ecs-security
Security and compliance guidance for Amazon ECS — "ECS was unable to assume the role", task role vs execution role, iam:PassRole, confused-deputy aws:SourceArn trust, Fargate vs EC2 shared responsibility, injecting Secrets Manager/SSM secrets (trailing-colon JSON-key gotcha), rea
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Skill manifest
ECS Security & Compliance
End-to-end, opinionated security and compliance guidance for Amazon ECS, structured as a 7-layer stack plus a compliance-regime cross-cutting view. This skill is discovery-driven — the right hardening stack is a function of (launch type × compliance regime × workload sensitivity × audit timeline × team skill × network topology × operational-overhead tolerance). The single biggest ECS-specific variable is launch type (Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances vs ECS Anywhere), because it moves the shared-responsibility line and changes which controls are even available. Skipping discovery makes the recommendation wrong about half the time.
The AWS-published foundation for every recommendation is the ECS Best Practices: Security guide (task & container security, network security, IAM roles) and the ECS security documentation set (IAM, shared-responsibility, Fargate FIPS, infrastructure security). For "which launch/deployment model should I use" (non-security) use ecs-architect; for auditing a live estate's operational posture use ecs-operation-review.
The accuracy bar (non-negotiable for this skill). Compliance is the one domain where customers validate every claim against an auditor. Compliance status changes over time — always defer to the live AWS Services in Scope page before quoting program coverage in any customer-facing document; the ECS-specific pointer is Compliance validation for Amazon ECS. Never state a cryptographic-module status, FedRAMP boundary, or certification you cannot cite to an AWS-published source. When you can't ground a claim, say so — do not synthesize.
When to Use This Skill
Activate when the user wants to:
- Fix the #1 recurring ECS error — "ECS was unable to assume the role …" (task/execution-role trust misconfiguration)
- Get the task role vs task execution role vs container instance role vs infrastructure role distinction right, and least-privilege each one
- Add confused-deputy protection (
aws:SourceArn/aws:SourceAccount) to a task-role trust policy, or scopeiam:PassRole - Understand the Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances shared-responsibility split for a security/audit conversation
- Inject secrets from Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store into a task definition (and dodge the trailing-colon JSON-key gotcha)
- Harden containers —
readonlyRootFilesystem, non-rootuser,privileged: false, drop Linux capabilities, distroless images - Isolate the network —
awsvpcsecurity-group-per-task, private subnets, VPC endpoints for ECR/S3/Secrets Manager/CloudWatch - Add runtime detection (GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring + Extended Threat Detection) and image supply-chain controls (ECR enhanced scanning, AWS Signer + Notation signing)
- Prepare an ECS workload for a PCI-DSS / HIPAA / FedRAMP / SOC 2 / ISO audit, or turn on Fargate FIPS
Don't use this skill for:
- EKS / Kubernetes container security (RBAC, Pod Identity/IRSA, PSA, NetworkPolicy, kube-bench) →
eks-security - GenAI / GPU / ML-workload security specifically (model-artifact provenance, GPU-node compliance) →
ecs-genai(oreks-genaion EKS) - AWS App Runner / Lambda / Batch — different services with different security models
- AWS account-level / org-wide security with no ECS-specific angle (SCPs, SSO, org GuardDuty) → Security guidance, not this skill
- Choosing a launch/deployment model with no security driver (→
ecs-architect), auditing live operational posture (→ecs-operation-review), or discovery/inventory of an estate (→ecs-recon)
Discovery First — the Required Questions
Do NOT recommend a hardening stack before answering these. The single most common mistake is prescribing controls without confirming the launch type — a Fargate answer and an ECS-on-EC2 answer differ at Layers 1, 3, 5, and 6. The first four answers determine ~80% of the recommendation.
- Launch type(s)? AWS Fargate / ECS on EC2 / ECS Managed Instances / ECS Anywhere (external) / mixed. (This is the ECS-specific first question — it sets the shared-responsibility line.)
- Compliance regime(s)? None / SOC 2 / HIPAA / PCI-DSS / FedRAMP Class C (formerly Moderate baseline) / Class D (formerly High baseline) / GDPR / ISO 27001 / NIST 800-53/171 / IL4-IL5 — rank primary/secondary if multiple.
- Workload sensitivity? Public / internal / PII / PHI (HIPAA) / cardholder data (PCI) / federal.
- Audit timeline? None / <3 mo (urgent) / 3-6 mo / 6-12 mo / continuous.
- Network topology? Public subnets + IGW / private subnets + NAT / fully private + VPC endpoints; single vs multi-account; multi-region; GovCloud.
- Secrets & config posture? Plaintext env vars (bad) / Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store / hybrid; rotation requirement.
- Team ECS/security skill? Low / moderate / high / mixed.
- Current security tooling baseline? None / AWS-native / third-party CNAPP / OSS / hybrid.
Full required + recommended question set, adoption-challenge archetypes, and the response framework: references/engagement-and-response.md.
The 7-Layer Security & Compliance Stack
Walk the layers bottom-up on a first engagement; each layer's controls compound on the previous. The AWS-canonical default column assumes a new commercial Fargate workload — the launch-type substitutions are noted per layer.
