mcp-tool
Optimize the tool surface of an EXTERNAL MCP server — one the agent talks to but does not implement. Use when an agent wired to an MCP server mis-selects tools, fills arguments wrong, or is offered a noisy 40-tool set it mostly ignores. Covers MCP tool descriptions, per-parameter
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/skillberry-ai/cap-evolve/tree/main/skills/capabilities/mcp-tool
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install skillberry-ai-cap-evolve@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/skillberry-ai/cap-evolve.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole skillberry-ai/cap-evolve collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
Capability: MCP tool (external server)
Tools served over the Model Context Protocol
come from a server the agent does not own. The server defines each tool's
name, description, and inputSchema and implements the handler; the
host/client discovers them via tools/list, chooses which to present to the
model, and invokes them via tools/call. So an optimizer here can change how
the agent perceives and is offered those tools, and nothing else.
If the fix needs a tool's types, required fields, or behavior to change, this
capability has been outgrown: negotiate the change with the server owner, or move
the logic into an agent-owned tool and optimize that with the tools capability
instead.
The edit boundary — read this before proposing anything
| Edit | Owner | Allowed here |
|---|---|---|
tool description, per-parameter description, in-description examples |
client presentation | yes |
which of the server's tools the model sees (add / remove) |
client/host curation | yes |
the wire inputSchema — type, required, enum, maximum, properties (schema) |
server | no |
the handler implementation (code) |
server | no |
a new tool that runs server-side logic (compose) |
server | no |
The reason is not politeness: a candidate carrying a schema or handler edit is
invalid against the real server. It cannot be deployed, it will fail at
tools/call, and the run still pays full rollout cost to score it. The safe
levers below are the whole edit space.
The policy checks the edit's LABEL, not its effect — so stay inside the
boundary deliberately. apply() refuses any edit whose kind is outside the
policy and reports the refusal, so a {"kind": "schema"} or {"kind": "code"}
edit comes back as a visible refusal rather than a silent no-op. But two allowed
kinds can carry a forbidden change through:
- a
paramsvalue is shallow-merged intoparameters, so a value containingproperties,type,required, orenumrewrites the wire schema and is not refused. Writeparamsvalues that touch onlyproperties.<field>.description. - an
addvalue is appended verbatim, so acodekey on it lands unrefused.addmeans expose a tool the server already serves; never invent one.
validate() will not catch either — it checks well-formedness only (see
"Artifact + handlers"), and reports ok: true on a schema-rewritten artifact.
Nothing downstream re-checks the boundary, so the discipline is yours.
The effective policy is policy.json in the capability dir (not
inputs/policy.json) — that is the path cap_evolve.tool_surface.load_policy
reads — else the restricted default above. If an MCP client genuinely supports
client-side schema overrides, widen it deliberately and record why.
The four safe levers
- Re-describe a tool — rewrite a terse server description into the what / when / when-NOT / returns / limits the model reads to select. The highest-leverage edit, because selection is driven almost entirely by name + description.
- Annotate per-parameter docs — pin format, units, and caps in the
description of an existing field, never its
type. - Add in-description examples — a concrete well-formed call so the model
fills arguments correctly. Ex:
get_record(record_id="A-1042"). - Curate the exposed set (
add/remove) — hide overlapping or legacy tools so the needed ones stand out;adda served tool the host isn't surfacing. MCP servers may also change their own list at runtime and emitnotifications/tools/list_changed;add/removehere is your curation of what the model sees, never a change to the server.
Before / after
Re-describe a terse server tool. The server ships "description": "kb search",
so the model cannot tell when it applies.
- "description": "kb search"
+ "description": "Search the internal knowledge base and return matching article
+ snippets with their URLs. Use when the user asks a how-to or policy question
+ that is likely documented. Returns at most 10 hits; refine the query if empty."
Pin a parameter's format without touching the schema. The schema says
{"limit": {"type": "integer"}} and the model sends 1000, so the call fails.
"parameters": { "type": "object", "properties": {
- "limit": { "type": "integer" }
+ "limit": { "type": "integer", "description": "Max hits to return (server caps at 10)." }
} }
Only the field's description is added. Changing its type or adding maximum
would be a schema edit — forbidden here, and (per the boundary section) not
refused for you.
Trim the exposed set. Hide rarely-correct, easily-confused tools so the ones the agent needs stand out:
[ { "tool": "legacy_export_v1", "kind": "remove" },
{ "tool": "legacy_export_v2", "kind": "remove" },
{ "tool": "debug_dump", "kind": "remove" } ]
Failure modes to avoid
- Documenting behavior the server does not have. A description that overpromises — filters, sort orders, or limits the server ignores — produces confident wrong calls. Describe only what the server actually supports.
