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incident-to-remediation-protocol

Use this skill when a security incident must be triaged, contained, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust assume-breach posture across Microsoft 365 and Dynamics 365 environments. Defines the end-to-end flow from detection through severity triage, containment approval, investi

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Part of vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic — 293 skills

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skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/tree/master/skills/cross-functional/incident-to-remediation-protocol
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install vincentchuwaichow-vanguard-frontier-agentic@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Incident-to-Remediation Protocol

Purpose

This skill defines how a security incident detected across Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 is triaged, classified by severity, contained, investigated, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust posture. It applies the assume-breach principle throughout: the scope of compromise is always assumed to be larger than initial signals suggest until evidence proves otherwise. It does not authorize containment or remediation actions; those require the incident commander or security owner. It does not replace a qualified SecOps team or Microsoft Defender XDR escalation.

When to use

  • A security incident has been detected in the Microsoft Defender portal (Microsoft Defender XDR) or reported through another channel.
  • An identity compromise, device compromise, data exfiltration signal, or malicious configuration change is suspected in Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365.
  • A SecOps team needs a structured workflow for triage, containment approval, investigation, and post-incident review.
  • A cross-workload incident spans Microsoft Defender for Identity, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, and Dataverse environments simultaneously.

When NOT to use

  • The incident has already been triaged and is in active SecOps investigation — hand off to the active investigation owner.
  • The matter is a vulnerability disclosure rather than an active incident — use the security review path, not this protocol.
  • The incident involves a data breach with regulatory notification obligations — escalate to the privacy owner and legal counsel immediately; this protocol does not cover breach notification timelines.
  • The matter is outside Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 scope — route to the appropriate security team.

Participating agents

  • m365-identity-zero-trust-agent — primary: assesses identity signals, Conditional Access coverage, Entra ID risk events, and Zero Trust posture gaps
  • copilot-governance-maestro-agent — secondary: assesses Copilot and AI surface area exposure; coordinates cross-workload governance review
  • microsoft-maestro-agent — orchestrates cross-workload incident scope; escalation path to Microsoft Defender XDR SecOps specialists (planned: defender-xdr-secops-agent)

Inputs required

  • Incident ID or alert reference from Microsoft Defender portal
  • Affected entities (users, devices, mailboxes, apps, Dataverse environments)
  • Initial detection source (Microsoft Defender for Identity, Defender for Endpoint, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps, manual report)
  • Reported or suspected incident type (phishing, credential compromise, ransomware, insider threat, misconfiguration exploitation, data exfiltration)
  • Current containment status (not started, in progress, complete)

Evidence required

  • Incident details from Microsoft Defender XDR portal (alerts, affected entities, attack story)
  • Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs and risk events for affected identities
  • Audit logs from Microsoft Purview for affected workloads
  • Threat analytics data (if available) from Microsoft Defender portal
  • Prior incident or related-alert history

Workflow

  1. Detect and ingest — receive incident signal; record incident ID, detection source, affected entities, and initial classification.
  2. Severity triage — classify incident severity using Microsoft Defender XDR severity (Informational, Low, Medium, High, Critical) and assess blast radius (number of affected entities, data sensitivity, production impact).
  3. Assume breach — apply Zero Trust assume-breach posture: treat the scope of compromise as larger than confirmed until evidence narrows it; do not wait for full confirmation before containment planning.
  4. Containment planning — identify containment actions appropriate to severity and affected entities (disable compromised users, isolate affected devices, block hostile IPs or domains, revoke sessions); do not execute containment without approval.
  5. Escalation gate: severity triage — if severity is High or Critical, escalate immediately to incident commander and microsoft-maestro-agent for Defender XDR SecOps coordination; do not proceed to containment without incident commander acknowledgment.
  6. Escalation gate: containment approval — require explicit human approval from the incident commander or security owner before executing any containment action; record approval reference.
  7. Execute approved containment — execute containment actions per the approval; record each action with timestamp, actor, and affected entity.
  8. Investigation — analyze the attack story, affected entities, and alert timeline; identify root cause, initial access vector, lateral movement paths, and data accessed or exfiltrated.
  9. Remediation planning — identify remediation actions (credential reset, device re-imaging, configuration correction, policy strengthening); confirm remediation actions are least-privilege and reversible where possible.
  10. Remediation execution — execute approved remediation actions; verify each remediation step with evidence of completion.
  11. Post-incident review — conduct a structured post-incident review: what was the attack type and impact, what detection and response gaps existed, what configuration or policy changes are needed, and what playbook updates are required.
  12. Resolve incident — mark incident resolved in Microsoft Defender portal once all containment and remediation steps are confirmed; document resolution in audit log.