| Layer | Focus | AWS-canonical default | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 — Compute / Shared Responsibility | Who secures what; node OS | Fargate (AWS manages OS/kernel/runtime — smallest customer surface); on EC2/Managed Instances, harden the container instance (ECS-optimized AL2023 or Bottlerocket, patch cadence, IMDSv2, lock down IMDS from tasks) | shared-responsibility.md |
| 2 — Identity & Access | Role trust & least privilege | Task role (app → AWS) + task execution role (agent → ECR/logs/secrets) as separate least-privileged roles; confused-deputy aws:SourceArn/aws:SourceAccount on trust policies; scoped iam:PassRole |
identity-and-access.md |
| 3 — Task & Container Hardening | What a container may do | readonlyRootFilesystem: true + non-root user + privileged: false + drop Linux capabilities + distroless image + CPU/memory limits |
task-container-hardening.md |
| 4 — Image Supply Chain | Trust what you run | ECR Enhanced Scanning (Amazon Inspector) + immutable tags + AWS Signer + Notation signing + CMK-encrypted repos | image-supply-chain.md |
| 5 — Network Isolation | What a task may reach | awsvpc mode + security-group-per-service + private subnets + VPC endpoints (ECR api/dkr, S3 gateway, Secrets Manager, CloudWatch Logs) + no public IPs |
network-isolation.md |
| 6 — Runtime Security | Detect at runtime | GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring (Fargate + EC2; not Managed Instances, Windows, or ECS Anywhere; running Fargate tasks covered only after restart/redeploy) + Extended Threat Detection (automatic, no additional cost atop paid GuardDuty); findings → Security Hub | runtime-security.md |
| 7 — Audit Logging & Compliance | Prove what happened + continuous evidence | CloudTrail (ECS API) + Container Insights + app logs via awslogs/FireLens + Config conformance packs + Security Hub ECS controls + Artifact; Audit Manager existing setups only (maintenance mode) |
audit-logging.md · compliance-accelerators.md |
The AWS-canonical reference stack for a new commercial Fargate service: Fargate (L1) + separate least-privileged task role & execution role with confused-deputy-scoped trust (L2) +
readonlyRootFilesystem/non-root/privileged:false/dropped-capabilities/distroless (L3) + ECR Enhanced Scanning + immutable tags + AWS Signer signing (L4) +awsvpcSG-per-service in private subnets + VPC endpoints (L5) + GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring + Extended Threat Detection (L6) + CloudTrail + Container Insights + Config + Security Hub ECS controls (L7). The ECS-on-EC2 path adds container-instance OS hardening + IMDS lockdown at L1/L5 and loses Fargate's per-task kernel isolation (see the boundary note below). Managed Instances loses GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring support at L6.
Cross-cutting concerns (span every layer, aligned to the AWS ECS Best Practices security areas): secrets & data encryption (Secrets Manager/SSM injection, the JSON-key syntax, at-rest/in-transit, EBS volume & ephemeral-storage encryption, Fargate FIPS) → encryption-and-secrets.md; incident response & forensics (the runbook when a detection fires) → incident-response-and-forensics.md; and the shared-responsibility model itself → shared-responsibility.md. Each reference includes its per-layer shared-responsibility split.
The one boundary you must state precisely (verified, verbatim from AWS docs): "Containers are not a security boundary and the use of task IAM roles does not change this." On Fargate, each task has its own isolation boundary — no shared kernel, CPU, memory, or ENI with another task. On EC2, ECS Managed Instances, and ECS Anywhere there is no task isolation: a compromised container can reach credentials for co-located tasks, the container instance role, and instance metadata (IMDS). For strict workload isolation, use Fargate; on EC2, lock down IMDS access from tasks. Source: ECS task IAM role.
Compliance-Regime Scope (cross-cutting)
Amazon ECS and AWS Fargate are broadly in scope for AWS's major compliance programs (PCI-DSS, HIPAA eligibility, SOC 1/2/3, ISO, FedRAMP, and more) — but program scope changes over time and is not the same across services or Regions, so this skill does not quote a fixed ECS scope table from memory. Instead, defer to the authoritative live pages every time: AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program and the ECS-specific Compliance validation for Amazon ECS. Per-regime nuance, the verify-against-live-page discipline, and worked HIPAA/PCI/FedRAMP scenarios: references/compliance-regimes.md.
Always include the disclaimer in customer-facing output: "Compliance status changes over time — verify on the live AWS Services in Scope page before quoting program coverage." And precision matters: ECS/Fargate are HIPAA-eligible (with a signed BAA), not "HIPAA-compliant"; Fargate FIPS 140-3 is GovCloud (US) only, LINUX + X86_64 + platform version 1.4.0+, and off by default (verified: Fargate FIPS-140).
Security Baseline (non-negotiable — every recommendation includes this)
Regardless of regime, every ECS hardening recommendation MUST include:
- Separate task role and task execution role, each least-privileged — never one over-broad shared role, never static AWS keys in the container
- Confused-deputy protection (
aws:SourceArnscoped to your account via the all-clusters wildcardarn:aws:ecs:region:acct:*, plusaws:SourceAccount) on theecs-tasks.amazonaws.comtrust policy for cross-service roles — cluster/task scoping inaws:SourceArnis not supported (task IAM role) - Scoped
iam:PassRole— grant it only for the specific execution/task/infrastructure role ARNs, neverResource: "*" - Secrets via Secrets Manager or SSM Parameter Store injected through the task definition
secretsblock (execution role needs the retrieval permission) — never plaintext inenvironmentenv vars - Container hardening —
readonlyRootFilesystem: true, non-rootuser,privileged: false(privileged is unsettable on Fargate anyway), drop unneeded Linux capabilities (on Fargate the only addable capability isSYS_PTRACE), distroless/minimal base image, explicit CPU/memory limits, immutable ECR tags. Note the ECS Exec interplay:readonlyRootFilesystem: trueis incompatible with ECS Exec (the SSM agent must write to the container filesystem), and ECS Exec sessions run asrootregardless of the containeruser— govern Exec accordingly (below). Windows:readonlyRootFilesystem,user, and Linux-capability drops don't apply — see the Layer 3/6 caveats awsvpcnetwork mode with a least-privilege security group per service, tasks in private subnets, no auto-assigned public IPs, and VPC endpoints for ECR (api + dkr), S3 (gateway, for layers), Secrets Manager, and CloudWatch Logs- ECR Enhanced Scanning (Amazon Inspector) on all production repositories; image signing (AWS Signer + Notation) where the regime requires provenance
- GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring (Fargate + EC2 — not Managed Instances, Windows, or ECS Anywhere; see Layer 3/6 caveats) + Extended Threat Detection (automatic, no additional cost atop paid GuardDuty); route findings to Security Hub. On a fully-private default-deny build (Layer 5), the GuardDuty telemetry path must be explicitly allowed — the GuardDuty-created VPC endpoint plus the S3 managed prefix list (for the agent/sidecar image) — or detection silently goes dark
