Claude Cursor GitHub Copilot Skill

incident-to-remediation-protocol

Use this skill when a security incident must be triaged, contained, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust assume-breach posture across Microsoft 365 and Dynamics 365 environments. Defines the end-to-end flow from detection through severity triage, containment approval, investi

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Install

skills CLI npx skills add https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/tree/master/skills/cross-functional/incident-to-remediation-protocol
Claude Code claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install vincentchuwaichow-vanguard-frontier-agentic@llmmart
Git git clone https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic.git

The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.

Skill manifest

Incident-to-Remediation Protocol

Purpose

This skill defines how a security incident detected across Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 is triaged, classified by severity, contained, investigated, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust posture. It applies the assume-breach principle throughout: the scope of compromise is always assumed to be larger than initial signals suggest until evidence proves otherwise. It does not authorize containment or remediation actions; those require the incident commander or security owner. It does not replace a qualified SecOps team or Microsoft Defender XDR escalation.

When to use

  • A security incident has been detected in the Microsoft Defender portal (Microsoft Defender XDR) or reported through another channel.
  • An identity compromise, device compromise, data exfiltration signal, or malicious configuration change is suspected in Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365.
  • A SecOps team needs a structured workflow for triage, containment approval, investigation, and post-incident review.
  • A cross-workload incident spans Microsoft Defender for Identity, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, and Dataverse environments simultaneously.

When NOT to use

  • The incident has already been triaged and is in active SecOps investigation — hand off to the active investigation owner.
  • The matter is a vulnerability disclosure rather than an active incident — use the security review path, not this protocol.
  • The incident involves a data breach with regulatory notification obligations — escalate to the privacy owner and legal counsel immediately; this protocol does not cover breach notification timelines.
  • The matter is outside Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 scope — route to the appropriate security team.

Participating agents

  • m365-identity-zero-trust-agent — primary: assesses identity signals, Conditional Access coverage, Entra ID risk events, and Zero Trust posture gaps
  • copilot-governance-maestro-agent — secondary: assesses Copilot and AI surface area exposure; coordinates cross-workload governance review
  • microsoft-maestro-agent — orchestrates cross-workload incident scope; escalation path to Microsoft Defender XDR SecOps specialists (planned: defender-xdr-secops-agent)

Inputs required

  • Incident ID or alert reference from Microsoft Defender portal
  • Affected entities (users, devices, mailboxes, apps, Dataverse environments)
  • Initial detection source (Microsoft Defender for Identity, Defender for Endpoint, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps, manual report)
  • Reported or suspected incident type (phishing, credential compromise, ransomware, insider threat, misconfiguration exploitation, data exfiltration)
  • Current containment status (not started, in progress, complete)

Evidence required

  • Incident details from Microsoft Defender XDR portal (alerts, affected entities, attack story)
  • Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs and risk events for affected identities
  • Audit logs from Microsoft Purview for affected workloads
  • Threat analytics data (if available) from Microsoft Defender portal
  • Prior incident or related-alert history

Workflow

  1. Detect and ingest — receive incident signal; record incident ID, detection source, affected entities, and initial classification.
  2. Severity triage — classify incident severity using Microsoft Defender XDR severity (Informational, Low, Medium, High, Critical) and assess blast radius (number of affected entities, data sensitivity, production impact).
  3. Assume breach — apply Zero Trust assume-breach posture: treat the scope of compromise as larger than confirmed until evidence narrows it; do not wait for full confirmation before containment planning.
  4. Containment planning — identify containment actions appropriate to severity and affected entities (disable compromised users, isolate affected devices, block hostile IPs or domains, revoke sessions); do not execute containment without approval.
  5. Escalation gate: severity triage — if severity is High or Critical, escalate immediately to incident commander and microsoft-maestro-agent for Defender XDR SecOps coordination; do not proceed to containment without incident commander acknowledgment.
  6. Escalation gate: containment approval — require explicit human approval from the incident commander or security owner before executing any containment action; record approval reference.
  7. Execute approved containment — execute containment actions per the approval; record each action with timestamp, actor, and affected entity.
  8. Investigation — analyze the attack story, affected entities, and alert timeline; identify root cause, initial access vector, lateral movement paths, and data accessed or exfiltrated.
  9. Remediation planning — identify remediation actions (credential reset, device re-imaging, configuration correction, policy strengthening); confirm remediation actions are least-privilege and reversible where possible.
  10. Remediation execution — execute approved remediation actions; verify each remediation step with evidence of completion.
  11. Post-incident review — conduct a structured post-incident review: what was the attack type and impact, what detection and response gaps existed, what configuration or policy changes are needed, and what playbook updates are required.
  12. Resolve incident — mark incident resolved in Microsoft Defender portal once all containment and remediation steps are confirmed; document resolution in audit log.

