network-security-audit
Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter.
#security
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/Dandi41/ntnroute/tree/main/skills/network-security-audit
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install dandi41-ntnroute@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/Dandi41/ntnroute.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole dandi41/ntnroute collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
Network Security Audit
Read-only during the audit; remediation goes through the network-change-management skill. The audit is a guided procedure, not a vendor-specific parser: identify platform from live evidence, choose safe read-only commands, interpret output, and research uncertain findings. Never assume examples are supported on every release.
Core rules
- Audit only when the user asks. Never run an audit proactively ("while we're at it", "to be thorough"). Triggers: the user requests an audit, a security check, or an incident that needs a security assessment.
- Read-only. All audit commands are read-only (
show,print,display). No state changes during the audit. - Report, never authorize or veto. A security audit produces evidence, severity, and remediation advice only. It never blocks, permits, delays, or otherwise decides a requested configuration change — including a change that removes DHCP clients, firewall rules, services, routes, or accounts. The user decides whether to change configuration; the change workflow handles consent, rollback, and verification separately.
- Evidence, not opinion. Every finding has command output plus, for CVEs, an official link. Without a link → write "not yet verified".
- Both sides: local (device hardening) and perimeter (what can be reached from outside). The perimeter is usually the more fatal side.
- CVEs from research, not memory. The OS version comes from the device, CVEs are researched via the web from official sources (vendor PSIRT → NVD), and relevance is checked against the features actually in use.
When to Use
- User asks: "audit the security of the lab RouterOS device", "check network security", "is this device secure?"
- Before a new device goes into production (initial audit)
- After an incident: audit +
network-troubleshootingfor forensics
Not for: changing config (→ network-change-management), diagnosing
outages (→ network-troubleshooting), adding devices (→ ntnroute).
Audit Procedure
1. Confirm scope with the user
One short question: audit one device or all of them? Focus on local, perimeter, or both? Don't assume.
2. Collect live evidence (manual, read-only)
Use the ntnroute skill's approved read-only access. Do not use a pre-baked audit script: syntax and output vary across vendors, OS versions, roles, and models.
- Identify vendor/OS/version and device role from inventory and live evidence; if uncertain, ask for safe version/show output.
- Choose relevant checks from
references/baselines.mdand official docs. Ask for missing context (e.g. intended management source ranges or exposed services). - Run a small batch of relevant read-only commands and retain raw output. If syntax is rejected, verify it from official docs before alternatives.
- If unreachable, report unknown / not audited, never secure.
- Verify feature applicability; separate observed facts from inference and state confidence.
For multiple devices, repeat and record findings per device. Never claim the fleet is clean if devices/checks were unreachable or unverified.
2b. Check the change log (when change-related)
Read the config/rollback timeline and attempts with no verdict (network-troubleshooting → references/audit-trail.md). Record out-of-band changes and unsettled applies; verify live config before trusting stored snapshots.
3. CVE + version research (if requested or a suspicious version shows up)
Identify exact product, OS train, version, hardware/model and relevant features. Follow references/threat-research.md: vendor PSIRT first → verify in NVD → confirm affected/fixed versions and feature relevance. Cite URLs; state when unverified.
4. Assess against the baseline
Use references/baselines.md as a framework, not a vendor parser or exhaustive oracle. Adapt to platform and role; distinguish not applicable, not checked, and unknown. Verify command examples against official docs.
5. Assemble the report
Use templates/audit-report-template.md: scope, inventory, reachability/completeness, evidence-backed findings with confidence, sources/CVEs, perimeter exposure, limitations, and proposed hardening. Do not execute remediation or recommend recurring audits.
Division of labor across networking skills
| Skill | Role |
|---|---|
ntnroute |
inventory, transport, ntn config/rollback |
network-device-cli |
how to SSH to devices directly (outside ntn) |
network-troubleshooting |
outage diagnosis, OSI layers, hypothesis tests |
network-change-management |
change approval, rollback generation |
network-security-audit (this) |
security findings, CVE/baseline, audit report |
Complementary flow: the audit (this skill) finds → the user approves
remediation → network-change-management plans it, gets approval, and
applies it → network-troubleshooting verifies nothing broke.
Pitfalls
- CVE findings require applicability evidence. Match product/model/build, affected versions, and enabled features before assigning severity.
- Version ≠ patch level. Verify release notes and fixed-version advisories; do not infer patch status from version numbering alone.
- The perimeter needs an outside vantage point. Configuration shows intended policy, not measured reachability. Active external tests require explicit permission and documented scope.
- Unknown is not safe. Mark unreachable or unverified checks unknown/not checked, not pass.
- Don't run an audit unrequested. This is a user rule, not a preference.
- Audit ≠ outage diagnosis. Use
network-troubleshootingfor availability/performance symptoms.
Verification
This is a guided, read-only workflow with no bundled parsers. Gather actual output, adapt to the device, and cite sources for externally verified claims. Audit runs are not recorded in the device inventory: the audit report is the record.