- CloudTrail for the ECS API audit trail + Container Insights + application logs to CloudWatch via
awslogsor FireLens - Encryption — EBS volumes and ephemeral storage encrypted (Fargate ephemeral storage is AES-256 encrypted by default on platform version 1.4.0+); CMK for ECR/EBS/logs under compliance regimes; lock down IMDS from tasks on EC2 — the actual controls are
ECS_AWSVPC_BLOCK_IMDS=truein/etc/ecs/ecs.configforawsvpctasks, an iptablesDROPto169.254.169.254forbridge-mode tasks, and IMDSv2 with hop-limit 1 on the instance (see shared-responsibility.md) - ECS Exec governance (if Exec is enabled) — restrict
ecs:ExecuteCommandvia IAM condition keys (ecs:cluster,ecs:container-name, resource tags), turn on clusterexecuteCommandConfigurationsession logging to S3/CloudWatch with KMS session encryption, audit ExecuteCommand events in CloudTrail, and disable Exec in production unless break-glass is required (see identity-and-access.md) - Preventive governance — ECS itself won't refuse a non-compliant task definition at launch, so enforce what IAM can see with SCPs / IAM condition keys:
ecs:RegisterTaskDefinitionsupports theecs:privileged,ecs:compute-compatibility,ecs:task-cpu/ecs:task-memory, and tag condition keys — so you can denyprivilegedtask definitions (Service Authorization Reference — ECS). No condition key inspectsenvironment/secret contents as of 2026-07-10, so plaintext-secret registration is not IAM/SCP-deniable — catch it with detective/pipeline controls instead (Security Hub ECS.8 — note it matches only the three fixed key namesAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY/ECS_ENGINE_AUTH_DATA, not arbitrary secrets, so cfn-guard/OPA in CI carries the broad coverage — plus AWS Config) and require image signing in the pipeline. Add VPC Flow Logs on task subnets (assumed by IR; PCI Req 10) and AWS WAF + Shield on any internet-facing ALB
Hardening Roadmap (30 / 60 / 90)
- Days 1-30 (baseline, non-disruptive): enable CloudTrail (if not already) + GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring + ECR Enhanced Scanning + Security Hub (AWS FSBP + the ECS controls) + Container Insights. Establish the baseline and the finding inventory. Caveat: enabling Runtime Monitoring does not retroactively cover already-running Fargate tasks — the security sidecar is injected only at task start, so existing tasks stay uncovered until they are restarted/redeployed (plan a rolling redeploy). On a locked-down network, also allow the GuardDuty telemetry path (its VPC endpoint + the S3 managed prefix list) or coverage reports "Unhealthy."
- Days 31-60 (identity + secrets): split any over-broad shared role into least-privileged task role + execution role; add confused-deputy conditions to trust policies; scope
iam:PassRole; migrate plaintext env-var secrets to Secrets Manager/SSM injection; lock down IMDS from tasks on EC2. - Days 61-90 (workload + network + image): roll out
readonlyRootFilesystem/non-root/privileged:false/dropped-capabilities (test first — read-only rootfs breaks apps that expect to write); move tasks to private subnets + VPC endpoints + SG-per-service; enable immutable tags + image signing; enable the applicable AWS Config conformance pack (HIPAA/PCI/NIST/FedRAMP) + validate Security Hub against it (Audit Manager existing setups only — maintenance mode; see compliance-accelerators.md). - Greenfield: deploy the full 7-layer stack in the task definition and service at creation, not retrofitted.
Top Guardrails (the high-cost mistakes)
- Don't recommend a stack before confirming launch type — the #1 ECS mistake; Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances changes Layers 1, 3, 5, and 6.
- Don't confuse the task role with the execution role. The execution role grants the ECS/Fargate agent permission to pull images, write logs, and fetch secrets at launch; the task role vends credentials to your application code at runtime. Putting app permissions on the execution role (or ECR/secrets permissions only on the task role) is a classic misconfiguration.
- Don't leave the "ECS was unable to assume the role" error unresolved by guessing — it is almost always (a) a missing/incorrect trust policy (
Principal: ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com+sts:AssumeRole), (b) a deleted/renamed role, or (c) an over-restrictive confused-deputy condition. See identity-and-access.md and re:Post: ECS unable to assume role. - Don't forget the trailing colons in a secret ARN. The full
valueFromsyntax isarn:aws:secretsmanager:region:acct:secret:name:json-key:version-stage:version-id; the last three fields are optional but if you omit them you must still include the colons to select defaults. A single JSON key requires Fargate platform version 1.4.0+ (Linux) or EC2 agent 1.37.0+. Source: Pass Secrets Manager secrets via env vars. - Don't claim GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring covers Managed Instances — it covers Fargate and EC2 container instances; Runtime Monitoring does not support ECS Managed Instances (verified). Injected env-var secrets are also not auto-rotated — the container gets the value only at start; use SSM Parameter Store programmatic retrieval or force a new deployment to refresh.
- Don't treat containers as a security boundary on EC2 — no task isolation there; a compromised container can reach co-located tasks' credentials, the instance role, and IMDS. Use Fargate for strict isolation, or lock down IMDS.
- Don't promise "HIPAA-compliant" — ECS/Fargate are HIPAA-eligible; a signed BAA is required and the customer owns workload-level controls.
- Don't claim Fargate FIPS in commercial Regions — Fargate FIPS 140-3 is GovCloud (US) only and must be explicitly enabled.
- Watch ECS Express Mode's secure-by-default gaps. Express Mode auto-creates the service, task definition, networking, and ALB, and defaults to internet-facing when given the default/public subnets (internal ALB only if you supply private subnets). The infrastructure role is a required customer-supplied input (
infrastructureRoleArn, with theAmazonECSInfrastructureRoleforExpressGatewayServicesmanaged policy), as is the execution role — only service-linked roles (ECS, ELB, Application Auto Scaling) are auto-created (verified 2026-07-10). If a workload is regulated or sensitive, drive it to private subnets + internal ALB, keep the infrastructure role you supply least-privileged, and layer the Layer 3-7 baseline on top — the fast path is not the hardened path. Source: Resources created by ECS Express Mode. - Don't let the default log mode silently drop your audit evidence. Since June 25, 2025 the ECS default log driver mode is
non-blocking— under backpressure logs are dropped silently, fatal when logs are the compliance evidence. Setmode: blocking(or the account default) for audit-critical services and weigh the availability trade-off. See audit-logging.md. - Don't conflate the
ssmandssmmessagesVPC endpoints.ssmserves Parameter Store retrieval; ECS Exec needsssmmessages—ssmalone leaves Exec broken on private networks. See network-isolation.md. - Don't synthesize compliance/crypto claims — cite an AWS-published source or recommend escalation.
