Claude Skill

recon-a-domain-passively

- End-to-end passive reconnaissance for a domain, website or IP — builds an asset inventory covering registration, DNS, subdomains, infrastructure, tech stack, history and ownership without sending a single packet to the target. Use when asked to research or profile a domain or w

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Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit/tree/master/skills/recon-a-domain-passively
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install tonydzi-second-brain-starter-kit@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Recon a domain passively

Turn one domain into a defensible map of an organization's internet-facing estate plus the owner behind it. The techniques live in other skills; what this workflow contributes is the order, the inventory, and the stopping rule. Two failure modes to avoid from the start: enumerating for hours and producing 400 hostnames with no attribution, dates or priority, which is not a map; and drifting active without noticing, because one probe "just to check if it's up" ends the passive claim. Decide the passive boundary before step 2, not during it.

Ordering logic

Each stage feeds the next, and the sequence is cheapest-and-quietest first:

Order Stage Why here
1 Registration and DNS Defines the perimeter. Without the apex set and the registrant you do not know what is in scope
2 Name expansion Archival sources only. Costs nothing, touches nothing, produces the candidate list everything else consumes
3 Resolution and inventory Converts names to addresses, which is what infrastructure lookups take as input
4 Infrastructure and services Needs stage 3's addresses. Third-party scan data only
5 Content, history, code, tech stack Needs hostnames and org names from earlier stages as search terms, and reuses artifacts already collected
6 Owner attribution The registrant, tenant and organization names surfaced above are the input

Run stages 1–5 as a loop, not a line. Every stage produces new selectors that belong back at stage 1 or 2. Stop looping when the stopping rule in step 7 is met.

Step 1 — Authorized scope

State in writing: the subject (which domains and netblocks, and which adjacent ones are explicitly excluded), the objective, the jurisdictions involved, and the passive boundary — specifically whether DNS resolution, wordlist brute-forcing and any HTTP contact with the target are permitted. Read ../../ETHICS.md. If being noticed matters, set up attribution hygiene with investigate-without-getting-made before querying anything.

Done when subject, objective, out-of-bounds list, jurisdiction and passive boundary are written down, and you know which of the three grey activities you may perform.

Step 2 — Registration and DNS baseline

Run who-owns-this-domain on every in-scope apex. You want registrar, dates and status, nameservers, the full record set, and the mail and SaaS fingerprints TXT, MX, DKIM and CAA give up. Where registration is redacted, pull historical WHOIS in the same pass.

Done when every apex has a registration record with a retrieval timestamp, a complete record set, and a list of named third-party vendors extracted from its DNS.

Step 3 — Expand the name space

Run find-hidden-subdomains. Certificate Transparency and passive DNS first, because they are free, historical and invisible. Feed it the organization names from step 2 as well as the domains — a certificate-subject search finds sibling and acquired domains nobody put in the brief.

Done when you have a deduplicated candidate hostname list with the source and first-seen date recorded per name, and any newly discovered apex domains have been pushed back through step 2.

Step 4 — Resolve and start the inventory

Classify each candidate: resolves to an address, resolves to a third-party CNAME, or does not resolve. Build the inventory now rather than at the end — retrofitting provenance onto a list you already collected is how findings lose their timestamps. The schema and per-row fields are in reference/asset-inventory.md.

Done when every candidate is in one of the three buckets with a resolution timestamp, every resolving host has an IP and an ASN, and every third-party CNAME is attributed to a named vendor.

Step 5 — Infrastructure and services

Run find-exposed-servers over the addresses and netblocks from step 4. Query scan platforms only — no port scanning, no service probing. Use the certificate and favicon pivots to catch hosts that share the target's infrastructure without sharing its DNS, and note anything that looks unintentionally exposed.

Done when each in-scope IP has its observed ports and services with scan dates, each netblock has an owner from its RIR record, and any infrastructure found only through cert or favicon pivots has been added to the inventory and attribution-graded.

Step 6 — Content, history, code and tech stack

Three sources, in this order:

  • read-deleted-pages for the estate as it used to be: retired hostnames, old staff pages, exposed paths, pre-CDN infrastructure references.
  • google-like-a-spy for what is indexed now on the hosts you found — documents, directory listings, configs, forgotten portals.
  • secrets-in-git-history for the org names, GitHub organization slugs, cloud tenant labels and project IDs surfaced in steps 2 to 5.