Decision gates

Gate Condition Action
Severity triage Severity is High or Critical Escalate immediately to incident commander + microsoft-maestro-agent; do not proceed without acknowledgment
Containment approval Any containment action is planned Require explicit human approval before execution; record approval reference
Breach scope uncertainty Scope of compromise is not confirmed Maintain assume-breach posture; treat scope as larger until evidence narrows it
Post-incident review Incident is resolved Mandatory post-incident review before closing; update playbooks and policies as needed

Refusal triggers

  • A request is made to execute containment (user disable, device isolation, IP block) without recorded human approval — refuse.
  • A request is made to close or resolve an incident without a completed post-incident review — refuse.
  • Credentials, session tokens, OAuth tokens, or personal data are requested to perform investigation — refuse; work from sanitized incident signals and audit log references only.
  • A data breach with regulatory notification obligations is suspected — stop and escalate to privacy owner and legal counsel; this protocol does not cover breach notification.

Handoff rules

  • Every handoff carries: incident ID, severity, affected entities, containment status, investigation summary, remediation status, escalations fired, open questions, and a do-not-do list.
  • No agent executes a containment or remediation action without recorded human approval.
  • Post-incident review findings are handed off to the security owner for policy and playbook updates.

KPIs

  • Mean time to detect (MTTD) and mean time to contain (MTTC) per severity tier
  • Percentage of incidents with completed post-incident reviews
  • Number of playbook or policy updates generated from post-incident reviews
  • Percentage of containment actions executed within approved scope (no overreach)

References

Files (vanguard-frontier-agentic)
  • references
    • workflow-and-output.md 10.6 KB
      # Incident-to-Remediation Protocol — Detailed Workflow and Output Contract
      
      ## Overview
      
      This document provides the step-by-step workflow, decision tree, and output contract for the `incident-to-remediation-protocol` skill. It is the reference for `m365-identity-zero-trust-agent`, `copilot-governance-maestro-agent`, `microsoft-maestro-agent`, and human incident commanders who need to understand the gate structure, the incident record format, and post-incident review requirements.
      
      Zero Trust assume-breach is applied at every phase: the scope of compromise is assumed to be larger than initial signals suggest until forensic evidence explicitly narrows it.
      
      ---
      
      ## Detailed Workflow
      
      ### Phase 1 — Detection and Triage
      
      **Step 1.1 — Ingest incident signal**
      - Source: Microsoft Defender portal incident queue, manual report, or alert from a connected workload
      - Record: `incident_id`, `detection_source`, `initial_alert_count`, `affected_entity_types[]` (users, devices, mailboxes, apps, Dataverse environments), `incident_type_hypothesis`
      - Apply assume-breach immediately: treat affected scope as potentially wider than initial entity list
      
      **Step 1.2 — Severity classification**
      Microsoft Defender XDR severity scale:
      - **Informational**: no immediate risk; monitor
      - **Low**: limited scope; standard response cadence
      - **Medium**: moderate scope or data sensitivity; elevated response
      - **High**: significant scope or high-value asset at risk; escalate immediately
      - **Critical**: organization-wide threat, ransomware, or mass credential compromise; immediate escalation
      
      Blast radius factors:
      - Number of affected entities
      - Sensitivity classification of accessed data (e.g., Purview sensitivity labels)
      - Production environment impact
      - Presence of lateral movement indicators
      
      Output: `severity_assessment` with `severity_level`, `blast_radius_estimate`, `lateral_movement_suspected: true|false`, `data_exfiltration_suspected: true|false`
      
      **Step 1.3 — Cross-workload scope mapping**
      - Map affected entities to workloads: Entra ID, Exchange Online, SharePoint, Teams, Dynamics 365 / Dataverse, Copilot Studio
      - Identify which Microsoft Defender workloads have signals (Defender for Identity, Defender for Endpoint, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps)
      - Output: `workload_scope_map` with per-workload `affected: true|false`, `signal_source`, `entity_list[]`
      
