name: audit-csrf\nversion: 1.2.1\ndescription: |\nCheck CSRF posture across every form and mutation API. Pracht enforces\nsame-origin on mutation API requests by default (api.requireSameOrigin); this\nverifies the default is intact and that cookies, middleware, or tokens cover\nwhat it does not.\nUse for \"audit CSRF\", \"check CSRF protection\", \"are forms safe\", \"review session\nsecurity\".\nallowed-tools:
What the framework guarantees: by default (ApiConfig.requireSameOrigin,\ntrue unless explicitly disabled), the runtime rejects state-changing API\nrequests (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) with a 403 unless the browser signals\nan exact same-origin fetch (Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin) or the request's\nOrigin/Referer matches the request URL's origin. same-site is not\naccepted (sibling subdomains can be attacker-controlled). Requests with no\nbrowser provenance headers at all (curl, server-to-server) are allowed — the\nthreat model is browser-form CSRF, which cannot strip those headers. Page\nroutes reject unsafe methods outright, so the API surface is where mutations\nlive.
The same check also covers WebSocket upgrade requests (any request carrying\nan Upgrade header), even though they are GET. Browsers do not apply CORS to\nWebSocket, so an upgrade is a cross-site-reachable, cookie-carrying request —\ncross-site WebSocket hijacking. requireSameOrigin: false therefore opens\nsockets as well as mutations.
The audit therefore targets the OPT-OUTS and the remaining layers, in order of\npreference:
\nrequireSameOrigin, on by default).SameSite=Lax (or Strict) on session cookies — defense in depth.requireSameOrigin is\ndisabled or for non-/api endpoints.SameSite=None is required.Prerequisites: pracht inspect requires a vite config that registers the\npracht plugin.
Read src/routes.ts (the app manifest) for\ndefineApp({ api: { requireSameOrigin } }). Absent means true (the\ndefault). An explicit requireSameOrigin: false is a top finding (error):\nthe project has opted out of the built-in CSRF protection and MUST show\ncompensating layers (origin-check middleware or token protocol) — demand them\nin the report.
Grep for <Form across src/. For each occurrence:
method (default is get — only post/put/patch/delete are\nCSRF-relevant).action.pracht inspect api --json\nMCP: when the pracht MCP server is registered (pracht dev-mcp), prefer its\ninspect_routes/inspect_api/inspect_build/doctor/verify tools over\nshelling out.
For each API route, read the exported methods. Mutation methods: POST,\nPUT, PATCH, DELETE. Caveat: a default-export handler serves ALL\nmethods but reports methods: [] — check the hasDefaultHandler field\n(requires a current @pracht/cli) or, on older CLIs, grep the handler file\nfor export default. A default handler counts as exposing all mutation\nmethods unless it gates on request.method itself.
Grep API handlers for upgrade, WebSocketPair, and status: 101. A route\nthat returns a handshake is a mutation-equivalent surface: it is reachable\ncross-site, carries cookies, and — once open — is not covered by any\nper-request check. Treat it as a mutation surface in Step 5, and additionally\nverify:
api.middleware). The built-in origin check stops other websites; it\ndoes nothing about an unauthenticated client.Locate cookie issuance — typically src/server/session.ts, src/api/auth/*,\nor anywhere Set-Cookie appears in a response. For every cookie set:
| Attribute | \nRequired posture | \nFailure mode | \n
|---|---|---|
HttpOnly | \nPresent | \nXSS can steal the session | \n
Secure | \nPresent in production | \nSniffable on HTTP | \n
SameSite | \nLax or Strict | \nCross-site sends the cookie | \n
Path | \nSet (usually /) | \nScope confusion | \n
Flag any cookie missing HttpOnly, missing SameSite, or with\nSameSite=None without an accompanying token check. A missing\nMax-Age/Expires is info only — session cookies are legitimate and\nstrictly shorter-lived, not a failure.
A manual origin-check middleware is only needed when requireSameOrigin is\ndisabled, or for mutation endpoints outside /api handled by custom code.\nIf Step 0 found requireSameOrigin: false, look for middleware that:
request.headers.get('origin').url.origin and an allowlist.The canonical shape is in recipes-auth.md (the origin-check.ts example).
Verify the wiring: the middleware name must appear in\ndefineApp({ api: { middleware: [...] } }) — that single global list applies\nto every API route and generated capability HTTP endpoint. There is no\nper-group API middleware, and\npracht inspect api --json output has no middleware field, so the manifest is\nthe only place to check.
Grep for: csrf, csrfToken, hidden form fields with token values, headers\nlike x-csrf-token. Verify both sides of the protocol exist (issue + verify).\nA token issuer with no verifier (or vice versa) is a bug.
For each <Form> and each mutation API, assign a severity (primary) and a\nposture verdict (secondary):
info / Strong — built-in same-origin enforcement intact (default) +\nSameSite=Lax/Strict cookies.info / Adequate — built-in enforcement intact; cookie posture unknown\nor SameSite unset (the runtime check still blocks browser CSRF).warn / Compensated — requireSameOrigin: false but a verified\norigin-check middleware or token protocol covers the surface.warn / Token-only — token verified, cookie has SameSite=None.error / Weak — requireSameOrigin: false and no token / no\norigin-check.warn / Unknown — cookie source not located — investigate.Produce:
\n| Surface | \nFile:Line | \nMethod | \nrequireSameOrigin | \nCookie posture | \nMiddleware/Token? | \nSeverity | \nVerdict | \n
|---|
ApiConfig.requireSameOrigin for the\nbuilt-in guard.<Form> intercepts unsafe-method submissions and\nissues fetch(actionUrl, { method, body: formData }) — not a document\nPOST. Fetch's default credentials mode is same-origin, so a cross-origin\naction gets no cookies at all; same-origin submissions carry cookies and\nthe browser's Sec-Fetch-Site/Origin headers, which the built-in check\nvalidates.SameSite=None, require either a token check or an\norigin-check in addition to the built-in guard — explain why in the report.$ARGUMENTS
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