If imagery matters — a logo reused across a network of sites, a stock photo posing as an office — run find-the-original-image. Shared images tie sites together when DNS and registration do not.

Then assemble the tech stack from what you now hold: headers and cookies in archived copies and scan records, certificate issuers, CNAME targets, JavaScript and asset paths, CSP directives, favicon hashes, and the SaaS fingerprints from step 2. Where you need a live page, read a third-party scan of it instead of fetching it.

Done when archived and indexed content is reviewed for the top-priority hostnames, code exposure is documented or ruled out, new hostnames have gone back through step 4, and the stack is documented per host with the artifact each conclusion rests on and versions marked claimed rather than verified.

Step 7 — Decide whether the map is done

Completeness is a judgement, so make it against criteria:

  • Two consecutive new sources produced no new assets. Saturation, not exhaustion, is the signal.
  • Every discovered name is resolved or classified, and every resolving host has an owner and an attribution grade.
  • Naming conventions have no unexplained gaps: if web01 and web03 are in the inventory, you have accounted for web02.
  • Every named vendor and tenant from step 2 has yielded assets or been ruled out.
  • The objective from step 1 can be answered from the inventory.

A failing criterion tells you exactly which stage to re-enter.

Done when all five pass, or the remaining gaps are written up as stated limitations rather than left implicit.

Step 8 — Hand off the owner

If the registrant, certificate subject, RIR reassignment or tenant label resolves to a legal entity rather than an individual, the domain work is finished and a corporate investigation starts: hand the entity name and jurisdiction to x-ray-a-company, take registry and beneficial-ownership questions to who-really-owns-it, and send recovered emails to what-an-email-reveals. Do not attempt corporate structure from DNS artifacts — DNS shows operators, not shareholders.

Done when every owner-side selector is routed to the right skill or recorded as a dead end with the reason.

Step 9 — Report

Run write-the-intel-brief. Lead with the asset inventory, then the attribution chain, then anything that appears unintentionally exposed, then the limitations from step 7. Done when every claim traces to an inventory row with a source and timestamp, and every finding carries a confidence grade.

Where this goes wrong

  • Scope creep through pivots. Enumeration produces sibling domains endlessly and each looks like the next target. If it is not in the step 1 subject list it is a finding to report, not a workstream to start.
  • Silent drift into active. Resolution, brute-forcing and HTTP probing sit on a [человек], and tools blur it — passive collectors have active modes one flag away, and one careless flag ends the passive claim for the engagement.
  • Inventory without attribution. Shared hosting, CDN addresses and bundled certs attach assets to your target that are not the target's, and an ungraded inventory row is a liability. Relatedly, a vulnerable SaaS tenant the target merely uses is a supply-chain finding and must be phrased as one.
  • Stale data presented as current. Archives, CT and scan records are all historical, and undated findings are not findings.
  • Stopping at the first quiet moment. No new results usually means one source saturated, not the estate mapped — which is what step 7 catches.
  • Over-collection. Staff names from archived pages and SNMP contacts are personal data. Collect what the objective needs, nothing more.

Confidence grading

Grade the inventory and the attribution separately. A host can be a confirmed live service and an unconfirmed asset of your target at once, and conflating the two is the most common reporting error in domain recon.

  • Confirmed asset — under a domain whose registration you verified, or on a netblock reassigned to the target by name, or serving a certificate the target demonstrably controls, and corroborated by a second independent source.
  • Probable asset — one strong infrastructure fingerprint (shared DKIM key, same mail tenant label, same provider-assigned nameserver pair, distinctive favicon or body string) with nothing contradicting it.
  • Unconfirmed — shared-hosting or CDN addresses, bundled-certificate names, org:-only attribution, or an aggregator result whose underlying record you have not seen.

Per-technique criteria in the technique skills override these where more specific.

Worked example

Engagement: a client is acquiring meridian-freight.test and wants its internet-facing estate before signing. Scope: the apex plus any domain the registrant demonstrably controls. Boundary: resolution allowed, no brute-forcing, no HTTP contact.

