adversary
Pre-implementation red-team analysis. Use when a plan is high-risk, critical path, or expensive to reverse. Challenges plans before code is written — finds edge cases, security holes, scalability bottlenecks, error propagation risks, and integration conflicts. Catches flaws at pl
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/Rune-kit/rune/tree/master/skills/adversary
claude plugin marketplace add https://llmmart.ai/marketplace.json && claude plugin install rune-kit-rune@llmmart
git clone https://github.com/Rune-kit/rune.git
The skills CLI installs just this skill, for any of its supported agents. Claude Code installs the whole rune-kit/rune collection as a plugin from our marketplace. Git is the plain clone.
Skill manifest
adversary
Purpose
Pre-implementation adversarial analysis. After a plan is approved but BEFORE code is written, adversary stress-tests the plan across 5 dimensions: edge cases, security, scalability, error propagation, and integration risk. It does NOT fix or redesign — it reports weaknesses so the plan can be hardened before implementation begins.
This fills the only gap in the plan-to-ship pipeline: all other quality skills (review, preflight, sentinel) operate AFTER code exists. Catching a flaw in a plan costs minutes; catching it in implementation costs hours.
Triggers
- Called by
cookPhase 2.5 — after plan approved, before Phase 3 (TEST) /rune adversary— manual red-team analysis of any plan or design document- Auto-trigger: when plan files are created in
.rune/ordocs/plans/
Calls (outbound)
sentinel(L2): deep security scan when adversary identifies auth/crypto/payment attack vectors in the planperf(L2): scalability analysis when adversary identifies potential bottleneck patternsscout(L2): find existing code that might conflict with planned changesdocs-seeker(L3): verify framework/API assumptions in the plan are correct and currenthallucination-guard(L3): verify that APIs, packages, or patterns referenced in the plan actually existcontext-engine(L3): (oracle-mode) emitcontext.previewbefore bundle build to gate token costsession-bridge(L3): (oracle-mode) detach protocol when target model is opus-class for non-blocking dispatchcouncil(L3): Step 0.6 — decorrelated multi-perspective critique for CRITICAL-tier plans (one-way-door decisions, auth/payment/crypto/user-data), mode=critique
Called By (inbound)
cook(L1): Phase 2.5 — after plan approval, before TDDplan(L2): optional post-step for critical featuresteam(L1): when decomposing large tasks, adversary validates the decompositiondebug(L2): (oracle-mode) listens toagent.stuckfrom debug after 3 disproved hypothesesfix(L2): (oracle-mode) listens toagent.stuckfrom fix after 2+ failed attempts- User:
/rune adversarydirect invocation
Cross-Hub Connections
adversary←cook— plan produced → adversary challenges it → hardened plan feeds Phase 3adversary→sentinel— security attack vector identified → sentinel validates depthadversary→perf— scalability concern raised → perf quantifies the bottleneckadversary→scout— integration risk flagged → scout finds affected codeadversary→plan— CRITICAL findings → plan revises before implementationadversary→council— CRITICAL-tier plan (one-way-door decision, or auth/payment/crypto/user-data) → decorrelated critique before red-teaming
Execution
Step 0: Load Context
- Read the plan document (from
.rune/features/<name>/plan.md, phase file, or user-specified path) - Read the requirements document if it exists (
.rune/features/<name>/requirements.mdfrom BA) - Use
scoutto identify existing code files that the plan will touch or depend on - Identify the plan's core assumptions — what MUST be true for this plan to work?
