security-architecture
Optional, opt-in STRIDE threat pass for a sensitive feature — invoked deliberately via /threat-model, never forced on ordinary changes. Walks the change's attack surface and security boundaries (governed by {{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/security-controls.md), surfaces threats and
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/arbiterForge/codeArbiter/tree/main/core/surface/skills/security-architecture
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install arbiterforge-codearbiter@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/arbiterForge/codeArbiter.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole arbiterforge/codearbiter collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
security-architecture
For every security policy reference below, follow {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/includes/knowledge.md
("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's
context format, read the complete policy from exact CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS
records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read
operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or
unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy.
Optional, lightweight threat-modeling pass over a design before it is built. Selected when the user deliberately requests threat modeling of a sensitive design, with or without {{CMD:threat-model}}. Never forced on an ordinary change. Reviews architectural intent before code exists; for code already written, dispatch security-reviewer instead.
Entry boundaries
Read-only: modify no project file, decision record, control or implementation. Optional reviewers inherit this read-only analysis scope. An explanation-only security question does not start the pass; mentioning authentication in an ordinary change does not opt in. The user need not repeat a slash command to request it. Missing required security-controls input is a prerequisite failure, separate from the severity of a finding. A lesser gap is a constraint, not blanket denied clearance.
Pre-flight
- Read the complete format-selected
security-controlspolicy — approved primitives, declared security boundaries and their permitted crossings, what is and is not allowed. If the required policy cannot be read, STOP and surface the gap; do not guess the boundary model. - Establish the scope from the user's request: the feature, component, or design under review.
- Read relevant security ADRs under
{{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/decisions/; do not invent decisions or interpret their absence as approval.
Phase 1 — Attack surface · gate: BLOCK
Map what the change exposes. Name, for the scope:
- New or changed entry points — routes, endpoints, message consumers, CLI surfaces.
- New egress — outbound calls, external dependencies, new data sinks.
- Security boundaries crossed, as declared in
security-controls.md(trust transitions, privilege changes, data leaving a controlled zone). - The data handled and its sensitivity.
A boundary crossing not described in security-controls.md is a finding, not a silent pass. A finding outside this scope gets one line with an inline [NEEDS-TRIAGE] marker.
Gate: the attack surface and every boundary crossing in scope are enumerated.
Phase 2 — STRIDE pass · gate: STOP
Walk the surface from Phase 1 through STRIDE. For each relevant category, name the concrete threat and the control expected to mitigate it:
- Spoofing — identity/authentication of the actor at the boundary.
- Tampering — integrity of data in transit and at rest.
- Repudiation — whether actions are attributable.
- Information disclosure — exposure of sensitive data, including in logs and errors.
- Denial of service — exhaustion or availability impact.
- Elevation of privilege — privilege gained across the boundary.
Mark each threat's mitigation PRESENT, PLANNED, or GAP. Skip a category only with a one-line reason it does not apply.
If the threat depends on auth, crypto, key handling, or secrets, MAY dispatch {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md. For broader boundary or surface concerns, MAY dispatch {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/security-reviewer.md. Both govern by security-controls.md.
Gate: STOP only on a genuinely critical unmitigated threat — a GAP that is exploitable now with high impact. Lesser gaps are surfaced as constraints, not stops.
Phase 3 — Report · gate: BLOCK
Produce a terse report:
- Surface — entry points, egress, boundaries crossed.
- Threats — the STRIDE findings; lead with
GAPs, thenPLANNED, summarizePRESENTin one line. - Verdict —
PROCEED(no open gap),PROCEED-WITH-CONSTRAINTS(gaps listed with owner), orSTOP(a critical unmitigated threat is present; name it).
A decision-worthy gap is escalated to the user or to {{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/decisions/ via /adr — never authored as an ADR by this skill.
Gate: report delivered with a stated verdict; every STOP-level threat from Phase 2 is reflected in it.
Hard rules
- MUST NOT force this pass on an ordinary change. It is invoked deliberately for sensitive features only.
- MUST NOT guess the boundary model — read
security-controls.mdor STOP. - MUST NOT silently pass an undeclared boundary crossing — surface it.
- MUST NOT STOP on anything short of a critical, exploitable, unmitigated threat; lesser gaps are constraints.
- MUST NOT author an ADR — escalate decision-worthy gaps to the user or
/adr.
