Claude Cursor Skill

review-agent-setup

Configure human-in-the-loop gating for AI agent review actions in Claude Code. Use when setting up a project where an agent may post PR reviews, comments, merges, or edit CI configuration, and you want a cryptographically auditable approval trail with Cedar-enforced gates.

LLM Mart · 0 points · 19 views 0 listing impressions 0 install-command copies
Download wshobson-agents-plugins_review-agent-governance_skills_review-agent-setup-9b15b34.zip · 2 KB

Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/wshobson/agents/tree/main/plugins/review-agent-governance/skills/review-agent-setup
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install wshobson-agents@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/wshobson/agents.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole wshobson/agents collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

review-agent-governance — Setup

Gate AI agent review actions (PR reviews, comments, merges, CI edits) behind explicit human approval. Every attempt, approved or denied, produces an Ed25519-signed receipt.

When to use this plugin

Install it in projects where a Claude Code agent:

  • Reviews, comments on, or merges pull requests (gh pr review, gh pr merge)
  • Triages issues (gh issue comment, gh issue close)
  • Publishes releases (gh release create)
  • Modifies CI configuration (.github/workflows/, .gitlab-ci.yml)
  • Pushes to protected branches (main, master, release, production)
  • Posts to external notification surfaces (Slack webhooks, Discord), once you add a rule for the command that posts (the default policy does not gate them)

If the agent is only doing local file edits and running tests, this plugin is overkill. Use protect-mcp for general tool-call policy enforcement and skip this one.

One-time setup

1. Install the plugin

claude plugin install wshobson/agents/review-agent-governance

2. Copy the default policy to your project

cp .claude/plugins/review-agent-governance/policies/review-agent-governance.cedar \
   ./review-governance.cedar

You can edit this file to match your project's specific rules. See ../agents/review-policy-author.md for guidance on authoring review policies.

3. Create a receipts directory and sign key

mkdir -p ./review-receipts
echo "/review-receipts/" >> .gitignore
echo "/review-governance.key" >> .gitignore
echo "/.review-approved" >> .gitignore
if [ ! -e ./review-governance.key ]; then
  d=$(mktemp -d) && npx protect-mcp@0.7.4 init --dir "$d" && mv "$d/keys/gateway.json" ./review-governance.key
fi

protect-mcp 0.7.4 sign does not create the key, so the last command creates it, and it never replaces an existing key. Without a key, the receipts are unsigned. To rotate the key, archive ./review-governance.key and ./review-receipts/receipts.jsonl first, then run the command again. Give auditors the publicKey value from ./review-governance.key. Do not commit the file, because it also holds the private key.

Per-session workflow

The Cedar policy denies review-surface actions unconditionally. To approve a specific action, open an approval window before it and close it after.

Flag file (simplest)

# Before the action you want to approve
touch ./.review-approved

# Let Claude Code run the review / comment / merge

# Immediately after
rm ./.review-approved

Slash command (from within Claude Code)

/approve-review "Reviewing PR #123 authored by contributor X"

This creates ./.review-approved with the given reason embedded as a note, and records the reason in an unsigned approval log under ./review-receipts/approvals/. A follow-up rm is still needed to close the window.

Dry-run everything (force full policy evaluation)

If you want every tool call to go through Cedar with no approval bypass:

export REVIEW_APPROVAL_FLAG=./.never-approve

Any tool call matching a forbid rule will be denied; approved windows have no effect. Useful for CI or for a locked-down audit run.

Verifying the receipts

List all receipts:

ls -la ./review-receipts/

Verify every receipt offline with the public key:

PUB=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("./review-governance.key")).publicKey')
npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./review-receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"

Exit 0 means every receipt verified. Exit 1 means a receipt failed verification, because it was tampered with, the key is wrong, or a line is malformed. Exit 2 means the receipts file could not be read.

A denied call never runs, so it has no receipt. To see what the policy blocked, run this inside Claude Code:

/list-pending

It lists the tool calls that the PreToolUse hook blocked in the current session, with the tool name and the command or path.

