pr-security-review
Use when reviewing a pull request for security issues — automatically analyzes the diff for vulnerabilities, hardcoded secrets, injection risks, and broken access control before merging
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/drvoss/everything-copilot-cli/tree/main/skills/security/pr-security-review
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install drvoss-everything-copilot-cli@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/drvoss/everything-copilot-cli.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole drvoss/everything-copilot-cli collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
PR Security Review
Automated security analysis of pull request diffs. Focuses on security-specific concerns that generic code review misses: injection vulnerabilities, authentication bypasses, hardcoded secrets, and insecure data handling introduced by the change.
When to Use
- Before merging any PR that touches authentication, authorization, or session handling
- Before merging PRs that add or modify API endpoints
- When a PR processes user input, file uploads, or external data
- Before merging PRs that update security-sensitive dependencies
- As a final gate before releasing to production
When NOT to Use
| Instead of pr-security-review | Use |
|---|---|
| Full codebase audit (not a PR) | evaluate-repository + security-scan skills |
| Dependency-only update with no code change | npm audit / pip-audit directly |
| Code quality review (no security concerns) | code-review skill |
Prerequisites
- Access to the PR diff (via
get_difforget_filesGitHub MCP methods) - Understanding of the application's trust boundary (what data is user-controlled)
Workflow
1. Fetch the PR diff
# Using GitHub MCP (built-in to Copilot CLI)
get_diff(owner, repo, pullNumber)
# Or review changed files
get_files(owner, repo, pullNumber)
2. Identify the attack surface in the diff
Before scanning for specific vulnerabilities, map what the PR adds or changes:
Attack surface checklist (mark relevant items):
[ ] New API endpoints or routes
[ ] Changes to authentication logic
[ ] Changes to authorization / permission checks
[ ] New or modified database queries
[ ] User input processing (form data, URL params, file uploads)
[ ] New dependencies added (check each with npm audit / pip-audit)
[ ] Environment variable / config changes
[ ] Cryptographic operations (hashing, encryption, token generation)
[ ] File system access
[ ] External HTTP requests
Only continue with checks relevant to the PR's actual attack surface.
3. Scan for injection vulnerabilities
# Fetch the PR diff first
$diff = gh pr diff <number>
# A03 — SQL Injection: string concatenation in queries
$diff | Select-String -Pattern "query.*\+|exec.*\+|`.*\${"
# A03 — Command Injection: unsanitized input in shell execution
$diff | Select-String -Pattern "exec\(|spawn\(|child_process|subprocess"
# A07 — XSS: unsanitized output in HTML context
$diff | Select-String -Pattern "innerHTML|dangerouslySetInnerHTML|document\.write"
4. Scan for authentication and authorization issues
# Check for missing auth middleware on new routes
# Look for patterns like:
# router.get('/sensitive', handler) ← no auth middleware
# vs
# router.get('/sensitive', authenticate, handler) ← protected
# Check for hardcoded credentials in the diff
$diff | Select-String -Pattern "password\s*=\s*['\`"]|secret\s*=\s*['\`"]|api.key\s*=\s*['\`"]" -CaseSensitive:$false
# Check for tokens/keys in new config files
$diff | Select-String -Pattern "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}|sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}"
5. Check new dependencies
For any new package added in the PR:
# After checking out the PR branch
npm audit --json 2>&1 | Select-Object -First 100
# Check the specific package
npm info <package-name> dist-tags
Flag packages that:
- Have known CVEs in
npm audit - Have very few downloads or no maintenance
- Are unusual alternatives to well-known packages (potential typosquatting)
6. Review data flow for sensitive data
Trace user-controlled inputs through the diff:
Input sources (user-controlled):
→ req.body, req.params, req.query, req.headers
→ file uploads (req.files, multer)
→ WebSocket messages
→ URL paths
For each input: does it reach a dangerous sink without sanitization?
Dangerous sinks: database queries, shell execution, HTML output, file paths, eval()
7. Write the security review comment
Structure findings by severity:
## Security Review — PR #[number]
### 🔴 Critical (Block merge)
- **[SQL Injection]** `src/db/users.ts:42` — User-controlled `id` concatenated
into raw SQL query. Use parameterized queries.