      ---
      
      ### Phase 2 — Escalation and Containment Gates
      
      **Gate 1 — Severity Triage Gate**
      ```
      IF severity_level = High OR Critical:
        → ESCALATE IMMEDIATELY to:
          - Incident commander (human)
          - microsoft-maestro-agent (for Defender XDR SecOps coordination)
          - copilot-governance-maestro-agent (if Copilot surface area is in scope)
        → Do NOT proceed to containment planning without incident commander acknowledgment
        → Record: escalation_timestamp, escalation_target, commander_acknowledgment_reference
      ```
      
      **Gate 2 — Containment Approval Gate**
      ```
      FOR EVERY containment action (user disable, device isolation, IP/domain block, session revoke):
        → REQUEST explicit human approval from incident commander or security owner
        → Record: action_description, approver_id, approval_timestamp, approval_reference
        → Do NOT execute any containment action without recorded approval
        → If approval cannot be obtained within the required timeframe for a Critical incident:
          → Escalate to security leadership for emergency authorization
      ```
      
      **Step 2.1 — Containment planning**
      Identify containment actions per affected entity type:
      | Entity type | Possible containment actions |
      |---|---|
      | User identity | Disable account, revoke sessions, reset credentials, enforce MFA via Conditional Access |
      | Device | Isolate device via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint |
      | Mailbox | Block external forwarding, remove malicious inbox rules |
      | IP / domain | Block in Microsoft Defender portal |
      | Dataverse environment | Revoke service principal access, disable affected flows |
      | Copilot surface | Disable affected agent instance, revoke data source connections |
      
      ---
      
      ### Phase 3 — Investigation
      
      **Step 3.1 — Attack story analysis**
      - Use Microsoft Defender XDR correlated incident view to trace the attack timeline
      - Identify: initial access vector, privilege escalation path, lateral movement, persistence mechanisms, data accessed or exfiltrated
      - Map findings to MITRE ATT&CK techniques where applicable
      - Output: `attack_story_summary` with `initial_access_vector`, `techniques[]`, `affected_data_classification`, `exfiltration_evidence: true|false|suspected`
      
      **Step 3.2 — Identity and Zero Trust posture assessment**
      - `m365-identity-zero-trust-agent` assesses:
        - Conditional Access coverage gaps that enabled the attack
        - Entra ID risk event details for affected identities
        - Privileged Identity Management (PIM) anomalies
        - Zero Trust gap: which verify-explicitly or least-privilege control failed
      - Output: `identity_zt_assessment` with `ca_gap[]`, `risk_events[]`, `pim_anomalies[]`, `zt_gap_summary`
      
      **Step 3.3 — Audit log and evidence preservation**
      - Confirm relevant audit logs are preserved (Purview Unified Audit Log)
      - If legal or regulatory investigation is likely: escalate to compliance owner for legal-hold placement in Microsoft Purview eDiscovery
      - Do NOT allow audit logs to be deleted or retention shortened during active investigation
      
      ---
      
      ### Phase 4 — Remediation
      
      **Step 4.1 — Remediation planning**
      For each confirmed compromise or misconfiguration:
      - Identify remediation action (credential reset, device re-image, inbox rule cleanup, Conditional Access policy correction, service principal removal)
      - Confirm action is least-privilege (does not require broader permissions than necessary)
      - Confirm action is reversible where possible; flag irreversible actions for extra approval
      - Output: `remediation_plan[]` with `action`, `target_entity`, `reversible: true|false`, `approval_required: true|false`
      
      **Step 4.2 — Remediation execution**
      - Execute each approved remediation action
      - Record: `action`, `executor`, `timestamp`, `result: success|failed|partial`
      - Verify each action with confirmation evidence (e.g., sign-in log showing no further anomalous activity, device compliance status restored)
      
      **Step 4.3 — Zero Trust posture hardening**
      - Based on the Zero Trust gap identified in Step 3.2, recommend and apply (with human approval) Conditional Access policy corrections, PIM role scope reductions, or MFA enforcement changes
      - Do NOT apply Zero Trust hardening that would lock out legitimate users without testing in report-only mode first
      
      ---
      
      ### Phase 5 — Post-Incident Review
      
      **Gate 3 — Post-Incident Review Gate**
      ```
      Mandatory before incident closure:
        → Complete structured post-incident review (items below)
        → Do NOT close incident in Microsoft Defender portal without completed review
        → Hand off review findings to security owner for playbook and policy updates
      ```
      