Files (ntnroute)
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references
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baselines.md 1.6 KB
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threat-research.md 4.1 KB
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templates
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audit-report-template.md 2 KB
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SKILL.md 6.3 KB
--- name: network-security-audit description: "Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter." version: 1.0.0 author: Dandi Suryadi, Hermes Agent license: MIT metadata: hermes: tags: [network, security, audit, cve, hardening, perimeter, cisco, mikrotik, compliance] related_skills: [ntnroute, network-device-cli, network-change-management, network-troubleshooting] --- # Network Security Audit Read-only during the audit; remediation goes through the `network-change-management` skill. The audit is a **guided procedure**, not a vendor-specific parser: identify platform from live evidence, choose safe read-only commands, interpret output, and research uncertain findings. Never assume examples are supported on every release. ## Core rules 1. **Audit only when the user asks.** Never run an audit proactively ("while we're at it", "to be thorough"). Triggers: the user requests an audit, a security check, or an incident that needs a security assessment. 2. **Read-only.** All audit commands are read-only (`show`, `print`, `display`). No state changes during the audit. 3. **Report, never authorize or veto.** A security audit produces evidence, severity, and remediation advice only. It never blocks, permits, delays, or otherwise decides a requested configuration change — including a change that removes DHCP clients, firewall rules, services, routes, or accounts. The user decides whether to change configuration; the change workflow handles consent, rollback, and verification separately. 4. **Evidence, not opinion.** Every finding has command output plus, for CVEs, an official link. Without a link → write "not yet verified". 5. **Both sides:** local (device hardening) and perimeter (what can be reached from outside). The perimeter is usually the more fatal side. 6. **CVEs from research, not memory.** The OS version comes from the device, CVEs are researched via the web from official sources (vendor PSIRT → NVD), and relevance is checked against the features actually in use. ## When to Use - User asks: "audit the security of the lab RouterOS device", "check network security", "is this device secure?" - Before a new device goes into production (initial audit) - After an incident: audit + `network-troubleshooting` for forensics Not for: changing config (→ `network-change-management`), diagnosing outages (→ `network-troubleshooting`), adding devices (→ `ntnroute`). ## Audit Procedure ### 1. Confirm scope with the user One short question: audit one device or all of them? Focus on local, perimeter, or both? Don't assume. ### 2. Collect live evidence (manual, read-only) Use the `ntnroute` skill's approved read-only access. Do not use a pre-baked audit script: syntax and output vary across vendors, OS versions, roles, and models. 1. Identify vendor/OS/version and device role from inventory and live evidence; if uncertain, ask for safe version/show output. 2. Choose relevant checks from `references/baselines.md` and official docs. Ask for missing context (e.g. intended management source ranges or exposed services). 3. Run a small batch of relevant read-only commands and retain raw output. If syntax is rejected, verify it from official docs before alternatives. 4. If unreachable, report **unknown / not audited**, never secure. 5. Verify feature applicability; separate observed facts from inference and state confidence. For multiple devices, repeat and record findings per device. Never claim the fleet is clean if devices/checks were unreachable or unverified. ### 2b. Check the change log (when change-related) Read the config/rollback timeline and attempts with no verdict (`network-troubleshooting` → `references/audit-trail.md`). Record out-of-band changes and unsettled applies; verify live config before trusting stored snapshots. ### 3. CVE + version research (if requested or a suspicious version shows up) Identify exact product, OS train, version, hardware/model and relevant features. Follow `references/threat-research.md`: vendor PSIRT first → verify in NVD → confirm affected/fixed versions and feature relevance. Cite URLs; state when unverified. ### 4. Assess against the baseline Use `references/baselines.md` as a framework, not a vendor parser or exhaustive oracle. Adapt to platform and role; distinguish `not applicable`, `not checked`, and `unknown`. Verify command examples against official docs. ### 5. Assemble the report Use `templates/audit-report-template.md`: scope, inventory, reachability/completeness, evidence-backed findings with confidence, sources/CVEs, perimeter exposure, limitations, and proposed hardening. Do not execute remediation or recommend recurring audits. ## Division of labor across networking skills | Skill | Role | |---|---| | `ntnroute` | inventory, transport, `ntn config`/rollback | | `network-device-cli` | how to SSH to devices directly (outside ntn) | | `network-troubleshooting` | outage diagnosis, OSI layers, hypothesis tests | | `network-change-management` | change approval, rollback generation | | `network-security-audit` (this) | security findings, CVE/baseline, audit report | Complementary flow: the audit (this skill) finds → the user approves remediation → `network-change-management` plans it, gets approval, and applies it → `network-troubleshooting` verifies nothing broke. ## Pitfalls - **CVE findings require applicability evidence.** Match product/model/build, affected versions, and enabled features before assigning severity. - **Version ≠ patch level.** Verify release notes and fixed-version advisories; do not infer patch status from version numbering alone. - **The perimeter needs an outside vantage point.** Configuration shows intended policy, not measured reachability. Active external tests require explicit permission and documented scope. - **Unknown is not safe.** Mark unreachable or unverified checks unknown/not checked, not pass. - **Don't run an audit unrequested.** This is a user rule, not a preference. - **Audit ≠ outage diagnosis.** Use `network-troubleshooting` for availability/performance symptoms. ## Verification This is a guided, read-only workflow with no bundled parsers. Gather actual output, adapt to the device, and cite sources for externally verified claims. Audit runs are not recorded in the device inventory: the audit report is the record.
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