Step 0.5: Steelman + Pick a Reasoning Lens
Files (rune)
-
references
-
context-bundle-format.md 5.2 KB
Loading… -
cross-model-escalation.md 5.2 KB
Loading… -
oracle-mode.md 5.8 KB
Loading… -
reasoning-modes.md 6.3 KB
Loading…
-
-
evals.md 3.6 KB
Loading… -
SKILL.md 24.4 KB
--- name: adversary description: "Pre-implementation red-team analysis. Use when a plan is high-risk, critical path, or expensive to reverse. Challenges plans before code is written — finds edge cases, security holes, scalability bottlenecks, error propagation risks, and integration conflicts. Catches flaws at plan time (10x cheaper than post-implementation)." metadata: author: runedev version: "0.5.0" layer: L2 model: opus group: quality tools: "Read, Glob, Grep" emit: oracle.dispatched, oracle.response, oracle.failed listen: agent.stuck, context.preview --- # adversary ## Purpose Pre-implementation adversarial analysis. After a plan is approved but BEFORE code is written, adversary stress-tests the plan across 5 dimensions: edge cases, security, scalability, error propagation, and integration risk. It does NOT fix or redesign — it reports weaknesses so the plan can be hardened before implementation begins. This fills the only gap in the plan-to-ship pipeline: all other quality skills (review, preflight, sentinel) operate AFTER code exists. Catching a flaw in a plan costs minutes; catching it in implementation costs hours. <HARD-GATE> adversary MUST NOT approve a plan without at least one specific challenge per dimension analyzed. A report that says "plan looks solid" without concrete attack vectors is NOT a red-team analysis. Every finding MUST reference the specific plan section, file, or assumption it challenges. </HARD-GATE> ## Triggers - Called by `cook` Phase 2.5 — after plan approved, before Phase 3 (TEST) - `/rune adversary` — manual red-team analysis of any plan or design document - Auto-trigger: when plan files are created in `.rune/` or `docs/plans/` ## Calls (outbound) - `sentinel` (L2): deep security scan when adversary identifies auth/crypto/payment attack vectors in the plan - `perf` (L2): scalability analysis when adversary identifies potential bottleneck patterns - `scout` (L2): find existing code that might conflict with planned changes - `docs-seeker` (L3): verify framework/API assumptions in the plan are correct and current - `hallucination-guard` (L3): verify that APIs, packages, or patterns referenced in the plan actually exist - `context-engine` (L3): (oracle-mode) emit `context.preview` before bundle build to gate token cost - `session-bridge` (L3): (oracle-mode) detach protocol when target model is opus-class for non-blocking dispatch - `council` (L3): Step 0.6 — decorrelated multi-perspective critique for CRITICAL-tier plans (one-way-door decisions, auth/payment/crypto/user-data), mode=critique ## Called By (inbound) - `cook` (L1): Phase 2.5 — after plan approval, before TDD - `plan` (L2): optional post-step for critical features - `team` (L1): when decomposing large tasks, adversary validates the decomposition - `debug` (L2): (oracle-mode) listens to `agent.stuck` from debug after 3 disproved hypotheses - `fix` (L2): (oracle-mode) listens to `agent.stuck` from fix after 2+ failed attempts - User: `/rune adversary` direct invocation ## Cross-Hub Connections - `adversary` ← `cook` — plan produced → adversary challenges it → hardened plan feeds Phase 3 - `adversary` → `sentinel` — security attack vector identified → sentinel validates depth - `adversary` → `perf` — scalability concern raised → perf quantifies the bottleneck - `adversary` → `scout` — integration risk flagged → scout finds affected code - `adversary` → `plan` — CRITICAL findings → plan revises before implementation - `adversary` → `council` — CRITICAL-tier plan (one-way-door decision, or auth/payment/crypto/user-data) → decorrelated critique before red-teaming ## Execution ### Step 0: Load Context 1. Read the plan document (from `.rune/features/<name>/plan.md`, phase file, or user-specified path) 2. Read the requirements document if it exists (`.rune/features/<name>/requirements.md` from BA) 3. Use `scout` to identify existing code files that the plan will touch or depend on 4. Identify the plan's core assumptions — what MUST be true for this plan to work? ### Step 0.5: Steelman + Pick a Reasoning Lens <MUST-READ path="references/reasoning-modes.md" trigger="before challenging any plan — to steelman the thesis and select the reasoning lens per dimension"/> Before attacking, **steelman the plan's core thesis** — restate it in its strongest form (strip weak framing, supply the strongest implied evidence, name what's genuinely good). Attacking a weak paraphrase produces findings the author dismisses with "that's not what I meant." The steelman also seeds the Strength Notes section (Step 6). The 5 dimensions below answer *what* to attack. The 5 **reasoning modes** answer *how*: | Mode | Core question | Reach for when | |------|---------------|----------------| | **Red