name: audit-auth\nversion: 1.5.0\ndescription: |\nFind pracht routes that look protected but aren't: missing auth middleware,\nmiddleware that augments context but never gates, client-only checks, and\nunguarded API mutations.\nUse for \"audit auth\", \"check route protection\", \"find unauthenticated routes\",\n\"review middleware coverage\".\nallowed-tools:
\nWhat the framework guarantees: middleware runs wrap-around style — every\nmiddleware must return a Response (the runtime throws if it doesn't), either\nreturn next() to continue the chain or a short-circuit Response to stop it.\nThe redirect() helper from @pracht/core returns a scheme/CRLF-validated\nredirect Response. What the framework does NOT decide is which routes get\nan auth gate — that is app wiring, and this skill audits it.
The pracht auth pattern (see https://pracht.resynapse.dev/docs/recipes/auth):\nmiddleware loads the session onto context.session and short-circuits with a\nredirect when there is no user; loaders downstream read context.session.
@pracht/session is the first-party implementation. Two of its exports map\nstraight onto the Gate/Augmenter classification below — requireSession() is\na Gate, sessionMiddleware() is an Augmenter — so a project using it can be\nclassified from the factory name without reading the middleware body. A\nproject that hand-rolls its session instead is not automatically wrong, but\ncheck it for the things the package handles: an expiry inside the signed\npayload (not only Max-Age), a constant-time or crypto.subtle.verify\nsignature check, HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite, and encryption if the cookie\ncarries anything beyond an opaque id.
Prerequisites: pracht inspect requires a vite config that registers the\npracht plugin.
pracht inspect routes --json\nMCP: when the pracht MCP server is registered (pracht dev-mcp), prefer its\ninspect_routes/inspect_api/inspect_build/doctor/verify tools over\nshelling out.
inspect reports middleware names, not files. Resolve them according to the\napp's router mode, then read each middleware file and classify it:
src/routes.ts (or the\nconfigured manifest), where middleware is registered through\ndefineApp({ middleware: { auth: () => import(\"./middleware/auth.ts\") } }).pagesDir, the generated name\n\"pages\" resolves to the root <pagesDir>/_middleware.ts (or .tsx, .js,\nor .jsx). It applies to every page route and never wraps API routes. There\nis no src/routes.ts manifest to inspect unless the app has ejected. Follow\nimports and re-exports into underscore-reserved helpers such as\n<pagesDir>/_server/auth.ts; Pracht excludes those helpers from client\nroute/shell registries, but a direct import from client code still bundles\nthem and should be treated as a server-code leak.Then classify each resolved middleware module:
\nResponse\n(redirect(\"/login\", { request }), or a 401/403 Response) WITHOUT calling\nnext(); on success, return next(). requireSession() from\n@pracht/session is one.context (or, in older code, on request\nheaders), then always returns next(). Never short-circuits.\nsessionMiddleware() is one.Flag any middleware that writes identity onto args.request.headers: the\nclient controls request headers, so a loader reading x-user-id back out is\ntrusting attacker-supplied input, and the write throws outright on Cloudflare\nWorkers where the incoming Request is immutable. Identity belongs on\ncontext.
The \"Augmenter\" category is the silent killer: it makes loaders think\nauth is enforced because request.headers.get('x-user-id') returns a value\nwhen present, but unauthenticated requests just get null and the loader has\nto handle it. Flag every loader downstream of an Augmenter that doesn't.
A shell loader that redirects anonymous users is not a gate either. A\nclient that already holds the shell's data sends x-pracht-shell-data: <shell>\non route-state requests and the server skips the shell loader, so the route's\ndata comes back without it running. Flag any shell whose loader is the only\nthing between an anonymous request and the routes under it; the gate belongs\nin middleware.
A route is \"expected protected\" if any of:
\nauth/session/requireUser/similar middleware applied.context.session, getSession, or (legacy)\nx-user-id/x-user-email./dashboard*, /admin*,\n/account*, /settings*, /app* (ask the user to confirm the\nconvention if unclear).Build a list of expected-protected routes.
