuinely critical unmitigated threat — a GAP that is exploitable now with high impact. Lesser gaps are surfaced as constraints, not stops.

Phase 3 — Report · gate: BLOCK

Produce a terse report:

  • Surface — entry points, egress, boundaries crossed.
  • Threats — the STRIDE findings; lead with GAPs, then PLANNED, summarize PRESENT in one line.
  • Verdict — PROCEED (no open gap), PROCEED-WITH-CONSTRAINTS (gaps listed with owner), or STOP (a critical unmitigated threat is present; name it).

A decision-worthy gap is escalated to the user or to <project-root>/.codearbiter/decisions/ via /adr — never authored as an ADR by this skill.

Gate: report delivered with a stated verdict; every STOP-level threat from Phase 2 is reflected in it.

Hard rules

  • MUST NOT force this pass on an ordinary change. It is invoked deliberately for sensitive features only.
  • MUST NOT guess the boundary model — read security-controls.md or STOP.
  • MUST NOT silently pass an undeclared boundary crossing — surface it.
  • MUST NOT STOP on anything short of a critical, exploitable, unmitigated threat; lesser gaps are constraints.
  • MUST NOT author an ADR — escalate decision-worthy gaps to the user or /adr.
Files (codearbiter)
  • SKILL.md 4.9 KB
    ---
    name: security-architecture
    description: "Threat-model a sensitive design with STRIDE on request. Read-only analysis of threats, controls, and implementation constraints."
    argument-hint: "<scope description>"
    ---
    
    # security-architecture
    
    For every security policy reference below, follow `<plugin-root>/includes/knowledge.md`
    ("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's
    context format, read the complete policy from exact `CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS`
    records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read
    operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or
    unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy.
    
    Optional, lightweight threat-modeling pass over a design before it is built. Selected when the user deliberately requests threat modeling of a sensitive design, with or without `/ca-threat-model`. Never forced on an ordinary change. Reviews architectural intent before code exists; for code already written, dispatch `security-reviewer` instead.
    
    ## Entry boundaries
    
    Read-only: modify no project file, decision record, control or implementation.
    Optional reviewers inherit this read-only analysis scope. An explanation-only
    security question does not start the pass; mentioning authentication in an ordinary
    change does not opt in. The user need not repeat a slash command to request it.
    Missing required security-controls input is a prerequisite failure, separate from
    the severity of a finding. A lesser gap is a constraint, not blanket denied clearance.
    
    ## Pre-flight
    
    - Read the complete format-selected `security-controls` policy — approved primitives, declared security boundaries and their permitted crossings, what is and is not allowed. If the required policy cannot be read, STOP and surface the gap; do not guess the boundary model.
    - Establish the scope from the user's request: the feature, component, or design under review.
    - Read relevant security ADRs under `<project-root>/.codearbiter/decisions/`; do not invent decisions or interpret their absence as approval.
    
    ## Phase 1 — Attack surface · gate: BLOCK
    
    Map what the change exposes. Name, for the scope:
    
    - New or changed entry points — routes, endpoints, message consumers, CLI surfaces.
    - New egress — outbound calls, external dependencies, new data sinks.
    - Security boundaries crossed, as declared in `security-controls.md` (trust transitions, privilege changes, data leaving a controlled zone).
    - The data handled and its sensitivity.
    
    A boundary crossing not described in `security-controls.md` is a finding, not a silent pass. A finding outside this scope gets one line with an inline `[NEEDS-TRIAGE]` marker.
    
    Gate: the attack surface and every boundary crossing in scope are enumerated.
    
    ## Phase 2 — STRIDE pass · gate: STOP
    
    Walk the surface from Phase 1 through STRIDE. For each relevant category, name the concrete threat and the control expected to mitigate it:
    
    - **Spoofing** — identity/authentication of the actor at the boundary.
    - **Tampering** — integrity of data in transit and at rest.
    - **Repudiation** — whether actions are attributable.
    - **Information disclosure** — exposure of sensitive data, including in logs and errors.
    - **Denial of service** — exhaustion or availability impact.
    - **Elevation of privilege** — privilege gained across the boundary.
    
    Mark each threat's mitigation `PRESENT`, `PLANNED`, or `GAP`. Skip a category only with a one-line reason it does not apply.
    
    If the threat depends on auth, crypto, key handling, or secrets, MAY dispatch `<plugin-root>/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md`. For broader boundary or surface concerns, MAY dispatch `<plugin-root>/agents/security-reviewer.md`. Both govern by `security-controls.md`.
    
    Gate: STOP only on a genuinely critical unmitigated threat — a `GAP` that is exploitable now with high impact. Lesser gaps are surfaced as constraints, not stops.
    
    ## Phase 3 — Report · gate: BLOCK
    
    Produce a terse report:
    
    - **Surface** — entry points, egress, boundaries crossed.
    - **Threats** — the STRIDE findings; lead with `GAP`s, then `PLANNED`, summarize `PRESENT` in one line.
    - **Verdict** — `PROCEED` (no open gap), `PROCEED-WITH-CONSTRAINTS` (gaps listed with owner), or `STOP` (a critical unmitigated threat is present; name it).
    
    A decision-worthy gap is escalated to the user or to `<project-root>/.codearbiter/decisions/` via `/adr` — never authored as an ADR by this skill.
    
    Gate: report delivered with a stated verdict; every STOP-level threat from Phase 2 is reflected in it.
    
    ## Hard rules
    
    - MUST NOT force this pass on an ordinary change. It is invoked deliberately for sensitive features only.
    - MUST NOT guess the boundary model — read `security-controls.md` or STOP.
    - MUST NOT silently pass an undeclared boundary crossing — surface it.
    - MUST NOT STOP on anything short of a critical, exploitable, unmitigated threat; lesser gaps are constraints.
    - MUST NOT author an ADR — escalate decision-worthy gaps to the user or `/adr`.
    

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