Decision gates

Gate Condition Action
Severity triage Severity is High or Critical Escalate immediately to incident commander + microsoft-maestro-agent; do not proceed without acknowledgment
Containment approval Any containment action is planned Require explicit human approval before execution; record approval reference
Breach scope uncertainty Scope of compromise is not confirmed Maintain assume-breach posture; treat scope as larger until evidence narrows it
Post-incident review Incident is resolved Mandatory post-incident review before closing; update playbooks and policies as needed

Refusal triggers

  • A request is made to execute containment (user disable, device isolation, IP block) without recorded human approval — refuse.
  • A request is made to close or resolve an incident without a completed post-incident review — refuse.
  • Credentials, session tokens, OAuth tokens, or personal data are requested to perform investigation — refuse; work from sanitized incident signals and audit log references only.
  • A data breach with regulatory notification obligations is suspected — stop and escalate to privacy owner and legal counsel; this protocol does not cover breach notification.

Handoff rules

  • Every handoff carries: incident ID, severity, affected entities, containment status, investigation summary, remediation status, escalations fired, open questions, and a do-not-do list.
  • No agent executes a containment or remediation action without recorded human approval.
  • Post-incident review findings are handed off to the security owner for policy and playbook updates.

KPIs

  • Mean time to detect (MTTD) and mean time to contain (MTTC) per severity tier
  • Percentage of incidents with completed post-incident reviews
  • Number of playbook or policy updates generated from post-incident reviews
  • Percentage of containment actions executed within approved scope (no overreach)

References

Files (vanguard-frontier-agentic)
  • references
    • workflow-and-output.md 10.6 KB
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  • metadata.json 2.2 KB
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  • SKILL.md 8.8 KB
    ---
    name: incident-to-remediation-protocol
    description: Use this skill when a security incident must be triaged, contained, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust assume-breach posture across Microsoft 365 and Dynamics 365 environments. Defines the end-to-end flow from detection through severity triage, containment approval, investigation, remediation, and post-incident review. Applies Zero Trust principles — verify explicitly, use least privilege, assume breach — throughout. Does not serve as an authorization to isolate devices, block users, or make configuration changes; all containment and remediation actions require human approval from the security owner or incident commander. Does not replace a qualified SecOps team or Microsoft Defender XDR specialist.
    allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob
    metadata:
      author: "github: VincentChuWaiChow"
      version: "0.1.0"
      updated: "2026-06-16"
      category: security
      lifecycle: experimental
    ---
    
    # Incident-to-Remediation Protocol
    
    ## Purpose
    This skill defines how a security incident detected across Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 is triaged, classified by severity, contained, investigated, remediated, and reviewed in a Zero Trust posture. It applies the assume-breach principle throughout: the scope of compromise is always assumed to be larger than initial signals suggest until evidence proves otherwise. It does not authorize containment or remediation actions; those require the incident commander or security owner. It does not replace a qualified SecOps team or Microsoft Defender XDR escalation.
    
    ## When to use
    - A security incident has been detected in the Microsoft Defender portal (Microsoft Defender XDR) or reported through another channel.
    - An identity compromise, device compromise, data exfiltration signal, or malicious configuration change is suspected in Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365.
    - A SecOps team needs a structured workflow for triage, containment approval, investigation, and post-incident review.
    - A cross-workload incident spans Microsoft Defender for Identity, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, and Dataverse environments simultaneously.
    
    ## When NOT to use
    - The incident has already been triaged and is in active SecOps investigation — hand off to the active investigation owner.
    - The matter is a vulnerability disclosure rather than an active incident — use the security review path, not this protocol.
    - The incident involves a data breach with regulatory notification obligations — escalate to the privacy owner and legal counsel immediately; this protocol does not cover breach notification timelines.
    - The matter is outside Microsoft 365 or Dynamics 365 scope — route to the appropriate security team.
    