Team** (default) | "How would someone break/exploit/game this?" | auth, payment, user data, public input, perverse incentives. NB: this is *persona framing* (who attacks, their capability/motivation) — it composes with Step 2's attack-surface inventory, not a duplicate of it | | **Pre-mortem** | "It's 6 months out and this failed — why?" | migrations, infra, architecture, cascading failure | | **Evidence Audit** | "Does the evidence actually support this claim?" | benchmark/"X is faster"/capacity-number justifications | | **Dialectic** | "What's the strongest case for the opposite choice?" | tech/vendor/architecture one-way-door decisions | | **Socratic** | "What is this plan taking for granted?" | vague scope, consensus-driven plans, thin specs | Default to **Red Team**. Switch or add a second lens when the plan's shape calls for it (signal→mode table + mode mechanics in `references/reasoning-modes.md`). State which lens you applied per dimension — don't ask the user to pick. Dialectic's synthesis usually produces concrete remediations (likely HARDEN), but maps to REVISE if it exposes a structural flaw in the chosen approach; Socratic's surfaced assumptions and Pre-mortem's narratives become findings. ### Step 0.6: Decorrelated Multi-Perspective Gathering (council, CRITICAL-tier only) adversary's own single pass is one model's opinion, however rigorous. For the subset of plans where being wrong is expensive enough to justify it, call `rune:council` (mode=critique) before Steps 1-5, instead of (or in addition to) solo analysis. **Trigger — call council when ANY of:** - Step 0.5 selected the **Dialectic** or **Pre-mortem** lens (one-way-door architecture/vendor decisions, irreversible migrations — exactly the cases where a second architecture's blind spots differing from yours has the highest expected value) - The plan touches auth, payment, crypto, or user data at a severity that would otherwise trigger mandatory `sentinel` escalation (Step 2) - The user explicitly asks for a second opinion or "gut check" before committing **Do NOT call council for**: Quick Challenge mode plans, plans under 3 files with no auth/payment/data logic, or routine feature work — council is opt-in overhead, not a default tax on every adversary run (see council's own Sharp Edges: never auto-fires on every plan). **Request**: `{ question: <steelmanned thesis + the specific risk being tested>, mode: "critique", n: 3, diversity: { prefer_model_families: true }, evidence_required: [reasoning, citation] }`. The question MUST be self-contained — council's voices have no access to this conversation. **Consume**: fold `CouncilResult.agreement.consensus_claims` into the relevant dimension's findings below, tagged `[council-verified]`. Fold `agreement.dissent` into that dimension's findings too, but tagged `[council-dissent]` — dissent is information, not something to resolve by picking a side. If `decorrelation: NO_DECORRELATION`, do not describe the result as a second opinion in the report — say plainly that no independent model family was reachable and the additional voices were same-family subagents. ### Step 1: Edge Case Analysis Challenge the plan's handling of boundary conditions. For each input/output/state transition in the plan, ask: - **Empty/zero**: What happens with no data, zero items, empty strings, null users? - **Overflow**: What happens at MAX — 10K items, 1MB payload, 1000 concurrent users? - **Race conditions**: What if two operations happen simultaneously? Can state become inconsistent? - **Partial failure**: What if step 3 of 5 fails? Is there rollback? Or orphaned state? - **Invalid combinations**: What input combinations are technically possible but semantically nonsensical? ``` EDGE_CASE_TEMPLATE: - Scenario: [specific edge case] - Plan assumption: [what the plan assumes] - Attack: [how this breaks] - Impact: [what fails — data loss, crash, wrong result, security breach] - Remediation: [1-sentence fix suggestion] ``` ### Step 2: Security Attack Vectors Analyze the plan for security weaknesses BEFORE any code exists. - **Input trust boundaries**: Where does the plan accept external input? Is validation specified? - **Authentication gaps**: Does the plan assume auth exists? Are there unprotected routes or actions? - **Data exposure**: Could the planned API responses leak sensitive fields? Are there over-fetching risks? - **Privilege escalation**: Can a normal user reach admin functionality through the planned flow? - **Injection surfaces**: Does the plan involve dynamic queries, template rendering, or shell commands? - **Dependency risk**: Does the plan introduce new dependencies? Are they well-maintained and trusted? If any auth, crypto, or payment logic is in the plan: MUST call `rune:sentinel` for deep analysis. ``` SECURITY_TEMPLATE: - Vector: [attack type — OWASP category if applicable] - Entry point: [which part of the plan is vulnerable] - Exploit scenario: [how an attacker would use this] - Severity: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM - Remediation: [what the plan should specify to prevent this] ``` ### Step 3: Scalability Stress Test Project the plan forward — what happens at 10x and 100x scale? - **N+1 queries**: Does the plan describe data fetching that will create N+1 database calls? - **Missing pagination**: Does the plan handle lists without specifying limits? - **Synchronous bottlenecks**: Are there blocking operations in the hot path? - **Cache invalidation**: If caching is planned, what happens when data changes? Stale reads? - **State growth**: Does the plan accumulate state (in-memory, database, file system) without cleanup? - **External service limits**: Does the plan account for rate limits on third-party APIs? If bottleneck patterns detected: call `rune:perf` for quantitative analysis. ``` SCALE_TEMPLATE: - Bottleneck: [what breaks at scale] - Current plan: [what the plan specifies] - At 10x: [what happens] - At 100x: [what happens] - Remediation: [what to add to the plan] ``` ### Step 4: Error Propagation Analysis Trace failure paths through the planned system. - **Cascade failures**: If Service A fails, does the plan specify what happens to B, C, D? - **Retry storms**: Does the plan include retries? Could retries amplify the failure? - **Silent failures**: Are there operations that could fail without anyone knowing? - **Inconsistent state**: If a multi-step operation fails midway, is the data left in a valid state? - **User experience**: When things fail, what does the user see? Is there a degraded mode? - **Recovery path**: After failure + fix, can the system resume? Or does it require manual intervention? ``` ERROR_TEMPLATE: - Failure point: [where in the plan] - Propagation: [what else breaks] - User impact: [what the user experiences] - Recovery: [how to get back to good state] - Missing in plan: [what the plan should specify] ``` ### Step 5: Integration Risk Assessment Check for conflicts with existing code and architecture. - Use `rune:scout` to find all files the plan will modify or depend on - **Breaking changes**: Does the plan modify shared interfaces, types, or APIs that other code depends on? - **Migration gaps**: Does the plan require database migrations? Are they reversible? - **Configuration drift**: Does the plan add new environment variables, feature flags, or config files? - **Test invalidation**: Will existing tests break from the planned changes? - **Deployment ordering**: Does the plan require specific deployment sequence? (DB first, then API, then frontend?) ``` INTEGRATION_TEMPLATE: - Conflict: [what clashes] - Existing code: [file:line that would be affected] - Plan assumption: [what the plan assumes about existing code] - Reality: [what the existing code actually does] - Remediation: [how to resolve the conflict] ``` ### Step 6: Verdict and Report Synthesize all findings into an actionable report. **Before reporting, apply rigor filter:** - Only report findings you can justify with specific references to the plan or codebase - Do NOT report theoretical concerns that require 3+ unlikely conditions to trigger - Prioritize findings that would cause the MOST wasted implementation time if discovered later - Consolidate related findings — "auth is underspecified" not 5 separate auth findings **Verdict logic:** - Any CRITICAL finding → **REVISE** (plan must be updated before Phase 3) - 3+ HIGH findings → **REVISE** - HIGH findings with clear remediations → **HARDEN** (add remediations to plan, then proceed) - Only MEDIUM/LOW findings → **PROCEED** (note findings for implementation awareness) - If council was invoked (Step 0.6) and returned `needs_decision: true` → the verdict cannot be PROCEED regardless of adversary's own findings; surface the unresolved dissent to the user instead of silently picking a side After reporting: - If verdict is REVISE: return to `plan` with findings attached as constraints - If verdict is HARDEN: present remediations to user for plan update - If verdict is PROCEED: pass findings to cook Phase 3 as implementation notes ## Output Format ``` ## Adversary Report: [feature/plan name] - **Plan analyzed**: [path to plan file] - **Dimensions checked**: [which of the 5 were relevant] - **Reasoning lens**: [Red Team | Pre-mortem | Evidence Audit | Dialectic | Socratic — and why] - **Council**: [not invoked | MULTI_FAMILY (N families) | NO_DECORRELATION — same-family subagents only] - **Findings**: [count by severity] - **Verdict**: REVISE | HARDEN | PROCEED ### CRITICAL - [ADV-001] [dimension]: [description with plan reference] - Attack: [how this breaks] - Remediation: [specific fix] ### HIGH - [ADV-002] [dimension]: [description with plan reference] - Attack: [how this breaks] - Remediation: [specific fix] ### MEDIUM - [ADV-003] [dimension]: [description] ### Strength Notes - [what the plan does well — adversary is harsh but fair] ### Verdict [Summary: why REVISE/HARDEN/PROCEED, what to do next] ``` ## Workflow Modes ### Full Red-Team (default) All 5 dimensions analyzed. Used for new