```typescript
// Current (vulnerable)
db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${req.params.id}`)
// Fix
db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [req.params.id])
```
### 🟠 High (Fix this sprint)
- **[Missing Auth]** `src/api/admin.ts:15` — New `/admin/export` endpoint has
no authentication middleware. Add `requireAdmin` middleware.
### 🟡 Medium (Fix next sprint)
- **[Weak Crypto]** `src/auth/token.ts:8` — Using `Math.random()` for token
generation. Use `crypto.randomBytes(32)` instead.
### ✅ No issues found in
- Dependency changes (npm audit clean)
- Database queries (all parameterized)
Severity Classification
| Level | Examples | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Critical | RCE, auth bypass, secret in code, SQL injection | Block merge |
| 🟠 High | Missing auth on endpoint, broken access control, XSS | Fix before merge or create critical issue |
| 🟡 Medium | Weak crypto, missing rate limiting, info leak | Fix this sprint |
| 🔵 Low | Verbose errors, minor config issues | Backlog acceptable |
OWASP Top 10 Quick Reference
| # | Category | What to look for in the diff |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing auth middleware, insecure direct object reference |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak algorithms (MD5, SHA1), unencrypted sensitive data |
| A03 | Injection | SQL, command, LDAP, XPath string concatenation |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Missing rate limiting, no input bounds |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Debug mode enabled, overly permissive CORS |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | New deps with CVEs, outdated packages |
| A07 | Auth Failures | Weak password policy, missing brute force protection |
| A08 | Software Integrity | Unsigned dependencies, missing subresource integrity |
| A09 | Logging Failures | PII in logs, insufficient audit trail |
| A10 | SSRF | User-controlled URLs used in server-side requests, especially when URL parsing, hostname allowlists, or IP validation can be bypassed |
Common Rationalizations
| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|---|
| "It's just an internal API, no auth needed" | Internal endpoints are compromised via SSRF, insider threat, or lateral movement. Authenticate everything. |
| "The frontend already validates this" | Frontend validation is bypass-able by any HTTP client. Server-side validation is mandatory. |
| "It's a small change, security review is overkill" | Most breaches start with a "small change" — a single parameter added to a query, one route added without auth. |
| "We'll fix the hardcoded secret before production" | Secrets committed to git history remain retrievable forever, even after deletion. Rotate immediately. |
Red Flags
- A new route is added without any mention of auth middleware in the diff
eval(),exec(), orchild_process.spawn()added with user input- A new
*.envfile or secrets file added to the repository - Dependencies added that are unusual variations of popular package names
- JWT or token validation logic changed or simplified
- New
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *header - SSRF protections only block plain
127.0.0.1or exact hostnames, but do not normalize encoded IP literals such as2130706433or0x7f.0.0.1 - SSRF allowlists or denylists compare raw hostnames without handling trailing-dot forms such as
internal.example.com.
Verification
- Attack surface mapped (all relevant categories identified)
- No injection vulnerabilities in new query/exec/eval calls
- All new API endpoints have appropriate auth middleware
- No secrets or API keys in the diff
- New dependencies pass
npm audit --audit-level=high - Sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) not logged
- Security findings communicated to PR author with specific line references
Tips
- Focus on the diff: you're reviewing what changed, not the whole codebase. A secure old function does not become a concern — a new insecure call does.
- Trace data flows: don't just grep for patterns. Follow user input from where it enters to where it lands.
- Use
exploreagent for deep analysis: "Find all places in this PR diff wherereq.bodyis used without validation." - Escalate confirmed Critical/High findings to the security team — don't merge.