Step 2: five-year-old registration, registrant redacted but country NL, a Microsoft 365 tenant, and TXT tokens for a support desk, an identity provider and a GitHub organization. That GitHub org name is the highest-value item in the entire record set and it cost one lookup.

Step 3 returns 74 candidates, and a certificate-subject search surfaces meridian-logistics-group.test, which is not in the brief. Back through step 2: same M365 tenant label in its MX, so same operator. Included, client notified.

Step 4: 31 resolve, nine of those to third-party CNAMEs — relationships, not assets. uat-portal sits in a small Dutch hosting netblock distinct from everything else, which makes it the lead of the engagement.

Step 5: that UAT host had 443 and 3306 observed open five weeks earlier. Also eleven hosts sharing a favicon hash, which looked like a hidden estate until the hash turned out to belong to a stock CMS theme — the dead end, and exactly the kind that inflates a report if you skip the check.

Step 6: a public repo in the GitHub org holds a CI config naming two internal hostnames absent from DNS. They do not resolve; they still matter, because the acquirer inherits those systems.

Step 7: third consecutive source adds nothing, web02 accounted for, every vendor chased. Complete, with one stated gap — the apex wildcard cert means subdomains issued after it are invisible to CT. Step 8: Dutch registrant country plus the sibling domain plus the group name in the cert subject point at a holding structure, so it goes to x-ray-a-company.

Pivots out

Selector Goes to
Legal entity, group name, jurisdiction x-ray-a-company, who-really-owns-it
Emails and phone numbers what-an-email-reveals, whose-number-is-this
Named employees from archives or metadata find-anyone
Developer handles from repositories hunt-a-handle
Documents pulled from the estate secrets-in-file-metadata
Breach exposure for the domain's mailboxes what-leaked-about-you
The whole asset and entity set, for structure graph-the-network

Legal and ToS notes

Passive collection from third-party datasets is lawful research in most jurisdictions; the boundary is traffic to the target and access to non-public systems. Registrant data recovered from historical WHOIS is personal data under GDPR even though it was once public, so you need a lawful basis and must minimize. Scan-platform and archive terms restrict bulk redistribution — cite findings, do not republish datasets. A discovered exposure authorizes a report to the operator or the relevant CERT and nothing else. And in due diligence, confirm you hold the client's written authority for the scope you are running: "our client is buying them" is not authorization from the target.


Like this skill? It is part of second-brain-starter-kit: the second brain we built for ourselves and run every day at Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Install the whole set with npx skills add tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit. Everything is open source and free, so take what you need.

Flagships worth a look on their own: secondop-panel (a second opinion from a panel of external models), claude-memory-tidy (stop your agent's memory from rotting), telegram-mcp-kit (your own Telegram over MCP in about 15 minutes).

Author: Anton Dziatkovskii, Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Telegram @tonydzi - WhatsApp +1 341 222 9178 - X @Tony_Stef_

Engineers: want to test-drive this setup? Message me. I hand out free starter seeds to engineers who test and report back, and custom skill requests are welcome.

Files (second-brain-starter-kit)
  • reference
    • asset-inventory.md 6.7 KB
      Loading…
  • SKILL.md 14 KB
    ---
    name: recon-a-domain-passively
    description: "- End-to-end passive reconnaissance for a domain, website or IP — builds an asset inventory covering registration, DNS, subdomains, infrastructure, tech stack, history and ownership without sending a single packet to the target. Use when asked to research or profile a domain or website, map what an organisation runs, or investigate a suspicious site without alerting its operator"
    disable-model-invocation: true
    ---
    
    # Recon a domain passively
    
    Turn one domain into a defensible map of an organization's internet-facing estate
    plus the owner behind it. The techniques live in other skills; what this workflow
    contributes is the **order**, the **inventory**, and the **stopping rule**. Two
    failure modes to avoid from the start: enumerating for hours and producing 400
    hostnames with no attribution, dates or priority, which is not a map; and drifting
    active without noticing, because one probe "just to check if it's up" ends the
    passive claim. Decide the passive boundary before step 2, not during it.
    