Escalation
Create a SpecReq / escalate for: first-time certification on a mission-critical regulated workload; XXL+ segment; FedRAMP High / GovCloud; IL4/IL5; ECS Anywhere inside a compliance boundary (customer owns the on-prem host entirely); multi-tenant SaaS with cross-tenant PHI/cardholder/federal isolation on shared EC2 container instances; customer-vs-auditor disagreement on AWS-managed-control acceptability; or any claim you cannot ground. Full criteria: references/engagement-and-response.md.
How to Use the References
Progressive disclosure — the essentials are above; load a reference only when the task needs that depth:
| Reference | Load when the task is about… |
|---|---|
| engagement-and-response.md | Full discovery question set, adoption-challenge archetypes, response framework, escalation criteria |
| shared-responsibility.md | Layer 1 — Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances vs Anywhere responsibility split; container-instance AMI hardening (AL2023/Bottlerocket); IMDS lockdown; patch cadence |
| identity-and-access.md | Layer 2 — task vs execution vs instance vs infrastructure roles; the "unable to assume the role" error; confused-deputy trust (all-clusters wildcard); iam:PassRole; credential delivery; ECS Exec governance; operator-side/cluster-admin IAM (ABAC, MFA) |
| task-container-hardening.md | Layer 3 — readonlyRootFilesystem, non-root user, privileged, Linux capabilities, dockerSecurityOptions, distroless, CPU/memory limits, Security Hub ECS controls |
| image-supply-chain.md | Layer 4 — ECR Enhanced (Inspector) vs basic scanning, immutable tags, CMK-encrypted repos, AWS Signer + Notation signing, third-party scanners |
| network-isolation.md | Layer 5 — awsvpc mode, SG-per-task/service, private subnets, VPC endpoints (incl. ssmmessages/kms for Exec, ECS control-plane endpoints on EC2), VPC Flow Logs, WAF/Shield, multi-tenancy isolation, ingress via ALB/NLB, egress control |
| runtime-security.md | Layer 6 — GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring (Fargate/EC2 coverage, the Managed-Instances exclusion), Extended Threat Detection, Security Hub, third-party CNAPP |
| audit-logging.md | Layer 7a — CloudTrail, Container Insights, awslogs/FireLens, log encryption + retention by regime |
| compliance-accelerators.md | Layer 7b — Config conformance packs + rules for ECS, Security Hub ECS controls, Artifact, Audit Manager (maintenance mode) |
| encryption-and-secrets.md | Secrets Manager/SSM injection + the JSON-key syntax; at-rest/in-transit; EBS + ephemeral-storage encryption; Fargate FIPS |
| compliance-regimes.md | Per-regime scope (HIPAA/PCI/FedRAMP/GDPR/…), the verify-against-live-page discipline, worked scenarios |
| incident-response-and-forensics.md | IR runbook for a compromised task/container, isolation, credential revocation, forensic capture |
Sources
- ECS Best Practices: Security · Task & container security · IAM roles best practices
- ECS task IAM role · ECS task execution IAM role · re:Post — "ECS unable to assume role"
- Pass sensitive data to a container · Secrets via env vars (Secrets Manager)
- GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring · How it works with ECS-Fargate · ECR Enhanced Scanning · Sign images in ECR (AWS Signer + Notation)
- Compliance validation for Amazon ECS · Fargate FIPS-140 · AWS Services in Scope · AWS Artifact
Files (sample-apex-skills)
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references
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audit-logging.md 6 KB
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compliance-accelerators.md 8.1 KB
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compliance-regimes.md 13.1 KB
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encryption-and-secrets.md 6.3 KB
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engagement-and-response.md 6.8 KB
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identity-and-access.md 14.3 KB
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image-supply-chain.md 6.2 KB
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incident-response-and-forensics.md 6.4 KB
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network-isolation.md 10.8 KB
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runtime-security.md 5.9 KB
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shared-responsibility.md 6.8 KB
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task-container-hardening.md 7.1 KB
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SKILL.md 28 KB
--- name: ecs-security description: Security and compliance guidance for Amazon ECS — "ECS was unable to assume the role", task role vs execution role, iam:PassRole, confused-deputy aws:SourceArn trust, Fargate vs EC2 shared responsibility, injecting Secrets Manager/SSM secrets (trailing-colon JSON-key gotcha), readonlyRootFilesystem / non-root / drop capabilities, ECS Exec governance, security-group-per-task, VPC endpoint policies, GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring, ECR Inspector scanning, image signing, Fargate FIPS, or PCI/HIPAA/FedRAMP. Walks a discovery-driven 7-layer stack plus the AWS-canonical baseline and a 30/60/90 roadmap. Trigger even if "compliance" is never said — any ECS hardening, task-trust fix, or secrets-injection qualifies. Skip for EKS/Kubernetes (eks-security), GenAI/GPU security (ecs-genai), App Runner/Lambda, auditing a live estate's operational posture (ecs-operation-review — "audit my ECS security posture" matches both), or account-level security with no ECS angle. --- # ECS Security & Compliance End-to-end, opinionated security and compliance guidance for Amazon ECS, structured as a **7-layer stack** plus a **compliance-regime cross-cutting view**. This skill is **discovery-driven** — the right hardening stack is a function of *(launch type × compliance regime × workload sensitivity × audit timeline × team skill × network topology × operational-overhead tolerance)*. The single biggest ECS-specific variable is **launch type (Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances vs ECS Anywhere)**, because it moves the shared-responsibility line and changes which controls are even available. Skipping discovery makes the recommendation wrong about half the time. The AWS-published foundation for every recommendation is the [ECS Best Practices: Security](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/bestpracticesguide/security.html) guide (task & container security, network security, IAM roles) and the [ECS security documentation set](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/security.html) (IAM, shared-responsibility, Fargate FIPS, infrastructure security). For "which launch/deployment model should I use" (non-security) use `ecs-architect`; for auditing a live estate's operational posture use `ecs-operation-review`. > **The accuracy bar (non-negotiable for this skill).