Example: approving a PR review

# 1. Human reviews the agent's proposed comment
$ /list-pending
  Blocked in this session:
  - Bash "gh pr review 42 --approve --body 'LGTM'"
  - Bash "gh pr comment 42 --body 'Looking good'"

# 2. Human decides the first one is appropriate, approves it
$ /approve-review "Approving LGTM on PR 42 after visual inspection"
  ./.review-approved created

# 3. Agent retries the action; this time it succeeds
$ agent: gh pr review 42 --approve --body "LGTM"
  [receipt appended to ./review-receipts/receipts.jsonl, decision=allow]

# 4. Human closes the window
$ rm ./.review-approved

The allowed call has a signed receipt that anyone with the public key can verify offline. The denied attempt has no receipt, and the approval log is not signed, so keep both in mind when you show the trail to an auditor.

Composing with protect-mcp

If both plugins are installed, each plugin's hooks/hooks.json registers its own PreToolUse hook, and Claude Code runs both on every tool call:

{ "type": "command", "command": "\"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}\"/hooks/evaluate.sh" }

Each evaluate.sh reads tool_name and tool_input from the hook payload on stdin (Claude Code sets no TOOL_NAME variable) and evaluates its own policy: ./protect.cedar for protect-mcp and ./review-governance.cedar here.

Both hooks must pass for the tool call to proceed. Cedar deny in either policy blocks it.

Standards

  • Ed25519 — RFC 8032 (digital signatures)
  • JCS — RFC 8785 (deterministic JSON canonicalization)
  • Cedar — AWS's open authorization policy language
  • IETF draft — draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts
Files (agents)
  • SKILL.md 5.9 KB
    ---
    name: review-agent-setup
    description: Configure human-in-the-loop gating for AI agent review actions in Claude Code. Use when setting up a project where an agent may post PR reviews, comments, merges, or edit CI configuration, and you want a cryptographically auditable approval trail with Cedar-enforced gates.
    ---
    
    # review-agent-governance — Setup
    
    Gate AI agent review actions (PR reviews, comments, merges, CI edits) behind
    explicit human approval. Every attempt, approved or denied, produces an
    Ed25519-signed receipt.
    
    ## When to use this plugin
    
    Install it in projects where a Claude Code agent:
    
    - Reviews, comments on, or merges pull requests (`gh pr review`, `gh pr merge`)
    - Triages issues (`gh issue comment`, `gh issue close`)
    - Publishes releases (`gh release create`)
    - Modifies CI configuration (`.github/workflows/`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`)
    - Pushes to protected branches (`main`, `master`, `release`, `production`)
    - Posts to external notification surfaces (Slack webhooks, Discord), once you
      add a rule for the command that posts (the default policy does not gate them)
    
    If the agent is only doing local file edits and running tests, this plugin is
    overkill. Use `protect-mcp` for general tool-call policy enforcement and skip
    this one.
    
    ## One-time setup
    
    ### 1. Install the plugin
    
    ```bash
    claude plugin install wshobson/agents/review-agent-governance
    ```
    
    ### 2. Copy the default policy to your project
    
    ```bash
    cp .claude/plugins/review-agent-governance/policies/review-agent-governance.cedar \
       ./review-governance.cedar
    ```
    
    You can edit this file to match your project's specific rules. See
    `../agents/review-policy-author.md` for guidance on authoring review
    policies.
    
    ### 3. Create a receipts directory and sign key
    
    ```bash
    mkdir -p ./review-receipts
    echo "/review-receipts/" >> .gitignore
    echo "/review-governance.key" >> .gitignore
    echo "/.review-approved" >> .gitignore
    if [ ! -e ./review-governance.key ]; then
      d=$(mktemp -d) && npx protect-mcp@0.7.4 init --dir "$d" && mv "$d/keys/gateway.json" ./review-governance.key
    fi
    ```
    
    protect-mcp 0.7.4 `sign` does not create the key, so the last command creates
    it, and it never replaces an existing key. Without a key, the receipts are
    unsigned. To rotate the key, archive `./review-governance.key` and
    `./review-receipts/receipts.jsonl` first, then run the command again. Give auditors the `publicKey`
    value from `./review-governance.key`. Do not commit the file, because it also
    holds the private key.
    