features, architectural changes, security-sensitive plans. ### Quick Challenge (for smaller plans) Skip Steps 3-4 (scalability, error propagation). Focus on edge cases, security, and integration. Trigger: plan modifies < 3 files AND no auth/payment/data logic. ### Security-Focused Steps 2 and 5 only (security + integration). Used when `sentinel` requests adversarial pre-analysis. Trigger: plan involves auth, crypto, payment, or user data handling. ### Mode: oracle (v0.2.0) **Triggered by**: `agent.stuck` signal — emitted by `debug` (after 3 disproved hypotheses) or `fix` (after 2+ failed attempts on the same file). **Purpose**: Break confirmation-bias loops. The same agent that read `auth.ts` 3 times has formed a theory it cannot un-form. Oracle-mode dispatches a stateless second-model pass with explicit "no prior context" framing, breaking the semantic loop that `scout`'s zoom-out mode (structural pivot) cannot. **When NOT to use**: - Single hypothesis cycle — escalate only after 3 cycles in `debug` or 2 attempts in `fix` - Trivial single-file bugs — overhead exceeds value - When the user already knows the answer — they're trying to validate, not diagnose **Protocol**: 1. **Pre-bundle gate** — emit `context.preview` to `context-engine` first; abort if action=block 2. **Build context bundle** — see `references/context-bundle-format.md` for exact format 3. **Dispatch** — emit `oracle.dispatched` signal; route via `session-bridge` detach if target model is opus-class (non-blocking). **For genuine architectural independence** (security-critical logic, irreversible ops, a loop the in-mesh model cannot break), prefer a **different-architecture external CLI** (Gemini/Codex) over another Claude instance — a same-family reviewer shares blind spots with the author. Invoke it via the safe transport in `references/cross-model-escalation.md`: explicit per-call user authorization, read-only sandbox, stdin not inline args, binary pre-flight. Never auto-invoke an external CLI in non-interactive contexts — skip and announce. 4. **Wait for response** — synchronous if model is sonnet-class, polled via `.rune/oracle-pending/<id>.json` if opus-class 5. **Validate response** — every claim MUST cite file:line. Strip + warn on uncited claims (`oracle.failed` if all claims uncited) 6. **Emit response** — `oracle.response` carries the validated diagnosis, consumed by `debug`/`fix` to override or refine their current hypothesis **Bundle format** (mandatory regex-validated): ``` [SYSTEM] You are Oracle, a focused one-shot problem solver. You have NO prior context — assume zero project knowledge. Cite file:line for every claim. Reject any claim you cannot ground in the provided files. [USER] <agent stuck after N hypothesis cycles. What is the most likely root cause not yet considered?> ### File 1: <relative/path/to/file.ts> <file content, normalized whitespace, max 4k chars per file> ### File 2: <...> <...> ``` **Hard caps**: - Bundle ≤ 100k tokens (estimated via char count × 0.25) - Per-file ≤ 4k chars (truncate with explicit `... [truncated]` marker) - Max 12 files per bundle (force caller to prune larger sets) **Response contract** — Oracle reply MUST contain: - A primary diagnosis (1-3 sentences) - At least 1 file:line citation per claim - An action recommendation (specific edit, additional file to read, hypothesis to test) Replies failing this contract are rejected — `oracle.failed` emitted, primary agent continues without second opinion. See `references/oracle-mode.md` for the full protocol and integration with `debug`/`fix`. See `references/cross-model-escalation.md` for the safe external-CLI transport when the second opinion should come from a different model architecture. ## Constraints 1. MUST challenge every plan — no rubber-stamping. At minimum, one finding per analyzed dimension 2. MUST NOT modify the plan or write code — adversary is read-only analysis 3. MUST reference specific plan sections or existing code for every finding 4. MUST escalate to sentinel when auth/crypto/payment attack vectors are identified 5. MUST use concrete attack scenarios, not vague warnings ("could be a problem" is NOT a finding) 6. MUST NOT block on MEDIUM/LOW findings — only CRITICAL and HIGH trigger REVISE verdict 7. MUST include Strength Notes — adversary finds weaknesses AND acknowledges what's well-designed 7b. SHOULD steelman the plan's core thesis before challenging it (Step 0.5) — a challenge that only lands against a weaker paraphrase is a weak finding, not a CRITICAL/HIGH. If steelmanning reveals a dimension is genuinely solid, record "No findings after steelman" for that dimension — that satisfies the per-dimension HARD-GATE 8. (oracle-mode) MUST emit `context.preview` BEFORE building the bundle — abort if context-engine action=block 9. (oracle-mode) MUST validate every Oracle reply citation against the provided files — reject uncited claims as `oracle.failed` ## Mesh Gates | Gate | Requires | If Missing | |------|----------|------------| | Plan Gate | A plan