** Compliance is the one domain where customers validate *every* claim against an auditor. **Compliance status changes over time — always defer to the live [AWS Services in Scope](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/) page before quoting program coverage** in any customer-facing document; the ECS-specific pointer is [Compliance validation for Amazon ECS](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/ecs-compliance.html). Never state a cryptographic-module status, FedRAMP boundary, or certification you cannot cite to an AWS-published source. When you can't ground a claim, say so — do not synthesize. ## When to Use This Skill **Activate when the user wants to:** - Fix the **#1 recurring ECS error — "ECS was unable to assume the role …"** (task/execution-role trust misconfiguration) - Get the **task role vs task execution role vs container instance role vs infrastructure role** distinction right, and least-privilege each one - Add **confused-deputy protection** (`aws:SourceArn` / `aws:SourceAccount`) to a task-role trust policy, or scope **`iam:PassRole`** - Understand the **Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances shared-responsibility split** for a security/audit conversation - **Inject secrets** from Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store into a task definition (and dodge the trailing-colon JSON-key gotcha) - **Harden containers** — `readonlyRootFilesystem`, non-root `user`, `privileged: false`, drop Linux capabilities, distroless images - **Isolate the network** — `awsvpc` security-group-per-task, private subnets, VPC endpoints for ECR/S3/Secrets Manager/CloudWatch - Add **runtime detection** (GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring + Extended Threat Detection) and **image supply-chain** controls (ECR enhanced scanning, AWS Signer + Notation signing) - Prepare an ECS workload for a **PCI-DSS / HIPAA / FedRAMP / SOC 2 / ISO** audit, or turn on **Fargate FIPS** **Don't use this skill for:** - **EKS / Kubernetes** container security (RBAC, Pod Identity/IRSA, PSA, NetworkPolicy, kube-bench) → `eks-security` - **GenAI / GPU / ML-workload** security specifically (model-artifact provenance, GPU-node compliance) → `ecs-genai` (or `eks-genai` on EKS) - **AWS App Runner / Lambda / Batch** — different services with different security models - **AWS account-level / org-wide** security with no ECS-specific angle (SCPs, SSO, org GuardDuty) → Security guidance, not this skill - Choosing a launch/deployment model with no security driver (→ `ecs-architect`), auditing live operational posture (→ `ecs-operation-review`), or discovery/inventory of an estate (→ `ecs-recon`) ## Discovery First — the Required Questions **Do NOT recommend a hardening stack before answering these.** The single most common mistake is prescribing controls without confirming the launch type — a Fargate answer and an ECS-on-EC2 answer differ at Layers 1, 3, 5, and 6. The first four answers determine ~80% of the recommendation. 1. **Launch type(s)?** AWS Fargate / ECS on EC2 / ECS Managed Instances / ECS Anywhere (external) / mixed. *(This is the ECS-specific first question — it sets the shared-responsibility line.)* 2. **Compliance regime(s)?** None / SOC 2 / HIPAA / PCI-DSS / FedRAMP Class C (formerly Moderate baseline) / Class D (formerly High baseline) / GDPR / ISO 27001 / NIST 800-53/171 / IL4-IL5 — rank primary/secondary if multiple. 3. **Workload sensitivity?** Public / internal / PII / PHI (HIPAA) / cardholder data (PCI) / federal. 4. **Audit timeline?** None / <3 mo (urgent) / 3-6 mo / 6-12 mo / continuous. 5. **Network topology?** Public subnets + IGW / private subnets + NAT / fully private + VPC endpoints; single vs multi-account; multi-region; GovCloud. 6. **Secrets & config posture?** Plaintext env vars (bad) / Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store / hybrid; rotation requirement. 7. **Team ECS/security skill?** Low / moderate / high / mixed. 8. **Current security tooling baseline?** None / AWS-native / third-party CNAPP / OSS / hybrid. Full required + recommended question set, adoption-challenge archetypes, and the response framework: [references/engagement-and-response.md](references/engagement-and-response.md). ## The 7-Layer Security & Compliance Stack Walk the layers bottom-up on a first engagement; each layer's controls compound on the previous. The **AWS-canonical default** column assumes a new commercial Fargate workload — the launch-type substitutions are noted per layer. | Layer | Focus | AWS-canonical default | Reference | |-------|-------|----------------------|-----------| | **1 — Compute / Shared Responsibility** | Who secures what; node OS | **Fargate** (AWS manages OS/kernel/runtime — smallest customer surface); on **EC2/Managed Instances**, harden the container instance (ECS-optimized AL2023 or **Bottlerocket**, patch cadence, IMDSv2, lock down IMDS from tasks) | [shared-responsibility.md](references/shared-responsibility.md) | | **2 — Identity & Access** | Role trust & least privilege | **Task role** (app → AWS) + **task execution role** (agent → ECR/logs/secrets) as *separate* least-privileged roles; **confused-deputy** `aws:SourceArn`/`aws:SourceAccount` on trust policies; scoped **`iam:PassRole`** | [identity-and-access.md](references/identity-and-access.md) | | **3 — Task & Container Hardening** | What a container may do | **`readonlyRootFilesystem: true`** + non-root **`user`** + **`privileged: false`** + drop Linux capabilities + distroless image + CPU/memory limits | [task-container-hardening.md](references/task-container-hardening.md) | | **4 — Image Supply Chain** | Trust what you run | **ECR Enhanced Scanning** (Amazon Inspector) + **immutable tags** + **AWS Signer + Notation** signing + CMK-encrypted repos | [image-supply-chain.md](references/image-supply-chain.md) | | **5 — Network Isolation** | What a task may reach | **`awsvpc` mode** + **security-group-per-service** + **private subnets** + **VPC endpoints** (ECR api/dkr, S3 gateway, Secrets Manager, CloudWatch Logs) + no public IPs | [network-isolation.md](references/network-isolation.md) | | **6 — Runtime Security** | Detect at runtime | **GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring** (Fargate + EC2; **not** Managed Instances, Windows, or ECS Anywhere; running Fargate tasks covered only after