\nFor each expected-protected route:
\npracht inspect routes --json, read the resolved middleware array.augmented-only.render too. A root pages Gate on an\nssg or isg route does not protect the static document per visitor:\ndocument middleware runs during build/revalidation with a sanitized request,\nwhile later route-state requests are separate live requests. Unless an\nindependently verified platform/CDN edge gate protects the document, report\nthe route as error / unprotected-static and recommend ssr/spa for\nsession-gated pages.Mutation endpoints (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) are the highest-impact\ntarget. From pracht inspect api --json:
path, file, methods, and hasDefaultHandler\n(the last requires a current @pracht/cli). A default-export handler\nserves ALL methods but reports methods: [] — treat\nhasDefaultHandler: true as \"every method exposed\". On older CLIs where\nthe field is missing, grep the handler file for export default instead.defineApp({ api: { middleware } }) applies a Gate, OR the handler/capability\nreads and validates a session itself. App-level API middleware wraps generated\ncapability endpoints before capability-specific middleware.Authorization is forwarded. Flag MCP-exposed\ncapabilities whose gate depends on a browser session cookie or a custom\ncredential header that the projection does not carry.context.agent as framework-owned, read-only verified identity. Flag\nmiddleware or capability code that attempts to mutate or replace it instead\nof deriving application authorization state on a separate context field.agent or middleware-added fields through this. The\nframework binds private-field methods to the immutable source receiver, which\ncannot observe fields added on its extensible overlay. Callable fields keep\ntheir own API and arrays keep their brand. Application-defined\nSymbol.toStringTag branding does not affect whether an ordinary context can\nbe overlaid, but immutable native built-ins such as Map and Date fail\nclosed because an overlay cannot preserve their internal slots. Use a fresh\nmutable wrapper when a context needs native built-ins or when receiver-bound\nhelpers depend on request state.invokeCapability(). Direct composition never re-applies app-level API\nmiddleware. Remote MCP additionally re-applies the callee's agentPolicy\nand refuses destructive callees unless the tool being served is itself a\ndestructive capability that already cleared prepare/commit — a request-scoped\ngrant over every destructive callee, private ones included, so audit a\nconfirmed destructive tool's body the way you would a confirmed HTTP\nendpoint's. Private non-destructive capabilities stay composable and rely on\ntheir named middleware for authorization. For\nHTTP/WebMCP composition, flag sensitive callees whose required transport\nauthorization or approval is absent from the composing capability and the\ncallee's named middleware.POST /api/items is not — attacker bypasses the UI entirely.Every module in src/server-islands/ (or pracht({ serverIslandsDir })) is\nreachable at GET /__pracht/server-island with the visitor's cookies, for any\npage whose route or shell lists it in export const serverIslands = [...] —\nwith that route's middleware\n(see https://pracht.resynapse.dev/docs/server-islands#security). Map each\nserver island to the routes that list it, directly or through their shell.
context itself — error: the\nungated route serves it to anyone.{isAdmin && <AdminStats />} behind a loader check, not middleware) —\nerror: the endpoint runs it for anyone who passes that route's middleware.props\n(userId, orderId, accountId) — the caller controls the query string\n(error, IDOR). Identity must come from context.GET (warn).Grep client components for patterns like if (!user) return <Login />. For\neach occurrence, confirm that the data path is also gated server-side.\nClient-side gating without a server gate is purely cosmetic and a common\nsource of \"I see the data flash before redirect\" or worse, leaked data via\nSPA route loaders.
With @pracht/session, check the configuration rather than the mechanics:\ncookie.secrets read from serverEnv (never a literal), the storage built\ninside a function rather than at module scope (Workers env is request-scoped),\na __Host- cookie name unless subdomain sharing is required, and sameSite\nmatching the app's embedding needs. A store is required for logout to\ninvalidate a session anywhere other than the browser that asked.
Then check the login path for session.regenerate(), called after\ncredentials verify and before the user is written onto the session. Its\nabsence is session fixation: with a store, an attacker who can plant a cookie\nfor the host keeps a valid pointer to the session that becomes authenticated.\nFlag it as error/fixation on any store-backed app; on a cookie-only app it\nis info (the cookie carries the sealed data, not a pointer), but still worth\nadding before the app grows a store. Audit every other privilege change the\nsame way — 2FA completion, role assumption, impersonation.
Cross-reference with audit-csrf: the same cookies that authorize the user\nare the CSRF target. Recommend running audit-csrf after this skill.
| Route/API | \nExpected | \nResolved middleware | \nGate present? | \nSeverity | \nVerdict | \n
|---|
Severity is the primary scale; the verdict is a secondary domain label:
\nerror / unprotected — no auth middleware on a route the user expects\nprotected.error / inconsistent — UI route is gated; sibling API is not.error / unprotected-static — a pages-router SSG/ISG document relies on\nrequest/session middleware without an independent per-request edge gate.warn / augmented-only — middleware reads session but never blocks;\nloader must handle null user.warn / client-only — server allows; client hides UI.error / fixation — store-backed session, no regenerate() at login.info / protected — gate confirmed.info / public-by-design — deliberately exposed (login, signup,\nmarketing).pracht inspect routes --json and pracht inspect api --json are the source of truth — group inheritance is already resolved.Response without\ncalling next() on failure), not by filename — projects use auth.ts,\nrequireUser.ts, session.ts, etc.agentPolicy; named middleware remains\nthe authorization seam for private non-destructive composition. Audit events\nidentify every nested attempt with transport: \"server\" and trusted request\nprovenance in via, but observability is not an authorization gate.$ARGUMENTS
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