      **Post-incident review checklist:**
      1. Confirmed attack type, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, and impact summary
      2. Root cause: which control failed, was misconfigured, or was absent
      3. Detection gap: how long between initial access and detection; what reduced MTTD
      4. Response gap: what slowed containment; what improved MTTC
      5. Data accessed or exfiltrated: confirmed or suspected; sensitivity classification
      6. Regulatory or legal notification obligation: yes / no / under assessment (escalate to legal if yes)
      7. Zero Trust gap findings and recommended Conditional Access or identity hardening
      8. Playbook updates required
      9. Policy changes required (with owner and timeline)
      
      ---
      
      ## Decision Tree (Condensed)
      
      ```
      Incident detected
        └─ Severity triage
             ├─ High / Critical → Gate 1: escalate to IC + maestro → awaiting acknowledgment
             └─ Low / Medium → containment planning
                  └─ Gate 2: approval for each containment action
                       └─ Execute approved containment
                            └─ Investigation (attack story, identity ZT assessment, audit log)
                                 └─ Remediation planning + Gate 2 (approval for each action)
                                      └─ Execute remediation
                                           └─ Gate 3: post-incident review (mandatory)
                                                └─ Resolve incident in Defender portal
      ```
      
      ---
      
      ## Output Contract
      
      ### Incident Record
      
      | Field | Type | Required | Description |
      |---|---|---|---|
      | `incident_record_id` | string (UUID) | Yes | Unique record identifier |
      | `skill_id` | string | Yes | Must be `incident-to-remediation-protocol` |
      | `skill_version` | string | Yes | Semantic version |
      | `incident_id` | string | Yes | Microsoft Defender portal incident ID |
      | `severity_level` | enum | Yes | `Informational | Low | Medium | High | Critical` |
      | `blast_radius_estimate` | string | Yes | Affected entity count and data sensitivity summary |
      | `workload_scope_map` | object | Yes | Per-workload affected status and entity list |
      | `containment_actions` | object[] | Yes | Each action with approval reference and result |
      | `attack_story_summary` | object | Yes | Initial access, techniques, data accessed |
      | `identity_zt_assessment` | object | Yes | CA gaps, risk events, ZT gap summary |
      | `remediation_plan` | object[] | Yes | Each remediation action with approval and result |
      | `escalations_fired` | string[] | Yes | Which gates fired |
      | `post_incident_review` | object | Yes (before closure) | Full review checklist completed |
      | `incident_status` | enum | Yes | `open | contained | remediated | closed` |
      | `do_not_do_list` | string[] | Yes | Mandatory refusal items |
      | `open_questions` | string[] | Yes | Unresolved items for human judgment |
      | `timestamp` | string (ISO) | Yes | Record creation datetime |
      
      ### Do-Not-Do List (always attached)
      
      - Do not execute containment actions (user disable, device isolation, IP block) without recorded human approval.
      - Do not close an incident without a completed post-incident review.
      - Do not allow audit logs to be deleted or retention shortened during an active investigation.
      - Do not minimize the assumed scope of compromise until forensic evidence explicitly narrows it.
      - Do not treat this protocol as covering data breach regulatory notification obligations; escalate breach scenarios to the privacy owner and legal counsel.
      - Do not request credentials, session tokens, or personal data to perform investigation; work from sanitized incident signals only.
      
      ---
      
      ## Audit Log Fields
      
      `incident_record_id`, `skill_id`, `skill_version`, `invoked_by`, `incident_id`, `severity_level`, `gates_fired`, `containment_actions_count`, `remediation_actions_count`, `post_incident_review_complete`, `incident_status`, `timestamp`
      