restart/redeploy) + **Extended Threat Detection** (automatic, no *additional* cost atop paid GuardDuty); findings → Security Hub | [runtime-security.md](references/runtime-security.md) | | **7 — Audit Logging & Compliance** | Prove what happened + continuous evidence | **CloudTrail** (ECS API) + **Container Insights** + app logs via `awslogs`/FireLens + **Config conformance packs** + **Security Hub** ECS controls + **Artifact**; **Audit Manager** existing setups only (maintenance mode) | [audit-logging.md](references/audit-logging.md) · [compliance-accelerators.md](references/compliance-accelerators.md) | > **The AWS-canonical reference stack for a new commercial Fargate service:** Fargate (L1) + separate least-privileged task role & execution role with confused-deputy-scoped trust (L2) + `readonlyRootFilesystem`/non-root/`privileged:false`/dropped-capabilities/distroless (L3) + ECR Enhanced Scanning + immutable tags + AWS Signer signing (L4) + `awsvpc` SG-per-service in private subnets + VPC endpoints (L5) + GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring + Extended Threat Detection (L6) + CloudTrail + Container Insights + Config + Security Hub ECS controls (L7). The **ECS-on-EC2 path** adds container-instance OS hardening + IMDS lockdown at L1/L5 and loses Fargate's per-task kernel isolation (see the boundary note below). **Managed Instances** loses GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring support at L6. **Cross-cutting concerns** (span every layer, aligned to the AWS ECS Best Practices security areas): **secrets & data encryption** (Secrets Manager/SSM injection, the JSON-key syntax, at-rest/in-transit, EBS volume & ephemeral-storage encryption, Fargate FIPS) → [encryption-and-secrets.md](references/encryption-and-secrets.md); **incident response & forensics** (the runbook when a detection fires) → [incident-response-and-forensics.md](references/incident-response-and-forensics.md); and the **shared-responsibility model** itself → [shared-responsibility.md](references/shared-responsibility.md). Each reference includes its per-layer shared-responsibility split. > **The one boundary you must state precisely (verified, verbatim from AWS docs):** *"Containers are not a security boundary and the use of task IAM roles does not change this."* On **Fargate**, each task has its own isolation boundary — no shared kernel, CPU, memory, or ENI with another task. On **EC2, ECS Managed Instances, and ECS Anywhere** there is **no task isolation**: a compromised container can reach credentials for co-located tasks, the container instance role, and instance metadata (IMDS). For strict workload isolation, use **Fargate**; on EC2, lock down IMDS access from tasks. Source: [ECS task IAM role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html). ## Compliance-Regime Scope (cross-cutting) Amazon ECS and AWS Fargate are broadly in scope for AWS's major compliance programs (PCI-DSS, HIPAA eligibility, SOC 1/2/3, ISO, FedRAMP, and more) — but **program scope changes over time and is not the same across services or Regions**, so this skill **does not quote a fixed ECS scope table from memory**. Instead, defer to the authoritative live pages every time: [AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/) and the ECS-specific [Compliance validation for Amazon ECS](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/ecs-compliance.html). Per-regime nuance, the verify-against-live-page discipline, and worked HIPAA/PCI/FedRAMP scenarios: [references/compliance-regimes.md](references/compliance-regimes.md). > **Always include the disclaimer in customer-facing output:** "Compliance status changes over time — verify on the live [AWS Services in Scope](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/) page before quoting program coverage." And precision matters: ECS/Fargate are **HIPAA-*eligible*** (with a signed BAA), not "HIPAA-compliant"; **Fargate FIPS 140-3 is GovCloud (US) only, LINUX + X86_64 + platform version 1.4.0+, and off by default** (verified: [Fargate FIPS-140](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/ecs-fips-compliance.html)). ## Security Baseline (non-negotiable — every recommendation includes this) Regardless of regime, every ECS hardening recommendation MUST include: - **Separate task role and task execution role**, each least-privileged — never one over-broad shared role, never static AWS keys in the container - **Confused-deputy protection** (`aws:SourceArn` scoped to your account via the all-clusters wildcard `arn:aws:ecs:region:acct:*`, plus `aws:SourceAccount`) on the `ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com` trust policy for cross-service roles — cluster/task scoping in `aws:SourceArn` is not supported ([task IAM role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html)) - **Scoped `iam:PassRole`** — grant it only for the specific execution/task/infrastructure role ARNs, never `Resource: "*"` - **Secrets via Secrets Manager or SSM Parameter Store** injected through the task definition `secrets` block (execution role needs the retrieval permission) — never plaintext in `environment` env vars - **Container hardening** — `readonlyRootFilesystem: true`, non-root `user`, `privileged: false` (privileged is unsettable on Fargate anyway), drop unneeded Linux capabilities (on Fargate the only *addable* capability is `SYS_PTRACE`), distroless/minimal base image, explicit CPU/memory limits, immutable ECR tags. Note the **ECS Exec interplay**: `readonlyRootFilesystem: true` is **incompatible with ECS Exec** (the SSM agent must write to the container filesystem), and ECS Exec sessions run as **`root` regardless of the container `user`** — govern Exec accordingly (below). **Windows:** `readonlyRootFilesystem`, `user`, and Linux-capability drops don't apply — see the Layer 3/6 caveats - **`awsvpc` network mode** with a **least-privilege security group per service**, tasks in **private subnets**, no auto-assigned public IPs, and **VPC endpoints** for ECR (api + dkr), S3 (gateway, for layers), Secrets Manager, and CloudWatch Logs - **ECR Enhanced Scanning** (Amazon Inspector) on all production repositories; image signing (AWS Signer + Notation) where the regime requires provenance - **GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring** (Fargate + EC2 — **not** Managed Instances, Windows, or ECS Anywhere; see Layer 3/6 caveats) + **Extended Threat Detection** (automatic, no additional cost atop paid GuardDuty); route findings to **Security Hub**. On a **fully-private default-deny build (Layer 5), the GuardDuty telemetry path must be explicitly allowed** — the GuardDuty-created VPC