document exists (from plan skill or user-provided) | Cannot run — ask for plan first | | Codebase Gate | Access to existing codebase (for integration checks) | Skip Step 5, note in report | ## Sharp Edges | Failure Mode | Severity | Mitigation | |---|---|---| | Over-challenging — nitpicking every line of the plan | HIGH | Rigor filter: only findings you can justify with specific references. Skip theoretical 3+ condition chains | | Strawmanning — attacking a weaker version of the plan than what's written | HIGH | Step 0.5: steelman the thesis first; a challenge that only lands against the weak reading is dropped | | One-lens tunnel vision — red-teaming a decision that needed dialectic/evidence-audit | MEDIUM | Step 0.5 signal→mode table: match the reasoning lens to the plan's shape, state which lens you applied | | False security alarms — flagging secure patterns as vulnerable | HIGH | Call sentinel for validation before reporting security findings as CRITICAL | | Analysis paralysis — too many findings block all progress | MEDIUM | Max 3 CRITICAL + 5 HIGH. If more found, consolidate or prioritize top impact | | Missing context — challenging plan without understanding existing codebase | HIGH | Step 0 MUST load existing code context via scout before challenging | | Scope creep — reviewing existing code quality instead of plan quality | MEDIUM | Adversary reviews THE PLAN, not the codebase. Existing code is context only | | Redundancy with review/preflight — duplicating post-implementation checks | MEDIUM | Adversary operates PRE-implementation only. Never run adversary on existing code | | (oracle-mode) Bundle exceeds token cap — caller didn't prune | HIGH | Caller MUST run `context.preview` first; adversary fails fast with `oracle.failed` instead of silently truncating signal | | (oracle-mode) Oracle reply has no citations — model improvised | CRITICAL | Reject reply with `oracle.failed`. Primary agent continues without second opinion (better than acting on hallucination) | | (oracle-mode) Loop: oracle reply triggers another `agent.stuck` | HIGH | Cap at 1 oracle dispatch per primary-agent stuck cycle. Subsequent stucks must escalate to user | | (cross-model) External CLI invoked without authorization or in non-interactive run | CRITICAL | Per-call user authorization required; non-interactive → skip + announce. See `references/cross-model-escalation.md` | | (cross-model) Bundle interpolated into shell args — embedded `$(...)` executes | CRITICAL | Always pass via stdin from a temp file; read-only sandbox. Never inline `-p "<bundle>"` | | (cross-model) Rubber-stamping the external reviewer's verdict | MEDIUM | Reply is data, not ruling — reconcile against the artifact; classify each finding | | (council) Reporting council output as consensus when decorrelation is NO_DECORRELATION | CRITICAL | Step 0.6 consume rule: report the decorrelation stamp plainly, never imply independent validation from same-family subagents | | (council) Calling council on every plan, not just CRITICAL-tier | MEDIUM | Step 0.6 trigger list is explicit — Dialectic/Pre-mortem lens, auth/payment/crypto/user-data, or explicit user request only | ## Done When - Plan thesis steelmanned before challenging (Step 0.5) — reasoning lens(es) selected and stated - All relevant dimensions analyzed (minimum: edge cases + security + integration) - Every finding references specific plan section or codebase file - Security-sensitive plans escalated to sentinel (or confirmed not security-relevant) - Verdict rendered: REVISE, HARDEN, or PROCEED - Findings formatted for consumption by cook Phase 3 (if PROCEED) or plan (if REVISE) - Strength Notes section acknowledges well-designed aspects of the plan - (oracle-mode) If dispatched: response cited file:line for each claim, or `oracle.failed` emitted with rejection reason - (council) If CRITICAL-tier trigger matched: council invoked before Steps 1-5, its decorrelation stamp reported plainly, consensus/dissent folded into the relevant dimension findings ## Returns | Artifact | Format | Location | |----------|--------|----------| | Adversary Report | Markdown | inline (stdout) | | Threat findings | Structured list (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM) | inline | | Risk matrix per dimension | Table | inline | | Verdict + remediation list | Markdown | inline | | Hardened plan notes (if PROCEED) | Text | passed to cook Phase 3 | ## Cost Profile ~4000-8000 tokens input (plan + codebase context), ~2000-3000 tokens output. Opus model for adversarial depth. Runs once per feature plan — high cost justified by preventing wasted implementation cycles. When Step 0.6 fires (CRITICAL-tier only): add council's cost profile (~1500-4000 tokens per voice × 2-5 voices) — reserved for the minority of plans where being wrong is expensive. **Scope guardrail:** adversary reviews THE PLAN only — never audits existing codebase quality or rewrites code.
Comments (0)
Sign in to join the conversation.
Reviews (0)
No reviews yet.
No comments yet.