    ## Ordering logic
    
    Each stage feeds the next, and the sequence is cheapest-and-quietest first:
    
    | Order | Stage | Why here |
    |---|---|---|
    | 1 | Registration and DNS | Defines the perimeter. Without the apex set and the registrant you do not know what is in scope |
    | 2 | Name expansion | Archival sources only. Costs nothing, touches nothing, produces the candidate list everything else consumes |
    | 3 | Resolution and inventory | Converts names to addresses, which is what infrastructure lookups take as input |
    | 4 | Infrastructure and services | Needs stage 3's addresses. Third-party scan data only |
    | 5 | Content, history, code, tech stack | Needs hostnames and org names from earlier stages as search terms, and reuses artifacts already collected |
    | 6 | Owner attribution | The registrant, tenant and organization names surfaced above are the input |
    
    Run stages 1–5 as a loop, not a line. Every stage produces new selectors that
    belong back at stage 1 or 2. Stop looping when the stopping rule in step 7 is met.
    
    ## Step 1 — Authorized scope
    
    State in writing: the subject (which domains and netblocks, and which adjacent ones
    are explicitly excluded), the objective, the jurisdictions involved, and the
    passive boundary — specifically whether DNS resolution, wordlist brute-forcing and
    any HTTP contact with the target are permitted. Read
    [../../ETHICS.md](../../ETHICS.md). If being noticed matters, set up attribution
    hygiene with `investigate-without-getting-made` before querying anything.
    
    **Done when** subject, objective, out-of-bounds list, jurisdiction and passive
    boundary are written down, and you know which of the three grey activities you may
    perform.
    
    ## Step 2 — Registration and DNS baseline
    
    Run `who-owns-this-domain` on every in-scope apex. You want registrar, dates and
    status, nameservers, the full record set, and the mail and SaaS fingerprints TXT, MX,
    DKIM and CAA give up. Where registration is redacted, pull historical WHOIS in the
    same pass.
    
    **Done when** every apex has a registration record with a retrieval timestamp,
    a complete record set, and a list of named third-party vendors extracted from its
    DNS.
    
    ## Step 3 — Expand the name space
    
    Run `find-hidden-subdomains`. Certificate Transparency and passive DNS first, because
    they are free, historical and invisible. Feed it the organization names from step 2 as
    well as the domains — a certificate-subject search finds sibling and acquired domains
    nobody put in the brief.
    
    **Done when** you have a deduplicated candidate hostname list with the source and
    first-seen date recorded per name, and any newly discovered apex domains have been
    pushed back through step 2.
    
    ## Step 4 — Resolve and start the inventory
    
    Classify each candidate: resolves to an address, resolves to a third-party CNAME, or
    does not resolve. Build the inventory now rather than at the end — retrofitting
    provenance onto a list you already collected is how findings lose their timestamps.
    The schema and per-row fields are in
    [reference/asset-inventory.md](reference/asset-inventory.md).
    
    **Done when** every candidate is in one of the three buckets with a resolution
    timestamp, every resolving host has an IP and an ASN, and every third-party CNAME
    is attributed to a named vendor.
    
    ## Step 5 — Infrastructure and services
    
    Run `find-exposed-servers` over the addresses and netblocks from step 4. Query scan
    platforms only — no port scanning, no service probing. Use the certificate and
    favicon pivots to catch hosts that share the target's infrastructure without sharing
    its DNS, and note anything that looks unintentionally exposed.
    
    **Done when** each in-scope IP has its observed ports and services with scan
    dates, each netblock has an owner from its RIR record, and any infrastructure
    found only through cert or favicon pivots has been added to the inventory and
    attribution-graded.
    
    ## Step 6 — Content, history, code and tech stack
    
    Three sources, in this order:
    
    - `read-deleted-pages` for the estate as it used to be: retired hostnames, old
      staff pages, exposed paths, pre-CDN infrastructure references.
    - `google-like-a-spy` for what is indexed now on the hosts you found — documents,
      directory listings, configs, forgotten portals.
    - `secrets-in-git-history` for the org names, GitHub organization slugs, cloud
      tenant labels and project IDs surfaced in steps 2 to 5.
    