endpoint plus the S3 managed prefix list (for the agent/sidecar image) — or detection silently goes dark - **CloudTrail** for the ECS API audit trail + **Container Insights** + application logs to CloudWatch via `awslogs` or FireLens - **Encryption** — EBS volumes and ephemeral storage encrypted (Fargate ephemeral storage is AES-256 encrypted by default on **platform version 1.4.0+**); CMK for ECR/EBS/logs under compliance regimes; **lock down IMDS from tasks on EC2** — the actual controls are `ECS_AWSVPC_BLOCK_IMDS=true` in `/etc/ecs/ecs.config` for `awsvpc` tasks, an iptables `DROP` to `169.254.169.254` for `bridge`-mode tasks, and IMDSv2 with hop-limit 1 on the instance (see [shared-responsibility.md](references/shared-responsibility.md)) - **ECS Exec governance** (if Exec is enabled) — restrict `ecs:ExecuteCommand` via IAM condition keys (`ecs:cluster`, `ecs:container-name`, resource tags), turn on cluster `executeCommandConfiguration` **session logging to S3/CloudWatch** with **KMS session encryption**, audit **ExecuteCommand** events in CloudTrail, and **disable Exec in production** unless break-glass is required (see [identity-and-access.md](references/identity-and-access.md)) - **Preventive governance** — ECS itself won't refuse a non-compliant task definition at launch, so enforce what IAM *can* see with **SCPs / IAM condition keys**: `ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition` supports the `ecs:privileged`, `ecs:compute-compatibility`, `ecs:task-cpu`/`ecs:task-memory`, and tag condition keys — so you can deny `privileged` task definitions ([Service Authorization Reference — ECS](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_ecs.html)). **No condition key inspects `environment`/secret contents as of 2026-07-10**, so plaintext-secret registration is *not* IAM/SCP-deniable — catch it with detective/pipeline controls instead (Security Hub ECS.8 — note it matches only the three fixed key names `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`/`ECS_ENGINE_AUTH_DATA`, not arbitrary secrets, so cfn-guard/OPA in CI carries the broad coverage — plus AWS Config) and require image signing in the pipeline. Add **VPC Flow Logs** on task subnets (assumed by IR; PCI Req 10) and **AWS WAF + Shield** on any internet-facing ALB ## Hardening Roadmap (30 / 60 / 90) - **Days 1-30 (baseline, non-disruptive):** enable CloudTrail (if not already) + GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring + ECR Enhanced Scanning + Security Hub (AWS FSBP + the ECS controls) + Container Insights. *Establish the baseline and the finding inventory.* **Caveat:** enabling Runtime Monitoring does **not** retroactively cover **already-running Fargate tasks** — the security sidecar is injected only at task start, so existing tasks stay uncovered until they are **restarted/redeployed** (plan a rolling redeploy). On a locked-down network, also allow the GuardDuty telemetry path (its VPC endpoint + the S3 managed prefix list) or coverage reports "Unhealthy." - **Days 31-60 (identity + secrets):** split any over-broad shared role into least-privileged task role + execution role; add confused-deputy conditions to trust policies; scope `iam:PassRole`; migrate plaintext env-var secrets to Secrets Manager/SSM injection; lock down IMDS from tasks on EC2. - **Days 61-90 (workload + network + image):** roll out `readonlyRootFilesystem`/non-root/`privileged:false`/dropped-capabilities (test first — read-only rootfs breaks apps that expect to write); move tasks to private subnets + VPC endpoints + SG-per-service; enable immutable tags + image signing; enable the applicable AWS Config conformance pack (HIPAA/PCI/NIST/FedRAMP) + validate Security Hub against it (Audit Manager existing setups only — maintenance mode; see [compliance-accelerators.md](references/compliance-accelerators.md)). - **Greenfield:** deploy the full 7-layer stack in the task definition and service at creation, not retrofitted. ## Top Guardrails (the high-cost mistakes) - **Don't recommend a stack before confirming launch type** — the #1 ECS mistake; Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances changes Layers 1, 3, 5, and 6. - **Don't confuse the task role with the execution role.** The **execution role** grants the *ECS/Fargate agent* permission to pull images, write logs, and fetch secrets *at launch*; the **task role** vends credentials to *your application code at runtime*. Putting app permissions on the execution role (or ECR/secrets permissions only on the task role) is a classic misconfiguration. - **Don't leave the "ECS was unable to assume the role" error unresolved by guessing** — it is almost always (a) a missing/incorrect trust policy (`Principal: ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com` + `sts:AssumeRole`), (b) a deleted/renamed role, or (c) an over-restrictive confused-deputy condition. See [identity-and-access.md](references/identity-and-access.md) and [re:Post: ECS unable to assume role](https://repost.aws/knowledge-center/ecs-unable-to-assume-role). - **Don't forget the trailing colons in a secret ARN.** The full `valueFrom` syntax is `arn:aws:secretsmanager:region:acct:secret:name:json-key:version-stage:version-id`; the last three fields are optional **but if you omit them you must still include the colons** to select defaults. A single JSON key requires Fargate platform version **1.4.0+** (Linux) or EC2 agent **1.37.0+**. Source: [Pass Secrets Manager secrets via env vars](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/secrets-envvar-secrets-manager.html). - **Don't claim GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring covers Managed Instances** — it covers Fargate and EC2 container instances; **Runtime Monitoring does not support ECS Managed Instances** (verified). Injected env-var secrets are also **not auto-rotated** — the container gets the value only at start; use SSM Parameter Store programmatic retrieval or force a new deployment to refresh. - **Don't treat containers as a security boundary on EC2** — no task isolation there; a compromised container can reach co-located tasks' credentials, the instance role, and IMDS. Use Fargate for strict isolation, or lock down IMDS. - **Don't promise "HIPAA-compliant"** — ECS/Fargate are HIPAA-*eligible*; a signed BAA is required and the customer owns workload-level controls. - **Don't claim Fargate FIPS in commercial Regions** — Fargate FIPS 140-3 is **GovCloud (US) only** and must be explicitly enabled. - **Watch ECS Express Mode's secure-by-default gaps.