Mcpify

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Turn any OpenAPI REST API into an MCP server — so Claude Code, Cursor, and every other MCP client can call your API directly. One command, zero runtime dependencies:

mcpify serve https://your-company.com/openapi.json

# try it right now, nothing installed (uvx pulls from PyPI on demand)
uvx --from mcpify-openapi mcpify list examples/petstore.json --cost

Focused, production-ready, CLI-first: one job (OpenAPI → MCP). Everything else — governance, credentials, token economics, operations — is opt-in and stays out of the way until you need it:

• Safe for agents by default — lazy context budget (--lazy), secret masking (--redact), blast-radius limits (--read-only, per-token RBAC)
• Ready for real deployments — stdio + HTTP/SSE, OAuth2 and split read/write credentials, health probes, audit trail, metrics, multi-API serving, hot reload
• Proven, not promised — 520 tests across twenty-eight suites, a hostile-spec corpus, live-CI checks, zero runtime dependencies

Why you'll like it

From spec to server

• 60 seconds to working — point it at any OpenAPI 3.x spec (file or URL)
• Every operation becomes a first-class MCP tool — input schemas are generated from parameters + requestBody, internal $refs are resolved
• Spec versions diffed from the tool view — mcpify diff old.yaml new.yaml reports added/removed/changed operations with per-change breaking verdicts and a migration guide; --fail-on-breaking is a CI gate
• mcpify doctor — tells you if your spec is agent-friendly before you ship: missing operationIds, missing summaries, instruction-like tool text, overlong descriptions; --probe dials the API once — with your real credential (--auth-env) when you want auth proven end-to-end, and --fail-on-http-error for a strict CI gate
• mcpify try / mcpify mock / mcpify output-server — call the tools without an agent client, serve a schema-shaped fake API for CI, or bake a serve command into a shareable script

Credentials & policy

• Credentials never touch the spec or the model — pulled from your environment at call time; the spec's own security declarations pick the flags (bearer, basic, header, query)
• OAuth2 client-credentials built in — tokens are fetched, cached, refreshed and re-fetched on a mid-flight 401 (RFC 6749, stdlib only); --write-oauth2-* gives non-GET calls a second client identity so reads and writes authenticate as different clients
• Least-privilege by default — --write-auth-env splits the static credential (reads on your read key, writes on a dedicated key), --read-only filters the surface, --deny/--allow hides mutating GETs, per-token RBAC gives each bearer token its own allow/deny scopes
• --redact password,token — values whose key names a secret are masked with *** at every level of every response (error bodies included, case-insensitive); the model never sees them
• Audit trail without content exposure — one JSON line per call: tool, API, status, latency, an argument fingerprint (never raw arguments); --plugin loads your Python module for auth/request/result hooks

Token economics