See Also
security-scan— full codebase scan (not just PR diff)evaluate-repository— 7-dimension repo security scorecardsecret-detection— dedicated secret scanninginput-validation— sanitization patterns for fixing findings
Files (everything-copilot-cli)
-
SKILL.md 9.1 KB
--- name: pr-security-review license: MIT description: Use when reviewing a pull request for security issues — automatically analyzes the diff for vulnerabilities, hardcoded secrets, injection risks, and broken access control before merging metadata: category: security agent_type: security-review origin: inspired by anthropics/claude-code-security-review --- # PR Security Review Automated security analysis of pull request diffs. Focuses on security-specific concerns that generic code review misses: injection vulnerabilities, authentication bypasses, hardcoded secrets, and insecure data handling introduced by the change. ## When to Use - Before merging any PR that touches authentication, authorization, or session handling - Before merging PRs that add or modify API endpoints - When a PR processes user input, file uploads, or external data - Before merging PRs that update security-sensitive dependencies - As a final gate before releasing to production ## When NOT to Use | Instead of pr-security-review | Use | |-------------------------------|-----| | Full codebase audit (not a PR) | `evaluate-repository` + `security-scan` skills | | Dependency-only update with no code change | `npm audit` / `pip-audit` directly | | Code quality review (no security concerns) | `code-review` skill | ## Prerequisites - Access to the PR diff (via `get_diff` or `get_files` GitHub MCP methods) - Understanding of the application's trust boundary (what data is user-controlled) ## Workflow ### 1. Fetch the PR diff ```text # Using GitHub MCP (built-in to Copilot CLI) get_diff(owner, repo, pullNumber) # Or review changed files get_files(owner, repo, pullNumber) ``` ### 2. Identify the attack surface in the diff Before scanning for specific vulnerabilities, map what the PR adds or changes: ```text Attack surface checklist (mark relevant items): [ ] New API endpoints or routes [ ] Changes to authentication logic [ ] Changes to authorization / permission checks [ ] New or modified database queries [ ] User input processing (form data, URL params, file uploads) [ ] New dependencies added (check each with npm audit / pip-audit) [ ] Environment variable / config changes [ ] Cryptographic operations (hashing, encryption, token generation) [ ] File system access [ ] External HTTP requests ``` Only continue with checks relevant to the PR's actual attack surface. ### 3. Scan for injection vulnerabilities ```powershell # Fetch the PR diff first $diff = gh pr diff <number> # A03 — SQL Injection: string concatenation in queries $diff | Select-String -Pattern "query.*\+|exec.*\+|`.*\${" # A03 — Command Injection: unsanitized input in shell execution $diff | Select-String -Pattern "exec\(|spawn\(|child_process|subprocess" # A07 — XSS: unsanitized output in HTML context $diff | Select-String -Pattern "innerHTML|dangerouslySetInnerHTML|document\.write" ``` ### 4. Scan for authentication and authorization issues ```powershell # Check for missing auth middleware on new routes # Look for patterns like: # router.get('/sensitive', handler) ← no auth middleware # vs # router.get('/sensitive', authenticate, handler) ← protected # Check for hardcoded credentials in the diff $diff | Select-String -Pattern "password\s*=\s*['\`"]|secret\s*=\s*['\`"]|api.key\s*=\s*['\`"]" -CaseSensitive:$false # Check for tokens/keys in new config files $diff | Select-String -Pattern "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}|sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}" ``` ### 5. Check new dependencies For any new package added in the PR: ```powershell # After checking out the PR branch npm audit --json 2>&1 | Select-Object -First 100 # Check the specific package npm info <package-name> dist-tags ``` Flag packages that: - Have known CVEs in `npm audit` - Have very few downloads or no maintenance - Are unusual alternatives to well-known packages (potential typosquatting) ### 6. Review data flow for sensitive data Trace user-controlled inputs through the diff: ```text Input sources (user-controlled): → req.body, req.params, req.query, req.headers → file uploads (req.files, multer) → WebSocket messages → URL paths For each input: does it reach a dangerous sink without sanitization? Dangerous sinks: database queries, shell execution, HTML output, file paths, eval() ``` ### 7. Write the security review comment Structure findings by severity: ````markdown ## Security Review — PR #[number] ### 🔴 Critical (Block merge) - **[SQL Injection]** `src/db/users.ts:42` — User-controlled `id` concatenated into raw SQL query. Use parameterized queries. ```typescript // Current (vulnerable) db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${req.params.id}`) // Fix db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [req.params.id]) ``` ### 🟠 High (Fix this sprint) - **[Missing Auth]** `src/api/admin.ts:15` — New `/admin/export` endpoint has no authentication middleware. Add `requireAdmin` middleware. ### 🟡 Medium (Fix next sprint) - **[Weak Crypto]** `src/auth/token.ts:8` — Using `Math.random()` for token generation. Use `crypto.randomBytes(32)` instead. ### ✅ No issues found in - Dependency changes (npm audit clean) - Database queries (all parameterized) ```` ## Severity Classification | Level | Examples | Action | |-------|----------|--------| | 🔴 Critical | RCE, auth bypass, secret in code, SQL injection | Block merge | | 🟠 High | Missing auth on endpoint, broken access control, XSS | Fix before merge or create critical issue | | 🟡 Medium | Weak crypto, missing rate limiting, info leak | Fix this sprint | | 🔵 Low | Verbose errors, minor config issues | Backlog acceptable | ## OWASP Top 10 Quick Reference | # | Category | What to look for in the diff | |---|----------|------------------------------| | A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing auth middleware, insecure direct object reference | | A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak algorithms (MD5, SHA1), unencrypted sensitive data | | A03 | Injection | SQL, command, LDAP, XPath string concatenation | | A04 | Insecure Design | Missing rate limiting, no input bounds | | A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Debug mode enabled, overly permissive CORS | | A06 | Vulnerable Components | New deps with CVEs, outdated packages | | A07 | Auth Failures | Weak password policy, missing brute force protection | | A08 | Software Integrity | Unsigned dependencies, missing subresource integrity | | A09 | Logging Failures | PII in logs, insufficient audit trail | | A10 | SSRF | User-controlled URLs used in server-side requests, especially when URL parsing, hostname allowlists, or IP validation can be bypassed | ## Common Rationalizations | Rationalization | Reality | |----------------|---------| | "It's just an internal API, no auth needed" | Internal endpoints are compromised via SSRF, insider threat, or lateral movement. Authenticate everything. | | "The frontend already validates this" | Frontend validation is bypass-able by any HTTP client. Server-side validation is mandatory. | | "It's a small change, security review is overkill" | Most breaches start with a "small change" — a single parameter added to a query, one route added without auth. | | "We'll fix the hardcoded secret before production" | Secrets committed to git history remain retrievable forever, even after deletion. Rotate immediately. | ## Red Flags - A new route is added without any mention of auth middleware in the diff - `eval()`, `exec()`, or `child_process.spawn()` added with user input - A new `*.env` file or secrets file added to the repository - Dependencies added that are unusual variations of popular package names - JWT or token validation logic changed or simplified - New `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header - SSRF protections only block plain `127.0.0.1` or exact hostnames, but do not normalize encoded IP literals such as `2130706433` or `0x7f.0.0.1` - SSRF allowlists or denylists compare raw hostnames without handling trailing-dot forms such as `internal.example.com.` ## Verification - [ ] Attack surface mapped (all relevant categories identified) - [ ] No injection vulnerabilities in new query/exec/eval calls - [ ] All new API endpoints have appropriate auth middleware - [ ] No secrets or API keys in the diff - [ ] New dependencies pass `npm audit --audit-level=high` - [ ] Sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) not logged - [ ] Security findings communicated to PR author with specific line references ## Tips - **Focus on the diff**: you're reviewing what changed, not the whole codebase. A secure old function does not become a concern — a new insecure call does. - **Trace data flows**: don't just grep for patterns. Follow user input from where it enters to where it lands. - **Use `explore` agent** for deep analysis: "Find all places in this PR diff where `req.body` is used without validation." - **Escalate confirmed Critical/High findings** to the security team — don't merge. ## See Also - [`security-scan`](../security-scan/SKILL.md) — full codebase scan (not just PR diff) - [`evaluate-repository`](../evaluate-repository/SKILL.md) — 7-dimension repo security scorecard - [`secret-detection`](../secret-detection/SKILL.md) — dedicated secret scanning - [`input-validation`](../input-validation/SKILL.md) — sanitization patterns for fixing findings
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