** Express Mode auto-creates the service, task definition, networking, and ALB, and defaults to **internet-facing** when given the default/public subnets (internal ALB only if you supply private subnets). The **infrastructure role is a required customer-supplied input** (`infrastructureRoleArn`, with the `AmazonECSInfrastructureRoleforExpressGatewayServices` managed policy), as is the execution role — only service-linked roles (ECS, ELB, Application Auto Scaling) are auto-created (verified 2026-07-10). If a workload is regulated or sensitive, drive it to **private subnets + internal ALB**, keep the infrastructure role you supply least-privileged, and layer the Layer 3-7 baseline on top — the fast path is not the hardened path. Source: [Resources created by ECS Express Mode](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/express-service-work.html). - **Don't let the default log mode silently drop your audit evidence.** Since June 25, 2025 the ECS default log driver mode is **`non-blocking`** — under backpressure logs are **dropped silently**, fatal when logs are the compliance evidence. Set `mode: blocking` (or the account default) for audit-critical services and weigh the availability trade-off. See [audit-logging.md](references/audit-logging.md). - **Don't conflate the `ssm` and `ssmmessages` VPC endpoints.** `ssm` serves Parameter Store retrieval; **ECS Exec needs `ssmmessages`** — `ssm` alone leaves Exec broken on private networks. See [network-isolation.md](references/network-isolation.md). - **Don't synthesize compliance/crypto claims** — cite an AWS-published source or recommend escalation. ## Escalation Create a SpecReq / escalate for: first-time certification on a mission-critical regulated workload; XXL+ segment; FedRAMP High / GovCloud; IL4/IL5; ECS Anywhere inside a compliance boundary (customer owns the on-prem host entirely); multi-tenant SaaS with cross-tenant PHI/cardholder/federal isolation on shared EC2 container instances; customer-vs-auditor disagreement on AWS-managed-control acceptability; or any claim you cannot ground. Full criteria: [references/engagement-and-response.md](references/engagement-and-response.md). ## How to Use the References Progressive disclosure — the essentials are above; load a reference only when the task needs that depth: | Reference | Load when the task is about… | |-----------|------------------------------| | [engagement-and-response.md](references/engagement-and-response.md) | Full discovery question set, adoption-challenge archetypes, response framework, escalation criteria | | [shared-responsibility.md](references/shared-responsibility.md) | Layer 1 — Fargate vs EC2 vs Managed Instances vs Anywhere responsibility split; container-instance AMI hardening (AL2023/Bottlerocket); IMDS lockdown; patch cadence | | [identity-and-access.md](references/identity-and-access.md) | Layer 2 — task vs execution vs instance vs infrastructure roles; the "unable to assume the role" error; confused-deputy trust (all-clusters wildcard); `iam:PassRole`; credential delivery; **ECS Exec governance**; operator-side/cluster-admin IAM (ABAC, MFA) | | [task-container-hardening.md](references/task-container-hardening.md) | Layer 3 — `readonlyRootFilesystem`, non-root user, `privileged`, Linux capabilities, `dockerSecurityOptions`, distroless, CPU/memory limits, Security Hub ECS controls | | [image-supply-chain.md](references/image-supply-chain.md) | Layer 4 — ECR Enhanced (Inspector) vs basic scanning, immutable tags, CMK-encrypted repos, AWS Signer + Notation signing, third-party scanners | | [network-isolation.md](references/network-isolation.md) | Layer 5 — `awsvpc` mode, SG-per-task/service, private subnets, VPC endpoints (incl. `ssmmessages`/`kms` for Exec, ECS control-plane endpoints on EC2), VPC Flow Logs, WAF/Shield, multi-tenancy isolation, ingress via ALB/NLB, egress control | | [runtime-security.md](references/runtime-security.md) | Layer 6 — GuardDuty ECS Runtime Monitoring (Fargate/EC2 coverage, the Managed-Instances exclusion), Extended Threat Detection, Security Hub, third-party CNAPP | | [audit-logging.md](references/audit-logging.md) | Layer 7a — CloudTrail, Container Insights, `awslogs`/FireLens, log encryption + retention by regime | | [compliance-accelerators.md](references/compliance-accelerators.md) | Layer 7b — Config conformance packs + rules for ECS, Security Hub ECS controls, Artifact, Audit Manager (maintenance mode) | | [encryption-and-secrets.md](references/encryption-and-secrets.md) | Secrets Manager/SSM injection + the JSON-key syntax; at-rest/in-transit; EBS + ephemeral-storage encryption; Fargate FIPS | | [compliance-regimes.md](references/compliance-regimes.md) | Per-regime scope (HIPAA/PCI/FedRAMP/GDPR/…), the verify-against-live-page discipline, worked scenarios | | [incident-response-and-forensics.md](references/incident-response-and-forensics.md) | IR runbook for a compromised task/container, isolation, credential revocation, forensic capture | ## Sources - [ECS Best Practices: Security](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/bestpracticesguide/security.html) · [Task & container security](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/bestpracticesguide/security-tasks-containers.html) · [IAM roles best practices](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/security-iam-roles.html) - [ECS task IAM role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html) · [ECS task execution IAM role](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task_execution_IAM_role.html) · [re:Post — "ECS unable to assume role"](https://repost.aws/knowledge-center/ecs-unable-to-assume-role) - [Pass sensitive data to a container](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/specifying-sensitive-data.html) · [Secrets via env vars (Secrets Manager)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/secrets-envvar-secrets-manager.html) - [GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/runtime-monitoring.html) · [How it works with ECS-Fargate](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/how-runtime-monitoring-works-ecs-fargate.html) · [ECR Enhanced Scanning](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning-enhanced.html) · [Sign images in ECR (AWS Signer + Notation)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-signing.html) - [Compliance validation for Amazon ECS](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/ecs-compliance.html) · [Fargate FIPS-140](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/ecs-fips-compliance.html) · [AWS Services in Scope](https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/) · [AWS Artifact](https://aws.amazon.com/artifact/)
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