    ## Participating agents
    - `m365-identity-zero-trust-agent` — primary: assesses identity signals, Conditional Access coverage, Entra ID risk events, and Zero Trust posture gaps
    - `copilot-governance-maestro-agent` — secondary: assesses Copilot and AI surface area exposure; coordinates cross-workload governance review
    - `microsoft-maestro-agent` — orchestrates cross-workload incident scope; escalation path to Microsoft Defender XDR SecOps specialists (planned: defender-xdr-secops-agent)
    
    ## Inputs required
    - Incident ID or alert reference from Microsoft Defender portal
    - Affected entities (users, devices, mailboxes, apps, Dataverse environments)
    - Initial detection source (Microsoft Defender for Identity, Defender for Endpoint, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps, manual report)
    - Reported or suspected incident type (phishing, credential compromise, ransomware, insider threat, misconfiguration exploitation, data exfiltration)
    - Current containment status (not started, in progress, complete)
    
    ## Evidence required
    - Incident details from Microsoft Defender XDR portal (alerts, affected entities, attack story)
    - Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs and risk events for affected identities
    - Audit logs from Microsoft Purview for affected workloads
    - Threat analytics data (if available) from Microsoft Defender portal
    - Prior incident or related-alert history
    
    ## Workflow
    
    1. **Detect and ingest** — receive incident signal; record incident ID, detection source, affected entities, and initial classification.
    2. **Severity triage** — classify incident severity using Microsoft Defender XDR severity (Informational, Low, Medium, High, Critical) and assess blast radius (number of affected entities, data sensitivity, production impact).
    3. **Assume breach** — apply Zero Trust assume-breach posture: treat the scope of compromise as larger than confirmed until evidence narrows it; do not wait for full confirmation before containment planning.
    4. **Containment planning** — identify containment actions appropriate to severity and affected entities (disable compromised users, isolate affected devices, block hostile IPs or domains, revoke sessions); do not execute containment without approval.
    5. **Escalation gate: severity triage** — if severity is High or Critical, escalate immediately to incident commander and microsoft-maestro-agent for Defender XDR SecOps coordination; do not proceed to containment without incident commander acknowledgment.
    6. **Escalation gate: containment approval** — require explicit human approval from the incident commander or security owner before executing any containment action; record approval reference.
    7. **Execute approved containment** — execute containment actions per the approval; record each action with timestamp, actor, and affected entity.
    8. **Investigation** — analyze the attack story, affected entities, and alert timeline; identify root cause, initial access vector, lateral movement paths, and data accessed or exfiltrated.
    9. **Remediation planning** — identify remediation actions (credential reset, device re-imaging, configuration correction, policy strengthening); confirm remediation actions are least-privilege and reversible where possible.
    10. **Remediation execution** — execute approved remediation actions; verify each remediation step with evidence of completion.
    11. **Post-incident review** — conduct a structured post-incident review: what was the attack type and impact, what detection and response gaps existed, what configuration or policy changes are needed, and what playbook updates are required.
    12. **Resolve incident** — mark incident resolved in Microsoft Defender portal once all containment and remediation steps are confirmed; document resolution in audit log.
    
    ## Decision gates
    
    | Gate | Condition | Action |
    |---|---|---|
    | Severity triage | Severity is High or Critical | Escalate immediately to incident commander + microsoft-maestro-agent; do not proceed without acknowledgment |
    | Containment approval | Any containment action is planned | Require explicit human approval before execution; record approval reference |
    | Breach scope uncertainty | Scope of compromise is not confirmed | Maintain assume-breach posture; treat scope as larger until evidence narrows it |
    | Post-incident review | Incident is resolved | Mandatory post-incident review before closing; update playbooks and policies as needed |
    
    ## Refusal triggers
    - A request is made to execute containment (user disable, device isolation, IP block) without recorded human approval — refuse.
    - A request is made to close or resolve an incident without a completed post-incident review — refuse.
    - Credentials, session tokens, OAuth tokens, or personal data are requested to perform investigation — refuse; work from sanitized incident signals and audit log references only.
    - A data breach with regulatory notification obligations is suspected — stop and escalate to privacy owner and legal counsel; this protocol does not cover breach notification.
    
    ## Handoff rules
    - Every handoff carries: incident ID, severity, affected entities, containment status, investigation summary, remediation status, escalations fired, open questions, and a do-not-do list.
    - No agent executes a containment or remediation action without recorded human approval.
    - Post-incident review findings are handed off to the security owner for policy and playbook updates.
    
    ## KPIs
    - Mean time to detect (MTTD) and mean time to contain (MTTC) per severity tier
    - Percentage of incidents with completed post-incident reviews
    - Number of playbook or policy updates generated from post-incident reviews
    - Percentage of containment actions executed within approved scope (no overreach)
    
    ## References
    - [Plan an incident response workflow in the Microsoft Defender portal](https://learn.microsoft.com/unified-secops/plan-incident-response)
    - [Investigate and respond using Microsoft Defender XDR](https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-xdr/pilot-deploy-investigate-respond)
    - [Incident response with XDR and integrated SIEM (Zero Trust)](https://learn.microsoft.com/security/zero-trust/siem-xdr-overview)
    - [Incident response playbooks](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbooks)
    

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