Files (codearbiter)
-
SKILL.md 5 KB
--- name: security-architecture description: "Threat-model a sensitive design with STRIDE on request. Read-only analysis of threats, controls, and implementation constraints." argument-hint: "<scope description>" --- # security-architecture For every security policy reference below, follow `{{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/includes/knowledge.md` ("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's context format, read the complete policy from exact `CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS` records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy. Optional, lightweight threat-modeling pass over a design before it is built. Selected when the user deliberately requests threat modeling of a sensitive design, with or without `{{CMD:threat-model}}`. Never forced on an ordinary change. Reviews architectural intent before code exists; for code already written, dispatch `security-reviewer` instead. ## Entry boundaries Read-only: modify no project file, decision record, control or implementation. Optional reviewers inherit this read-only analysis scope. An explanation-only security question does not start the pass; mentioning authentication in an ordinary change does not opt in. The user need not repeat a slash command to request it. Missing required security-controls input is a prerequisite failure, separate from the severity of a finding. A lesser gap is a constraint, not blanket denied clearance. ## Pre-flight - Read the complete format-selected `security-controls` policy — approved primitives, declared security boundaries and their permitted crossings, what is and is not allowed. If the required policy cannot be read, STOP and surface the gap; do not guess the boundary model. - Establish the scope from the user's request: the feature, component, or design under review. - Read relevant security ADRs under `{{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/decisions/`; do not invent decisions or interpret their absence as approval. ## Phase 1 — Attack surface · gate: BLOCK Map what the change exposes. Name, for the scope: - New or changed entry points — routes, endpoints, message consumers, CLI surfaces. - New egress — outbound calls, external dependencies, new data sinks. - Security boundaries crossed, as declared in `security-controls.md` (trust transitions, privilege changes, data leaving a controlled zone). - The data handled and its sensitivity. A boundary crossing not described in `security-controls.md` is a finding, not a silent pass. A finding outside this scope gets one line with an inline `[NEEDS-TRIAGE]` marker. Gate: the attack surface and every boundary crossing in scope are enumerated. ## Phase 2 — STRIDE pass · gate: STOP Walk the surface from Phase 1 through STRIDE. For each relevant category, name the concrete threat and the control expected to mitigate it: - **Spoofing** — identity/authentication of the actor at the boundary. - **Tampering** — integrity of data in transit and at rest. - **Repudiation** — whether actions are attributable. - **Information disclosure** — exposure of sensitive data, including in logs and errors. - **Denial of service** — exhaustion or availability impact. - **Elevation of privilege** — privilege gained across the boundary. Mark each threat's mitigation `PRESENT`, `PLANNED`, or `GAP`. Skip a category only with a one-line reason it does not apply. If the threat depends on auth, crypto, key handling, or secrets, MAY dispatch `{{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md`. For broader boundary or surface concerns, MAY dispatch `{{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/security-reviewer.md`. Both govern by `security-controls.md`. Gate: STOP only on a genuinely critical unmitigated threat — a `GAP` that is exploitable now with high impact. Lesser gaps are surfaced as constraints, not stops. ## Phase 3 — Report · gate: BLOCK Produce a terse report: - **Surface** — entry points, egress, boundaries crossed. - **Threats** — the STRIDE findings; lead with `GAP`s, then `PLANNED`, summarize `PRESENT` in one line. - **Verdict** — `PROCEED` (no open gap), `PROCEED-WITH-CONSTRAINTS` (gaps listed with owner), or `STOP` (a critical unmitigated threat is present; name it). A decision-worthy gap is escalated to the user or to `{{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/decisions/` via `/adr` — never authored as an ADR by this skill. Gate: report delivered with a stated verdict; every STOP-level threat from Phase 2 is reflected in it. ## Hard rules - MUST NOT force this pass on an ordinary change. It is invoked deliberately for sensitive features only. - MUST NOT guess the boundary model — read `security-controls.md` or STOP. - MUST NOT silently pass an undeclared boundary crossing — surface it. - MUST NOT STOP on anything short of a critical, exploitable, unmitigated threat; lesser gaps are constraints. - MUST NOT author an ADR — escalate decision-worthy gaps to the user or `/adr`.
Comments (0)
Sign in to join the conversation.
Reviews (0)
No reviews yet.
No comments yet.