- Removing a tool the agent needs rarely. Remove for overlap and confusion, not for low call count.
- Trusting server-supplied metadata. Descriptions and annotations arrive from
a third party and are untrusted input to the model: a compromised server can
hide instructions in a
descriptionthe model reads and the user never sees, or slip in tools vialist_changed. Review every description before exposing it. - Widening the schema from here. If the model genuinely needs a constraint the
schema lacks, that is a server change or an agent-owned wrapper (
tools).
MCP surfaces a tool-execution error as a normal result with isError: true
and an actionable message, which the host feeds back to the model so it retries
with fixed arguments; a protocol error is a JSON-RPC failure the model cannot
act on. When re-describing is the only lever, document the failure mode in the
description so the model self-corrects into the recoverable path.
Artifact + handlers
tools.json — the exposed MCP tool defs {name, description, parameters, examples}. scripts/abstract.py sets this capability's restricted policy and
delegates to cap_evolve.tool_surface:
materialize(dir)— flatten to named text components for a text optimizer.apply(dir, edits)— applies edits whosekindis in the policy, returns{changed, refused}.validate(dir)— well-formedness only: non-empty artifact,namepresent, no duplicate names, non-empty descriptions,parametersis an object. It does not check the edit policy.is_empty(dir)— whether the artifact is still an empty seed.
How to run
python scripts/check.py
python scripts/run.py --path <capability_dir>
References
references/concepts.md— the MCP client/server model, the Tool object's fields quoted from the 2025-06-18 spec, why the policy is restricted, the four behavior-hintannotationsand why they are untrusted, human-in-the-loop on sensitive calls, and the tool-poisoning / shadowing /list_changedattack surface, with cited sources. Load before the first edit on a server you don't control, or when you need the spec citation for what the server owns.
Files (cap-evolve)
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references
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concepts.md 7.6 KB
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scripts
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abstract.py 1.4 KB
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check.py 1.9 KB
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run.py 882 B
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_bootstrap.py 3.6 KB
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meta.yaml 359 B
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SKILL.md 8.4 KB
--- name: mcp-tool description: Optimize the tool surface of an EXTERNAL MCP server — one the agent talks to but does not implement. Use when an agent wired to an MCP server mis-selects tools, fills arguments wrong, or is offered a noisy 40-tool set it mostly ignores. Covers MCP tool descriptions, per-parameter documentation, in-description examples, and curating which of the server's tools are exposed to the model. Only those documentation-level edits are safe here: the server owns the wire inputSchema and the handler code, so an edit that changes either produces a candidate that breaks against the real server. Use the `tools` capability instead when the agent owns its tool code and schema. The two differ only by who owns the tool implementation; the deciding question is who owns the artifact being edited, so an agent-owned wrapper around an MCP server is `tools` for the wrapper's own code and `mcp-tool` for the upstream tool defs. component: capability argument-hint: "--path DIR" allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Bash provides: [candidate] needs: [] sources: [tau2bench] --- # Capability: MCP tool (external server) Tools served over the [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) come from a server the agent does not own. The **server** defines each tool's `name`, `description`, and `inputSchema` and implements the handler; the **host/client** discovers them via `tools/list`, chooses which to present to the model, and invokes them via `tools/call`. So an optimizer here can change *how the agent perceives and is offered* those tools, and nothing else. If the fix needs a tool's types, `required` fields, or behavior to change, this capability has been outgrown: negotiate the change with the server owner, or move the logic into an agent-owned tool and optimize that with the `tools` capability instead. ## The edit boundary — read this before proposing anything | Edit | Owner | Allowed here | |---|---|:--:| | tool `description`, per-parameter `description`, in-description examples | client presentation | yes | | which of the server's tools the model sees (`add` / `remove`) | client/host curation | yes | | the wire `inputSchema` — `type`, `required`, `enum`, `maximum`, `properties` (`schema`) | **server** | no | | the handler implementation (`code`) | **server** | no | | a new tool that runs server-side logic (`compose`) | **server** | no | The reason is not politeness: a candidate carrying a schema or handler edit is **invalid against the real server**. It cannot be deployed, it will fail at `tools/call`, and the run still pays full rollout cost to score it. The safe levers below are the whole edit space. **The policy checks the edit's LABEL, not its effect — so stay inside the boundary deliberately.