  • metadata.json 2.2 KB
    {
      "id": "incident-to-remediation-protocol",
      "name": "Incident-to-Remediation Protocol",
      "type": "skill",
      "provider": "generic",
      "harnesses": ["codex", "claude-code", "cursor", "gemini", "kiro", "other"],
      "summary": "Defines the end-to-end security incident lifecycle across Microsoft 365 and Dynamics 365 environments — from detection and severity triage through containment approval, investigation, remediation, and mandatory post-incident review. Applies Zero Trust assume-breach posture throughout: scope of compromise is treated as larger than confirmed until evidence narrows it. Severity and containment gates enforce human approval before any isolate, disable, or block action. Escalation paths route to microsoft-maestro-agent for Defender XDR SecOps coordination.",
      "source_type": "original",
      "official_docs": [
        "https://learn.microsoft.com/unified-secops/plan-incident-response",
        "https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-xdr/pilot-deploy-investigate-respond",
        "https://learn.microsoft.com/security/zero-trust/siem-xdr-overview",
        "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbooks"
      ],
      "security_notes": "Protocol is recommendation and orchestration only — never an authorization for containment or remediation actions. All actions that isolate devices, disable users, block IPs or domains, or revoke sessions require explicit human approval from the incident commander or security owner before execution. Zero Trust assume-breach posture is mandatory throughout: scope of compromise is never minimized. Never requests credentials, session tokens, OAuth tokens, or personal data to perform investigation; works from sanitized incident signals and audit log references only. Data breach scenarios with regulatory notification obligations must be escalated to the privacy owner and legal counsel; this protocol does not govern breach notification timelines or obligations. Planned escalation target: defender-xdr-secops-agent (not yet built); current escalation routes to microsoft-maestro-agent.",
      "last_verified": "2026-06-16",
      "path": "skills/cross-functional/incident-to-remediation-protocol",
      "author": "github: VincentChuWaiChow",
      "version": "0.1.0"
    }
    
  • SKILL.md 8.8 KB
    ---
    name: incident-to-remediation-protocol
    description: Use this skill when a security incident must be triaged, contained, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust assume-breach posture across Microsoft 365 and Dynamics 365 environments. Defines the end-to-end flow from detection through severity triage, containment approval, investigation, remediation, and post-incident review. Applies Zero Trust principles — verify explicitly, use least privilege, assume breach — throughout. Does not serve as an authorization to isolate devices, block users, or make configuration changes; all containment and remediation actions require human approval from the security owner or incident commander. Does not replace a qualified SecOps team or Microsoft Defender XDR specialist.
    allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
    metadata:
      author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
      version: "0.1.0"
      updated: "2026-06-16"
      category: security
      lifecycle: experimental
    ---
    
    # Incident-to-Remediation Protocol
    
    ## Purpose
    This skill defines how a security incident detected across Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 is triaged, classified by severity, contained, investigated, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust posture. It applies the assume-breach principle throughout: the scope of compromise is always assumed to be larger than initial signals suggest until evidence proves otherwise. It does not authorize containment or remediation actions; those require the incident commander or security owner. It does not replace a qualified SecOps team or Microsoft Defender XDR escalation.
    
    ## When to use
    - A security incident has been detected in the Microsoft Defender portal (Microsoft Defender XDR) or reported through another channel.
    - An identity compromise, device compromise, data exfiltration signal, or malicious configuration change is suspected in Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365.
    - A SecOps team needs a structured workflow for triage, containment approval, investigation, and post-incident review.
    - A cross-workload incident spans Microsoft Defender for Identity, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, and Dataverse environments simultaneously.
    
    ## When NOT to use
    - The incident has already been triaged and is in active SecOps investigation — hand off to the active investigation owner.
    - The matter is a vulnerability disclosure rather than an active incident — use the security review path, not this protocol.
    - The incident involves a data breach with regulatory notification obligations — escalate to the privacy owner and legal counsel immediately; this protocol does not cover breach notification timelines.
    - The matter is outside Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 scope — route to the appropriate security team.
    
    ## Participating agents
    - `m365-identity-zero-trust-agent` — primary: assesses identity signals, Conditional Access coverage, Entra ID risk events, and Zero Trust posture gaps
    - `copilot-governance-maestro-agent` — secondary: assesses Copilot and AI surface area exposure; coordinates cross-workload governance review
    - `microsoft-maestro-agent` — orchestrates cross-workload incident scope; escalation path to Microsoft Defender XDR SecOps specialists (planned: defender-xdr-secops-agent)
    
    ## Inputs required
    - Incident ID or alert reference from Microsoft Defender portal
    - Affected entities (users, devices, mailboxes, apps, Dataverse environments)
    - Initial detection source (Microsoft Defender for Identity, Defender for Endpoint, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps, manual report)
    - Reported or suspected incident type (phishing, credential compromise, ransomware, insider threat, misconfiguration exploitation, data exfiltration)
    - Current containment status (not started, in progress, complete)
    
