Claude Skill

network-security-audit

Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter.

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#security

Download dandi41-ntnroute-skills_network-security-audit-aeff5d4.zip · 7 KB

Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/Dandi41/ntnroute/tree/main/skills/network-security-audit
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install dandi41-ntnroute@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/Dandi41/ntnroute.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole dandi41/ntnroute collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Network Security Audit

Read-only during the audit; remediation goes through the network-change-management skill. The audit is a guided procedure, not a vendor-specific parser: identify platform from live evidence, choose safe read-only commands, interpret output, and research uncertain findings. Never assume examples are supported on every release.

Core rules

  1. Audit only when the user asks. Never run an audit proactively ("while we're at it", "to be thorough"). Triggers: the user requests an audit, a security check, or an incident that needs a security assessment.
  2. Read-only. All audit commands are read-only (show, print, display). No state changes during the audit.
  3. Report, never authorize or veto. A security audit produces evidence, severity, and remediation advice only. It never blocks, permits, delays, or otherwise decides a requested configuration change — including a change that removes DHCP clients, firewall rules, services, routes, or accounts. The user decides whether to change configuration; the change workflow handles consent, rollback, and verification separately.
  4. Evidence, not opinion. Every finding has command output plus, for CVEs, an official link. Without a link → write "not yet verified".
  5. Both sides: local (device hardening) and perimeter (what can be reached from outside). The perimeter is usually the more fatal side.
  6. CVEs from research, not memory. The OS version comes from the device, CVEs are researched via the web from official sources (vendor PSIRT → NVD), and relevance is checked against the features actually in use.

When to Use

  • User asks: "audit the security of the lab RouterOS device", "check network security", "is this device secure?"
  • Before a new device goes into production (initial audit)
  • After an incident: audit + network-troubleshooting for forensics

Not for: changing config (→ network-change-management), diagnosing outages (→ network-troubleshooting), adding devices (→ ntnroute).

Audit Procedure

1. Confirm scope with the user

One short question: audit one device or all of them? Focus on local, perimeter, or both? Don't assume.

2. Collect live evidence (manual, read-only)

Use the ntnroute skill's approved read-only access. Do not use a pre-baked audit script: syntax and output vary across vendors, OS versions, roles, and models.

  1. Identify vendor/OS/version and device role from inventory and live evidence; if uncertain, ask for safe version/show output.
  2. Choose relevant checks from references/baselines.md and official docs. Ask for missing context (e.g. intended management source ranges or exposed services).
  3. Run a small batch of relevant read-only commands and retain raw output. If syntax is rejected, verify it from official docs before alternatives.
  4. If unreachable, report unknown / not audited, never secure.
  5. Verify feature applicability; separate observed facts from inference and state confidence.

For multiple devices, repeat and record findings per device. Never claim the fleet is clean if devices/checks were unreachable or unverified.

2b. Check the change log (when change-related)

Read the config/rollback timeline and attempts with no verdict (network-troubleshooting → references/audit-trail.md). Record out-of-band changes and unsettled applies; verify live config before trusting stored snapshots.

3. CVE + version research (if requested or a suspicious version shows up)

Identify exact product, OS train, version, hardware/model and relevant features. Follow references/threat-research.md: vendor PSIRT first → verify in NVD → confirm affected/fixed versions and feature relevance. Cite URLs; state when unverified.

4. Assess against the baseline

Use references/baselines.md as a framework, not a vendor parser or exhaustive oracle. Adapt to platform and role; distinguish not applicable, not checked, and unknown. Verify command examples against official docs.

5. Assemble the report

Use templates/audit-report-template.md: scope, inventory, reachability/completeness, evidence-backed findings with confidence, sources/CVEs, perimeter exposure, limitations, and proposed hardening. Do not execute remediation or recommend recurring audits.

Division of labor across networking skills

Skill Role
ntnroute inventory, transport, ntn config/rollback
network-device-cli how to SSH to devices directly (outside ntn)
network-troubleshooting outage diagnosis, OSI layers, hypothesis tests
network-change-management change approval, rollback generation
network-security-audit (this) security findings, CVE/baseline, audit report

Complementary flow: the audit (this skill) finds → the user approves remediation → network-change-management plans it, gets approval, and applies it → network-troubleshooting verifies nothing broke.

Pitfalls

  • CVE findings require applicability evidence. Match product/model/build, affected versions, and enabled features before assigning severity.
  • Version ≠ patch level. Verify release notes and fixed-version advisories; do not infer patch status from version numbering alone.
  • The perimeter needs an outside vantage point. Configuration shows intended policy, not measured reachability. Active external tests require explicit permission and documented scope.
  • Unknown is not safe. Mark unreachable or unverified checks unknown/not checked, not pass.
  • Don't run an audit unrequested. This is a user rule, not a preference.
  • Audit ≠ outage diagnosis. Use network-troubleshooting for availability/performance symptoms.

Verification

This is a guided, read-only workflow with no bundled parsers. Gather actual output, adapt to the device, and cite sources for externally verified claims. Audit runs are not recorded in the device inventory: the audit report is the record.

Files (ntnroute)
  • references
    • baselines.md 1.6 KB
      Loading…
    • threat-research.md 4.1 KB
      Loading…
  • templates
    • audit-report-template.md 2 KB
      Loading…
  • SKILL.md 6.3 KB
    ---
    name: network-security-audit
    description: "Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter."
    version: 1.0.0
    author: Dandi Suryadi, Hermes Agent
    license: MIT
    metadata:
      hermes:
        tags: [network, security, audit, cve, hardening, perimeter, cisco, mikrotik, compliance]
        related_skills: [ntnroute, network-device-cli, network-change-management, network-troubleshooting]
    ---
    
    # Network Security Audit
    
    Read-only during the audit; remediation goes through the `network-change-management` skill. The audit is a **guided procedure**, not a vendor-specific parser: identify platform from live evidence, choose safe read-only commands, interpret output, and research uncertain findings. Never assume examples are supported on every release.
    