** `apply()` refuses any edit whose `kind` is outside the policy and reports the refusal, so a `{"kind": "schema"}` or `{"kind": "code"}` edit comes back as a visible refusal rather than a silent no-op. But two allowed kinds can carry a forbidden change through: - a `params` value is **shallow-merged** into `parameters`, so a value containing `properties`, `type`, `required`, or `enum` rewrites the wire schema and is *not* refused. Write `params` values that touch only `properties.<field>.description`. - an `add` value is appended **verbatim**, so a `code` key on it lands unrefused. `add` means *expose a tool the server already serves*; never invent one. `validate()` will not catch either — it checks well-formedness only (see "Artifact + handlers"), and reports `ok: true` on a schema-rewritten artifact. Nothing downstream re-checks the boundary, so the discipline is yours. The effective policy is `policy.json` **in the capability dir** (not `inputs/policy.json`) — that is the path `cap_evolve.tool_surface.load_policy` reads — else the restricted default above. If an MCP client genuinely supports client-side schema overrides, widen it deliberately and record why. ## The four safe levers 1. **Re-describe a tool** — rewrite a terse server description into the what / when / when-NOT / returns / limits the model reads to select. The highest-leverage edit, because selection is driven almost entirely by name + description. 2. **Annotate per-parameter docs** — pin format, units, and caps in the *description* of an existing field, never its `type`. 3. **Add in-description examples** — a concrete well-formed call so the model fills arguments correctly. *Ex:* `get_record(record_id="A-1042")`. 4. **Curate the exposed set** (`add` / `remove`) — hide overlapping or legacy tools so the needed ones stand out; `add` a served tool the host isn't surfacing. MCP servers may also change their own list at runtime and emit `notifications/tools/list_changed`; `add`/`remove` here is *your* curation of what the model sees, never a change to the server. ### Before / after **Re-describe a terse server tool.** The server ships `"description": "kb search"`, so the model cannot tell when it applies. ```diff - "description": "kb search" + "description": "Search the internal knowledge base and return matching article + snippets with their URLs. Use when the user asks a how-to or policy question + that is likely documented. Returns at most 10 hits; refine the query if empty." ``` **Pin a parameter's format without touching the schema.** The schema says `{"limit": {"type": "integer"}}` and the model sends 1000, so the call fails. ```diff "parameters": { "type": "object", "properties": { - "limit": { "type": "integer" } + "limit": { "type": "integer", "description": "Max hits to return (server caps at 10)." } } } ``` Only the field's `description` is added. Changing its `type` or adding `maximum` would be a `schema` edit — forbidden here, and (per the boundary section) not refused for you. **Trim the exposed set.** Hide rarely-correct, easily-confused tools so the ones the agent needs stand out: ```json [ { "tool": "legacy_export_v1", "kind": "remove" }, { "tool": "legacy_export_v2", "kind": "remove" }, { "tool": "debug_dump", "kind": "remove" } ] ``` ## Failure modes to avoid - **Documenting behavior the server does not have.** A description that overpromises — filters, sort orders, or limits the server ignores — produces confident wrong calls. Describe only what the server actually supports. - **Removing a tool the agent needs rarely.** Remove for overlap and confusion, not for low call count. - **Trusting server-supplied metadata.** Descriptions and annotations arrive from a third party and are untrusted input to the model: a compromised server can hide instructions in a `description` the model reads and the user never sees, or slip in tools via `list_changed`. Review every description before exposing it. - **Widening the schema from here.** If the model genuinely needs a constraint the schema lacks, that is a server change or an agent-owned wrapper (`tools`). MCP surfaces a **tool-execution error** as a normal result with `isError: true` and an actionable message, which the host feeds back to the model so it retries with fixed arguments; a **protocol error** is a JSON-RPC failure the model cannot act on. When re-describing is the only lever, document the failure mode in the description so the model self-corrects into the recoverable path. ## Artifact + handlers `tools.json` — the exposed MCP tool defs `{name, description, parameters, examples}`. `scripts/abstract.py` sets this capability's restricted policy and delegates to `cap_evolve.tool_surface`: - `materialize(dir)` — flatten to named text components for a text optimizer. - `apply(dir, edits)` — applies edits whose `kind` is in the policy, returns `{changed, refused}`. - `validate(dir)` — well-formedness only: non-empty artifact, `name` present, no duplicate names, non-empty descriptions, `parameters` is an object. It does **not** check the edit policy. - `is_empty(dir)` — whether the artifact is still an empty seed. ## How to run ``` python scripts/check.py python scripts/run.py --path <capability_dir> ``` ## References - [`references/concepts.md`](references/concepts.md) — the MCP client/server model, the Tool object's fields quoted from the 2025-06-18 spec, why the policy is restricted, the four behavior-hint `annotations` and why they are untrusted, human-in-the-loop on sensitive calls, and the tool-poisoning / shadowing / `list_changed` attack surface, with cited sources. **Load before the first edit on a server you don't control**, or when you need the spec citation for what the server owns.
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