    If imagery matters — a logo reused across a network of sites, a stock photo posing as
    an office — run `find-the-original-image`. Shared images tie sites together when DNS
    and registration do not.
    
    Then assemble the tech stack from what you now hold: headers and cookies in archived
    copies and scan records, certificate issuers, CNAME targets, JavaScript and asset
    paths, CSP directives, favicon hashes, and the SaaS fingerprints from step 2. Where
    you need a live page, read a third-party scan of it instead of fetching it.
    
    **Done when** archived and indexed content is reviewed for the top-priority
    hostnames, code exposure is documented or ruled out, new hostnames have gone back
    through step 4, and the stack is documented per host with the artifact each
    conclusion rests on and versions marked claimed rather than verified.
    
    ## Step 7 — Decide whether the map is done
    
    Completeness is a judgement, so make it against criteria:
    
    - Two consecutive new sources produced no new assets. Saturation, not exhaustion, is
      the signal.
    - Every discovered name is resolved or classified, and every resolving host has an
      owner and an attribution grade.
    - Naming conventions have no unexplained gaps: if `web01` and `web03` are in the
      inventory, you have accounted for `web02`.
    - Every named vendor and tenant from step 2 has yielded assets or been ruled out.
    - The objective from step 1 can be answered from the inventory.
    
    A failing criterion tells you exactly which stage to re-enter.
    
    **Done when** all five pass, or the remaining gaps are written up as stated
    limitations rather than left implicit.
    
    ## Step 8 — Hand off the owner
    
    If the registrant, certificate subject, RIR reassignment or tenant label resolves
    to a legal entity rather than an individual, the domain work is finished and a
    corporate investigation starts: hand the entity name and jurisdiction to
    `x-ray-a-company`, take registry and beneficial-ownership questions to
    `who-really-owns-it`, and send recovered emails to `what-an-email-reveals`. Do not
    attempt corporate structure from DNS artifacts — DNS shows operators, not
    shareholders.
    
    **Done when** every owner-side selector is routed to the right skill or recorded as
    a dead end with the reason.
    
    ## Step 9 — Report
    
    Run `write-the-intel-brief`. Lead with the asset inventory, then the attribution
    chain, then anything that appears unintentionally exposed, then the limitations
    from step 7. **Done when** every claim traces to an inventory row with a source and
    timestamp, and every finding carries a confidence grade.
    
    ## Where this goes wrong
    
    - **Scope creep through pivots.** Enumeration produces sibling domains endlessly and
      each looks like the next target. If it is not in the step 1 subject list it is a
      finding to report, not a workstream to start.
    - **Silent drift into active.** Resolution, brute-forcing and HTTP probing sit on a
      [человек], and tools blur it — passive collectors have active modes one flag away,
      and one careless flag ends the passive claim for the engagement.
    - **Inventory without attribution.** Shared hosting, CDN addresses and bundled certs
      attach assets to your target that are not the target's, and an ungraded inventory
      row is a liability. Relatedly, a vulnerable SaaS tenant the target merely uses is
      a supply-chain finding and must be phrased as one.
    - **Stale data presented as current.** Archives, CT and scan records are all
      historical, and undated findings are not findings.
    - **Stopping at the first quiet moment.** No new results usually means one source
      saturated, not the estate mapped — which is what step 7 catches.
    - **Over-collection.** Staff names from archived pages and SNMP contacts are personal
      data. Collect what the objective needs, nothing more.
    
    ## Confidence grading
    
    Grade the **inventory** and the **attribution** separately. A host can be a
    confirmed live service and an unconfirmed asset of your target at once, and
    conflating the two is the most common reporting error in domain recon.
    
    - **Confirmed asset** — under a domain whose registration you verified, or on a
      netblock reassigned to the target by name, or serving a certificate the target
      demonstrably controls, and corroborated by a second independent source.
    - **Probable asset** — one strong infrastructure fingerprint (shared DKIM key,
      same mail tenant label, same provider-assigned nameserver pair, distinctive
      favicon or body string) with nothing contradicting it.
    - **Unconfirmed** — shared-hosting or CDN addresses, bundled-certificate names,
      `org:`-only attribution, or an aggregator result whose underlying record you
      have not seen.
    
    Per-technique criteria in the technique skills override these where more specific.
    