    ## Core rules
    
    1. **Audit only when the user asks.** Never run an audit proactively
       ("while we're at it", "to be thorough"). Triggers: the user requests an
       audit, a security check, or an incident that needs a security assessment.
    2. **Read-only.** All audit commands are read-only (`show`, `print`,
       `display`). No state changes during the audit.
    3. **Report, never authorize or veto.** A security audit produces evidence,
       severity, and remediation advice only. It never blocks, permits, delays,
       or otherwise decides a requested configuration change — including a change
       that removes DHCP clients, firewall rules, services, routes, or accounts.
       The user decides whether to change configuration; the change workflow
       handles consent, rollback, and verification separately.
    4. **Evidence, not opinion.** Every finding has command output plus, for
       CVEs, an official link. Without a link → write "not yet verified".
    5. **Both sides:** local (device hardening) and perimeter (what can be
       reached from outside). The perimeter is usually the more fatal side.
    6. **CVEs from research, not memory.** The OS version comes from the device,
       CVEs are researched via the web from official sources (vendor PSIRT →
       NVD), and relevance is checked against the features actually in use.
    
    ## When to Use
    
    - User asks: "audit the security of the lab RouterOS device", "check network
      security", "is this device secure?"
    - Before a new device goes into production (initial audit)
    - After an incident: audit + `network-troubleshooting` for forensics
    
    Not for: changing config (→ `network-change-management`), diagnosing
    outages (→ `network-troubleshooting`), adding devices (→ `ntnroute`).
    
    ## Audit Procedure
    
    ### 1. Confirm scope with the user
    
    One short question: audit one device or all of them? Focus on local,
    perimeter, or both? Don't assume.
    
    ### 2. Collect live evidence (manual, read-only)
    
    Use the `ntnroute` skill's approved read-only access. Do not use a pre-baked audit script: syntax and output vary across vendors, OS versions, roles, and models.
    
    1. Identify vendor/OS/version and device role from inventory and live evidence; if uncertain, ask for safe version/show output.
    2. Choose relevant checks from `references/baselines.md` and official docs. Ask for missing context (e.g. intended management source ranges or exposed services).
    3. Run a small batch of relevant read-only commands and retain raw output. If syntax is rejected, verify it from official docs before alternatives.
    4. If unreachable, report **unknown / not audited**, never secure.
    5. Verify feature applicability; separate observed facts from inference and state confidence.
    
    For multiple devices, repeat and record findings per device. Never claim the fleet is clean if devices/checks were unreachable or unverified.
    
    ### 2b. Check the change log (when change-related)
    
    Read the config/rollback timeline and attempts with no verdict (`network-troubleshooting` → `references/audit-trail.md`). Record out-of-band changes and unsettled applies; verify live config before trusting stored snapshots.
    
    ### 3. CVE + version research (if requested or a suspicious version shows up)
    
    Identify exact product, OS train, version, hardware/model and relevant features. Follow `references/threat-research.md`: vendor PSIRT first → verify in NVD → confirm affected/fixed versions and feature relevance. Cite URLs; state when unverified.
    
    ### 4. Assess against the baseline
    
    Use `references/baselines.md` as a framework, not a vendor parser or exhaustive oracle. Adapt to platform and role; distinguish `not applicable`, `not checked`, and `unknown`. Verify command examples against official docs.
    
    ### 5. Assemble the report
    
    Use `templates/audit-report-template.md`: scope, inventory, reachability/completeness, evidence-backed findings with confidence, sources/CVEs, perimeter exposure, limitations, and proposed hardening. Do not execute remediation or recommend recurring audits.
    
    ## Division of labor across networking skills
    
    | Skill | Role |
    |---|---|
    | `ntnroute` | inventory, transport, `ntn config`/rollback |
    | `network-device-cli` | how to SSH to devices directly (outside ntn) |
    | `network-troubleshooting` | outage diagnosis, OSI layers, hypothesis tests |
    | `network-change-management` | change approval, rollback generation |
    | `network-security-audit` (this) | security findings, CVE/baseline, audit report |
    
    Complementary flow: the audit (this skill) finds → the user approves
    remediation → `network-change-management` plans it, gets approval, and
    applies it → `network-troubleshooting` verifies nothing broke.
    
    ## Pitfalls
    
    - **CVE findings require applicability evidence.** Match product/model/build, affected versions, and enabled features before assigning severity.
    - **Version ≠ patch level.** Verify release notes and fixed-version advisories; do not infer patch status from version numbering alone.
    - **The perimeter needs an outside vantage point.** Configuration shows intended policy, not measured reachability. Active external tests require explicit permission and documented scope.
    - **Unknown is not safe.** Mark unreachable or unverified checks unknown/not checked, not pass.
    - **Don't run an audit unrequested.** This is a user rule, not a preference.
    - **Audit ≠ outage diagnosis.** Use `network-troubleshooting` for availability/performance symptoms.
    
    ## Verification
    
    This is a guided, read-only workflow with no bundled parsers. Gather actual output, adapt to the device, and cite sources for externally verified claims. Audit runs are not recorded in the device inventory: the audit report is the record.
    

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