    ## Evidence required
    - Incident details from Microsoft Defender XDR portal (alerts, affected entities, attack story)
    - Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs and risk events for affected identities
    - Audit logs from Microsoft Purview for affected workloads
    - Threat analytics data (if available) from Microsoft Defender portal
    - Prior incident or related-alert history
    
    ## Workflow
    
    1. **Detect and ingest** — receive incident signal; record incident ID, detection source, affected entities, and initial classification.
    2. **Severity triage** — classify incident severity using Microsoft Defender XDR severity (Informational, Low, Medium, High, Critical) and assess blast radius (number of affected entities, data sensitivity, production impact).
    3. **Assume breach** — apply Zero Trust assume-breach posture: treat the scope of compromise as larger than confirmed until evidence narrows it; do not wait for full confirmation before containment planning.
    4. **Containment planning** — identify containment actions appropriate to severity and affected entities (disable compromised users, isolate affected devices, block hostile IPs or domains, revoke sessions); do not execute containment without approval.
    5. **Escalation gate: severity triage** — if severity is High or Critical, escalate immediately to incident commander and microsoft-maestro-agent for Defender XDR SecOps coordination; do not proceed to containment without incident commander acknowledgment.
    6. **Escalation gate: containment approval** — require explicit human approval from the incident commander or security owner before executing any containment action; record approval reference.
    7. **Execute approved containment** — execute containment actions per the approval; record each action with timestamp, actor, and affected entity.
    8. **Investigation** — analyze the attack story, affected entities, and alert timeline; identify root cause, initial access vector, lateral movement paths, and data accessed or exfiltrated.
    9. **Remediation planning** — identify remediation actions (credential reset, device re-imaging, configuration correction, policy strengthening); confirm remediation actions are least-privilege and reversible where possible.
    10. **Remediation execution** — execute approved remediation actions; verify each remediation step with evidence of completion.
    11. **Post-incident review** — conduct a structured post-incident review: what was the attack type and impact, what detection and response gaps existed, what configuration or policy changes are needed, and what playbook updates are required.
    12. **Resolve incident** — mark incident resolved in Microsoft Defender portal once all containment and remediation steps are confirmed; document resolution in audit log.
    
    ## Decision gates
    
    | Gate | Condition | Action |
    |---|---|---|
    | Severity triage | Severity is High or Critical | Escalate immediately to incident commander + microsoft-maestro-agent; do not proceed without acknowledgment |
    | Containment approval | Any containment action is planned | Require explicit human approval before execution; record approval reference |
    | Breach scope uncertainty | Scope of compromise is not confirmed | Maintain assume-breach posture; treat scope as larger until evidence narrows it |
    | Post-incident review | Incident is resolved | Mandatory post-incident review before closing; update playbooks and policies as needed |
    
    ## Refusal triggers
    - A request is made to execute containment (user disable, device isolation, IP block) without recorded human approval — refuse.
    - A request is made to close or resolve an incident without a completed post-incident review — refuse.
    - Credentials, session tokens, OAuth tokens, or personal data are requested to perform investigation — refuse; work from sanitized incident signals and audit log references only.
    - A data breach with regulatory notification obligations is suspected — stop and escalate to privacy owner and legal counsel; this protocol does not cover breach notification.
    
    ## Handoff rules
    - Every handoff carries: incident ID, severity, affected entities, containment status, investigation summary, remediation status, escalations fired, open questions, and a do-not-do list.
    - No agent executes a containment or remediation action without recorded human approval.
    - Post-incident review findings are handed off to the security owner for policy and playbook updates.
    
    ## KPIs
    - Mean time to detect (MTTD) and mean time to contain (MTTC) per severity tier
    - Percentage of incidents with completed post-incident reviews
    - Number of playbook or policy updates generated from post-incident reviews
    - Percentage of containment actions executed within approved scope (no overreach)
    
    ## References
    - [Plan an incident response workflow in the Microsoft Defender portal](https://learn.microsoft.com/unified-secops/plan-incident-response)
    - [Investigate and respond using Microsoft Defender XDR](https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-xdr/pilot-deploy-investigate-respond)
    - [Incident response with XDR and integrated SIEM (Zero Trust)](https://learn.microsoft.com/security/zero-trust/siem-xdr-overview)
    - [Incident response playbooks](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbooks)
    

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