    ## Worked example
    
    Engagement: a client is acquiring `meridian-freight.test` and wants its
    internet-facing estate before signing. Scope: the apex plus any domain the
    registrant demonstrably controls. Boundary: resolution allowed, no brute-forcing,
    no HTTP contact.
    
    Step 2: five-year-old registration, registrant redacted but country `NL`, a
    Microsoft 365 tenant, and TXT tokens for a support desk, an identity provider and
    a GitHub organization. That GitHub org name is the highest-value item in the entire
    record set and it cost one lookup.
    
    Step 3 returns 74 candidates, and a certificate-subject search surfaces
    `meridian-logistics-group.test`, which is not in the brief. Back through step 2:
    same M365 tenant label in its MX, so same operator. Included, client notified.
    
    Step 4: 31 resolve, nine of those to third-party CNAMEs — relationships, not
    assets. `uat-portal` sits in a small Dutch hosting netblock distinct from
    everything else, which makes it the lead of the engagement.
    
    Step 5: that UAT host had 443 and 3306 observed open five weeks earlier. Also
    eleven hosts sharing a favicon hash, which looked like a hidden estate until the
    hash turned out to belong to a stock CMS theme — the dead end, and exactly the
    kind that inflates a report if you skip the check.
    
    Step 6: a public repo in the GitHub org holds a CI config naming two internal
    hostnames absent from DNS. They do not resolve; they still matter, because the
    acquirer inherits those systems.
    
    Step 7: third consecutive source adds nothing, `web02` accounted for, every vendor
    chased. Complete, with one stated gap — the apex wildcard cert means subdomains
    issued after it are invisible to CT. Step 8: Dutch registrant country plus the
    sibling domain plus the group name in the cert subject point at a holding
    structure, so it goes to `x-ray-a-company`.
    
    ## Pivots out
    
    | Selector | Goes to |
    |---|---|
    | Legal entity, group name, jurisdiction | `x-ray-a-company`, `who-really-owns-it` |
    | Emails and phone numbers | `what-an-email-reveals`, `whose-number-is-this` |
    | Named employees from archives or metadata | `find-anyone` |
    | Developer handles from repositories | `hunt-a-handle` |
    | Documents pulled from the estate | `secrets-in-file-metadata` |
    | Breach exposure for the domain's mailboxes | `what-leaked-about-you` |
    | The whole asset and entity set, for structure | `graph-the-network` |
    
    ## Legal and ToS notes
    
    Passive collection from third-party datasets is lawful research in most
    jurisdictions; the boundary is traffic to the target and access to non-public
    systems. Registrant data recovered from historical WHOIS is personal data under
    GDPR even though it was once public, so you need a lawful basis and must minimize.
    Scan-platform and archive terms restrict bulk redistribution — cite findings, do
    not republish datasets. A discovered exposure authorizes a report to the operator
    or the relevant CERT and nothing else. And in due diligence, confirm you hold the
    client's written authority for the scope you are running: "our client is buying
    them" is not authorization from the target.
    
    <!--kit-footer-->
    
    ---
    
    **Like this skill?** It is part of [second-brain-starter-kit](https://github.com/tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit): the second brain we built for ourselves and run every day at Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Install the whole set with `npx skills add tonydzi/second-brain-starter-kit`. Everything is open source and free, so take what you need.
    
    Flagships worth a look on their own: [secondop-panel](https://github.com/tonydzi/secondop-panel) (a second opinion from a panel of external models), [claude-memory-tidy](https://github.com/tonydzi/claude-memory-tidy) (stop your agent's memory from rotting), [telegram-mcp-kit](https://github.com/tonydzi/telegram-mcp-kit) (your own Telegram over MCP in about 15 minutes).
    
    Author: **Anton Dziatkovskii**, Palo Alto AI Research Lab. Telegram [@tonydzi](https://t.me/tonydzi) - WhatsApp [+1 341 222 9178](https://wa.me/13412229178) - X [@Tony_Stef_](https://x.com/Tony_Stef_)
    
    **Engineers: want to test-drive this setup?** Message me. I hand out free starter seeds to engineers who test and report back, and custom skill requests are welcome.
    

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