    ## Per-session workflow
    
    The Cedar policy denies review-surface actions unconditionally. To approve
    a specific action, open an approval window before it and close it after.
    
    ### Flag file (simplest)
    
    ```bash
    # Before the action you want to approve
    touch ./.review-approved
    
    # Let Claude Code run the review / comment / merge
    
    # Immediately after
    rm ./.review-approved
    ```
    
    ### Slash command (from within Claude Code)
    
    ```
    /approve-review "Reviewing PR #123 authored by contributor X"
    ```
    
    This creates `./.review-approved` with the given reason embedded as a note,
    and records the reason in an unsigned approval log under
    `./review-receipts/approvals/`. A follow-up `rm` is still needed to close the
    window.
    
    ### Dry-run everything (force full policy evaluation)
    
    If you want every tool call to go through Cedar with no approval bypass:
    
    ```bash
    export REVIEW_APPROVAL_FLAG=./.never-approve
    ```
    
    Any tool call matching a forbid rule will be denied; approved windows have
    no effect. Useful for CI or for a locked-down audit run.
    
    ## Verifying the receipts
    
    List all receipts:
    
    ```bash
    ls -la ./review-receipts/
    ```
    
    Verify every receipt offline with the public key:
    
    ```bash
    PUB=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("./review-governance.key")).publicKey')
    npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./review-receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"
    ```
    
    Exit 0 means every receipt verified. Exit 1 means a receipt failed
    verification, because it was tampered with, the key is wrong, or a line is
    malformed. Exit 2 means the receipts file could not be read.
    
    A denied call never runs, so it has no receipt. To see what the policy
    blocked, run this inside Claude Code:
    
    ```
    /list-pending
    ```
    
    It lists the tool calls that the PreToolUse hook blocked in the current
    session, with the tool name and the command or path.
    
    ## Example: approving a PR review
    
    ```bash
    # 1. Human reviews the agent's proposed comment
    $ /list-pending
      Blocked in this session:
      - Bash "gh pr review 42 --approve --body 'LGTM'"
      - Bash "gh pr comment 42 --body 'Looking good'"
    
    # 2. Human decides the first one is appropriate, approves it
    $ /approve-review "Approving LGTM on PR 42 after visual inspection"
      ./.review-approved created
    
    # 3. Agent retries the action; this time it succeeds
    $ agent: gh pr review 42 --approve --body "LGTM"
      [receipt appended to ./review-receipts/receipts.jsonl, decision=allow]
    
    # 4. Human closes the window
    $ rm ./.review-approved
    ```
    
    The allowed call has a signed receipt that anyone with the public key can
    verify offline. The denied attempt has no receipt, and the approval log is
    not signed, so keep both in mind when you show the trail to an auditor.
    
    ## Composing with protect-mcp
    
    If both plugins are installed, each plugin's `hooks/hooks.json` registers its
    own PreToolUse hook, and Claude Code runs both on every tool call:
    
    ```json
    { "type": "command", "command": "\"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}\"/hooks/evaluate.sh" }
    ```
    
    Each `evaluate.sh` reads `tool_name` and `tool_input` from the hook payload on
    stdin (Claude Code sets no `TOOL_NAME` variable) and evaluates its own policy:
    `./protect.cedar` for protect-mcp and `./review-governance.cedar` here.
    
    Both hooks must pass for the tool call to proceed. Cedar deny in either
    policy blocks it.
    
    ## Standards
    
    - **Ed25519** — RFC 8032 (digital signatures)
    - **JCS** — RFC 8785 (deterministic JSON canonicalization)
    - **Cedar** — AWS's open authorization policy language
    - **IETF draft** — [draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/)
    

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