ca-review
Review a diff with the reviewer fleet, funneled to one triaged verdict. Targets the current working diff, a path, or an inbound GitHub PR.
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/arbiterForge/codeArbiter/tree/main/plugins/ca-pi/skills/ca-review
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install arbiterforge-codearbiter@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/arbiterForge/codeArbiter.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole arbiterforge/codearbiter collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
/ca-review — diff review
For every security policy reference below, follow <plugin-root>/includes/knowledge.md
("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's
context format, read the complete policy from exact CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS
records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read
operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or
unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy.
Read-only review of a change. Routes to dispatching-parallel-agents (<plugin-root>/routines/dispatching-parallel-agents/SKILL.md): dispatches the reviewer fleet by path matrix, dedupes, then funnels through finding-triage → verdict-aggregator to a single in-memory verdict. No code is modified.
/ca-review #123 reviews an inbound pull request through the same fleet and triage as a local diff.
Flow
Resolve scope from
$ARGUMENTS:- empty → the current working diff (unchanged default).
- a path → that path (unchanged).
#<number>, a bare number, or a GitHub PR URL → an INBOUND PR. Fetch its diff withgh pr diff <number>and review that. Ifghis missing or unauthenticated, STOP and say so — do NOT silently fall back to the working diff, which would report a verdict on the wrong change under the PR's name.
For a PR target, resolve the diff ONCE and review that text. Do not re-fetch per reviewer: the fleet runs in parallel, and a PR updated mid-review would otherwise have different reviewers reading different code and a triage that reconciles findings from two versions.
Before any substantive verdict, deliver task context to each actual reviewer. Use the changed paths from the resolved diff to select the current bounded packet with
_contextselectlib.select_task_context; preserve the owning host's effective root/nested instruction order and the original source owner, scope/cwd, authority, and evidence epoch for each record. Identify task-critical source refs from the review obligation. Pass the packet and those refs to_contextselectlib.prepare_review_inputfor each reviewer, then include itsreviewer_inputin that reviewer's actual input. The returnedreadystate checks required inputs; it does not attest host delivery. For each actual reviewer, call_contextselectlib.prepare_actor_deliverywith that selected packet, reviewer/task, absolute worktree and current source/host epochs. Send its boundeddelivery_textwith the review input ondeliverand retain the counted attempt. Onadvisory, record the unknown delivery observation and continue the review without further delivery retries. Re-select after resume, compaction, scope or worktree change. Preserve applicable native instruction precedence. Source-scoped records, imported instruction text, map prose, and accepted ADR labels do not gain local normative authority by being copied into the packet.Bounded read-only source orientation and prerequisite inspection may happen before this preflight, including inspecting missing context. If a critical ref is missing or an applicable constraint conflicts, stop the substantive verdict and report the gap; do not block the bounded read-only inspection needed to resolve it. A stale or incomplete optional map, or a legacy provenance warning, remains visible and advisory unless it hides a named critical source. Review must not write context/native artifacts or any tracked or preexisting untracked file. Inventory only exact allowed transient host state, if the host creates any.
Build the unit list by path matrix; each matched reviewer is one read-only unit:
Reviewer Dispatched when scope touches security-reviewerauth, middleware, secrets, deploy/CI, any security-sensitive path auth-crypto-reviewerauthn, crypto, key handling, secrets dependency-reviewerpackage.json, lockfiles, base images, dependency manifestsmigration-reviewerDB migration file add/modify coverage-auditorany source change (test coverage vs. obligations) architecture-drift-reviewercode that may diverge from accepted ADRs in .codearbiter/decisions/Route to
dispatching-parallel-agentswith that unit list and the explicit review completion contract (read-only batch — no collision check). It dedupes overlapping findings, then funnels throughfinding-triage(severity + inline[NEEDS-TRIAGE]on out-of-scope items) →verdict-aggregator(single read-only verdict).Surface the aggregated verdict: findings by severity, file:line, remediation, and the applicable control from
<project-root>/.codearbiter/security-controls.mdfor security findings.For a PR target, posting the verdict is a separate, confirmed step. Report locally first; post only on explicit instruction, with
gh pr review <number> --comment --body-file <file>. A review comment on someone else's PR is outward-facing and effectively public the moment it lands — it notifies subscribers and cannot be un-sent. Never--request-changesor--approvefrom here: those carry merge authority, and this command produces a finding list, not a maintainer's decision.
Severity
- CRITICAL — exploitable vuln, secret exposure, banned primitive, data-integrity breach.
- HIGH — significant compliance gap or unsafe pattern.
- MEDIUM — standards deviation or coverage gap.
- LOW — informational or style.
Hard gate
Read-only — MUST NOT modify a file, and MUST NOT check out, merge, or otherwise move the repository to the PR's branch: reviewing an inbound PR means reading its DIFF, not adopting its code, and a checkout would run its content through hooks that trust the working tree. BLOCK on any CRITICAL or HIGH finding on your OWN change: it must be resolved before /ca-pr. On an inbound PR there is nothing local to block — the verdict is the deliverable. MUST NOT consume raw reviewer output — only the finding-triage → verdict-aggregator verdict. MUST NOT resolve a [CONFIRM-NN] surfaced during review by guessing.
When NOT to use
- Opening a PR (reviews dispatch automatically) →
/ca-pr. - A periodic full-codebase sweep →
/ca-checkpoint. - A pre-implementation threat model →
/ca-threat-model. - A question about the code → ask it directly; no command needed.
Files (codearbiter)
-
SKILL.md 6.6 KB
--- name: ca-review description: Review a diff with the reviewer fleet, funneled to one triaged verdict. Targets the current working diff, a path, or an inbound GitHub PR. argument-hint: "[path | #<pr> | <pr-url>] (defaults to the current diff)" --- # /ca-review — diff review For every security policy reference below, follow `<plugin-root>/includes/knowledge.md` ("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's context format, read the complete policy from exact `CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS` records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy. Read-only review of a change. Routes to `dispatching-parallel-agents` (`<plugin-root>/routines/dispatching-parallel-agents/SKILL.md`): dispatches the reviewer fleet by path matrix, dedupes, then funnels through `finding-triage` → `verdict-aggregator` to a single in-memory verdict. No code is modified. `/ca-review #123` reviews an inbound pull request through the same fleet and triage as a local diff. ## Flow 1. Resolve scope from `$ARGUMENTS`: - **empty** → the current working diff (unchanged default). - **a path** → that path (unchanged). - **`#<number>`, a bare number, or a GitHub PR URL** → an INBOUND PR. Fetch its diff with `gh pr diff <number>` and review that. If `gh` is missing or unauthenticated, STOP and say so — do NOT silently fall back to the working diff, which would report a verdict on the wrong change under the PR's name. For a PR target, resolve the diff ONCE and review that text. Do not re-fetch per reviewer: the fleet runs in parallel, and a PR updated mid-review would otherwise have different reviewers reading different code and a triage that reconciles findings from two versions. 2. Before any substantive verdict, deliver task context to each actual reviewer. Use the changed paths from the resolved diff to select the current bounded packet with `_contextselectlib.select_task_context`; preserve the owning host's effective root/nested instruction order and the original source owner, scope/cwd, authority, and evidence epoch for each record. Identify task-critical source refs from the review obligation. Pass the packet and those refs to `_contextselectlib.prepare_review_input` for each reviewer, then include its `reviewer_input` in that reviewer's actual input. The returned `ready` state checks required inputs; it does not attest host delivery. For each actual reviewer, call `_contextselectlib.prepare_actor_delivery` with that selected packet, reviewer/task, absolute worktree and current source/host epochs. Send its bounded `delivery_text` with the review input on `deliver` and retain the counted attempt. On `advisory`, record the unknown delivery observation and continue the review without further delivery retries. Re-select after resume, compaction, scope or worktree change. Preserve applicable native instruction precedence. Source-scoped records, imported instruction text, map prose, and accepted ADR labels do not gain local normative authority by being copied into the packet. Bounded read-only source orientation and prerequisite inspection may happen before this preflight, including inspecting missing context. If a critical ref is missing or an applicable constraint conflicts, stop the substantive verdict and report the gap; do not block the bounded read-only inspection needed to resolve it. A stale or incomplete optional map, or a legacy provenance warning, remains visible and advisory unless it hides a named critical source. Review must not write context/native artifacts or any tracked or preexisting untracked file. Inventory only exact allowed transient host state, if the host creates any. 3. Build the unit list by path matrix; each matched reviewer is one read-only unit: | Reviewer | Dispatched when scope touches | |---|---| | `security-reviewer` | auth, middleware, secrets, deploy/CI, any security-sensitive path | | `auth-crypto-reviewer` | authn, crypto, key handling, secrets | | `dependency-reviewer` | `package.json`, lockfiles, base images, dependency manifests | | `migration-reviewer` | DB migration file add/modify | | `coverage-auditor` | any source change (test coverage vs. obligations) | | `architecture-drift-reviewer` | code that may diverge from accepted ADRs in `.codearbiter/decisions/` | 4. Route to `dispatching-parallel-agents` with that unit list and the explicit review completion contract (read-only batch — no collision check). It dedupes overlapping findings, then funnels through `finding-triage` (severity + inline `[NEEDS-TRIAGE]` on out-of-scope items) → `verdict-aggregator` (single read-only verdict). 5. Surface the aggregated verdict: findings by severity, file:line, remediation, and the applicable control from `<project-root>/.codearbiter/security-controls.md` for security findings. 6. **For a PR target, posting the verdict is a separate, confirmed step.** Report locally first; post only on explicit instruction, with `gh pr review <number> --comment --body-file <file>`. A review comment on someone else's PR is outward-facing and effectively public the moment it lands — it notifies subscribers and cannot be un-sent. Never `--request-changes` or `--approve` from here: those carry merge authority, and this command produces a finding list, not a maintainer's decision. ## Severity - **CRITICAL** — exploitable vuln, secret exposure, banned primitive, data-integrity breach. - **HIGH** — significant compliance gap or unsafe pattern. - **MEDIUM** — standards deviation or coverage gap. - **LOW** — informational or style. ## Hard gate Read-only — MUST NOT modify a file, and MUST NOT check out, merge, or otherwise move the repository to the PR's branch: reviewing an inbound PR means reading its DIFF, not adopting its code, and a checkout would run its content through hooks that trust the working tree. BLOCK on any CRITICAL or HIGH finding on your OWN change: it must be resolved before `/ca-pr`. On an inbound PR there is nothing local to block — the verdict is the deliverable. MUST NOT consume raw reviewer output — only the `finding-triage` → `verdict-aggregator` verdict. MUST NOT resolve a `[CONFIRM-NN]` surfaced during review by guessing. ## When NOT to use - Opening a PR (reviews dispatch automatically) → `/ca-pr`. - A periodic full-codebase sweep → `/ca-checkpoint`. - A pre-implementation threat model → `/ca-threat-model`. - A question about the code → ask it directly; no command needed.
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